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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

The international security environment in East Asia
is far from stable and predictable. A variety of states in
the region have long, troubled relationships. The People's
Republic of China (PRC, or China in the following
discussion) is a regional military power with a nuclear
arsenal, and it could contend for global superpower status
in the future. China has a number of security problems
inside and outside of its vast territory; among which their
greatest concern is the issue of the Republic of China (ROC
or Taiwan). Taiwan has an advanced economy and considerable
military forces to counter the threat from the mainland. Its
close relationship with the United States has provided some
power balance with China. The split of the Korean Peninsula
is a legacy of the Cold War. The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), under dictator Kim
Jong Il, has posed the most imminent post-Cold War threat to
the region with its nuclear weapons development and
ballistic missile programs. The Republic of Korea (ROK or
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South Korea), like Taiwan, showed impressive economic growth
in the 1980s and has maintained a stable democratic regime
since the late 1980s.
Following the defeat in World War II, Japan became
known as a peaceful nation and mercantile state. However,
the second largest economy in the world has gradually
developed its role in the international security field and
increased its military power. There exists "a complex,
multidimensional, multilevel security agenda that has forced
changes and has tested Japan's security policy" (Hughes 2004,
3). Japan faces a number of issues with its neighbors:
territorial disputes with China regarding the Senkaku
Islands, with South Korea regarding Takeshima (Dokdo) Island,
and with Russia regarding the Northern Territories;
historical legacies such as Japanese prime ministers'
worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine, reactionary revisions of
Japanese history schoolbooks, and chemical weapons abandoned
by the Japanese military in Chinese territory during World
War II; and economic concerns like the development of energy
and natural resources in the East China Sea.
Above all, the United States, the only global
superpower after the Cold War, is the key actor in the
region. George W. Bush's administration has been engaging in
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an unprecedented "war against terrorism," adopting an
approach to policy which critics condemn as "unilateralism."
The United States has played an irreplaceable role in East
Asia, adopting a hub and spokes type of alliance with Japan,
South Korea, and (informally) Taiwan, unlike the collective
defense organization of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in Europe. In this complex environment,
Japan's defense and security policies have a significant
impact on international relations.
Meanwhile, the development of military technology
through history has been remarkable. In order to fight and
win wars, humans have invented such offensive weapons as
bows and arrows, cannons, gunpowder, tanks, airplanes, and
missiles. The history of war consists of battles between
offense and defense, and we have tried to counter offensive
weapons with shields, fortifications, trenches, anti-tank
weapons and anti-aircraft missiles. Such battles and the
need to win wars have encouraged further advancement of
military technology. Recent developments in information and
communication technology (ICT) have brought about the socalled "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). Some believe
that we can finally "hit a bullet with a bullet" and shoot
down nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles before they hit a
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target. The United States has aggressively pursued the
development of a missile shield for the sake of its own
national security, but there remain many issues to be solved.
Japan has been involved in the US missile defense program
since 1993, and recently announced that it would build its
own missile defense system. However, the development and
deployment of Japan's missile defense could have grave
implications for regional and global security.
This study will focus on Japan's missile defense
program. This issue has been little discussed in public
until recently, compared with the debate on ballistic
missile defense in the United States. This is true even in
the Japanese international security literature. This can
partly be attributed to the fact that Japan has only been
cooperating with the United States on missile defense
research and had not made a decision to deploy its own
missile defense system until recently. But the substantive
shift in Japan's defense strategy should be of great concern.
There have been few scholarly works on the development of
strategic thinking in Japan's policy on defense against
ballistic missile threats. Considering the growing
importance of strategic views on emerging ballistic missile
threats, it is worth exploring the defense and security
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policy of the second largest economy in the world, a major
actor in the regional and world security arena, and the
holder of one of the world's largest and most sophisticated
armed forces.
This is a case study based on qualitative rather than
quantitative analysis. While it refers to theories of
international relations, its basic approach is inductive,
descriptive and discovery oriented. This is a historical and
narrative study of Japan's defense and security policy,
mainly focusing on the modern period following 1945, the
year that Japan was defeated in World War II and began
reconstructing its foreign and defense policy from scratch.
The data sources primarily consist of the following three.
First, this research used official documents from records of
the Kokkai (Diet; Japanese congress), Defense White Papers,
and other official publications by the Self Defense Forces
(SDF), Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), and so forth. Second, the author updated
readings from the wealth of materials continually coming out
on the missile defense issue, including relevant books and
academic journals articles, as well as documents, data, and
other materials available through the Internet. Third, this
research made use of media sources, including editorials,
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op-eds, and reports from leading newspapers in the United
States and Japan.
This research is conducted at three levels of
analysis: systemic, state, and individual. The systemic
level includes international structures, state power
polarity (unipolar or multipolar), international economic
conditions, and the Cold War and post-Cold War environments.
It also involves regional analysis, referring to Japan's
political relations with China, Taiwan, North Korea, South
Korea, and the United States, as well as their economic ties
and interdependence. The state level of analysis examines
institutions (e.g., the government, Diet, constitution),
bureaucratic politics (JDA and MOFA), partisanship (e.g.,
Liberal Democratic Party, Socialist Party), civil-military
relations (SDF), the military-industry complex (e.g.,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), mass media (newspaper,
television, and journals), public opinion, domestic economy
(economic development, recession, and financial resources),
security culture (World War II experiences, anti-nuclear
sentiments, historical legacies, and other philosophical
bases), and national identities. Finally, the individual
level of analysis comprises perceptions of leaders and
elites such as prime ministers, LDP leaders, and JDA
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officers.
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, it
provides an original case study for the international
security field. A number of historical case studies on
Japan's diplomacy and foreign policy can be found; however,
there has been no specific work on the relationships between
missile defense and Japan's grand strategy of national
security, the field to which this study contributes. Second,
this study offers empirical evidence testing theories of
international relations. Realism is a dominant school of
thought in the field of international security, but it has
constantly been attacked from other theoretical perspectives.
While neither supporting nor opposing realism, this study
provides evidence that should contribute to the development
of the field by analyzing an important specific case of
Japan's national security policymaking. Third, this study
presents implications for future defense and security
policies of Japan and the United States, with regard to
long-term grand strategies regarding ballistic missile
threats to both states.
This study is presented in the following four parts:
Chapter two defines strategic concepts and discusses
theoretical perspectives on Japan's national identity.
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Chapter three reviews Japanese security policies after World
War II and illustrates shifts and changes that have occurred.
Chapter four analyzes the missile defense program pursued by
Japan and assesses the goals of its national and
international security policies. Finally, chapter five
offers a proposal for future Japanese policy in the field of
international security.
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Chapter II
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter provides theoretical frameworks for the
following discussion on Japan's missile defense. First,
several key strategic concepts are defined. Here, debates on
the distinction between offense and defense are reviewed,
and a clue to examine the question of whether missile
defense is truly "defensive" or not is provided. Second, the
sense of Japanese identity underlying Japan's defense and
security policy is analyzed from perspectives drawn from
international political theory.

A. Basic Concepts

"Grand strategy" is the broadest and most basic
concept of international security used here. It is generally
defined as "a plan of action that is based on the calculated
relation of means to a larger ends" (International Security
Studies at Yale University). Grand Strategy is usually
thought of as drawing on all the instruments of statecraft
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(military, economic, diplomatic, and so on) for the
advancement of the interests of the state. In other words,
grand strategy is equivalent to a state's overall national
security policy. This study particularly focuses on "the
politico-military and governmental realms" (ibid.), using a
broader concept than a common definition of "military grand
strategy" at the level of movement and use of an entire
nation state at war, which includes calculations of economic
resources, manpower and moral resources, and what is
sometimes called national will.
"Strategy," "disarmament" and "arms control" are the
main components of a grand strategy. In forming a grand
strategy a state defines its interests and formulates
appropriate policies to protect or maximize such interests,
not only in warfare but also in peacetime. It can be said
that this concept is equivalent to policymaking in the
national security field. "Strategy" includes "war-fighting"
and "deterrence." And for the sake of the discussion on
missile defense, this study makes a distinction between
"deterrence by punishment" and "deterrence by denial."
Finally, arms control components, "mutual assured
destruction (MAD)" and "mutual defense emphasis (MDE)," are
examined.
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1. Strategy, Arms Control, and Disarmament
Military strategy is generally defined as the art of
a commander-in-chief in warfare; that is, the art of
projecting and directing overall military movements and
operations of a war or battle. It is usually distinguished
from the narrower concept, tactics, which is the art of
handling forces in battle or in the immediate presence of
the enemy. Strategy involves looking at the war as a whole
and supervising each tactic employed. Moreover, strategy
involves unilateral pursuit of a state's national interest,
including, in many cases, actual military action, and it
does not require negotiation or collaboration with other
states.
Disarmament is a traditional term meaning agreements
and negotiations for reduction or removal of armament.
According to Dictionary of World History, disarmament
"envisages a dramatic reduction in arms in order to achieve
peace" (Larsen and Smith 2005, 1). Disarmament can occur
both on a tactical level and/or on a strategic level. Its
early practices were "largely postconflict impositions of
limitations on military force by the victor upon the
vanquished"; however, "efforts to avoid conflict by
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cooperating to demilitarize likely regions of contact and to
restrict the use of new and destructive technologies" can be
seen as early as the 448 B.C. Athens-Persia Accord (ibid.).
Disarmament can be a voluntary action by a state motivated
by its own strategic interests, financial constraints, or
foreign pressure. But such a unilateral act is a state's own
choice based on self- rather than mutual-interest. Therefore
such unilateral actions belong more to the area of strategy
than disarmament. Disarmament can also take the form of a
cooperative multilateral action among states aimed at easing
international political and military tensions. This study
considers this form of disarmament, as a cooperative
endeavor between states to reduce military forces, with the
alternate objective of eliminating entire categories of
weapons or forces.
Arms control emerged to replace the concept of
disarmament early in the nuclear age. It is defined as any
international limitation of the development, testing,
production, deployment, or use of weapons, usually applying
to specific types of arms or geographic areas. At the same
time, in contrast to disarmament, the goal is the limitation
rather than the complete elimination of particular types of
weapons or forces (Ogawa 1996, 22-27). This approach is
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based on the recognition that in the nuclear age the
abolition of nuclear weapons is unobtainable in the near
term. In terms of nuclear weapons, then, an important
difference between disarmament and arms control is that the
latter gives priority not to reducing or eliminating
military capabilities but to minimizing the likelihood of
war. According to the classic differentiation of Hedley Bull,
"disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments,
while arms control is restraint internationally exercised
upon armaments policy - not only the number of weapons, but
also their character, development, and use" (Larsen and
Smith 2005, 3). Arms control implies some form of
collaboration between generally antagonistic states in areas
of military policy. Moreover, arms control emphasizes not
only reducing the risk of the outbreak of war but also
limiting the destruction in case of war.

2. War-Fighting, Deterrence, and Alliance
These three concepts belong to the larger notion of
strategy. "War-fighting" is distinguished from "deterrence"
in that the former is a wartime value, while the latter is a
peacetime objective. War-fighting is a policy based on
pursuit of a military strategy for the purpose of prevailing
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against the enemy in war. War-fighters "see aggression as a
constant threat" and "are drawn toward a policy based on
unilateral pursuit of a military (war-fighting) strategy"
(Goldfischer 1993, 22). They "claim that all forms of arms
control are unnecessary" because a strong state can "defend
itself through unilateral efforts" (ibid., 4).
According to Glenn Snyder's classic definition,
"Deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking
military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and
risk outweighing his prospective gain" (Snyder in Adams 2004,
404). Deterrence in essence is a coercive strategy, but it
is a "means" to achieve the desirable "end" of peace (Walzer
1977). Deterrence in this study of the nuclear age mainly
refers to nuclear rather than conventional deterrence. It is
logical to see nuclear deterrence as far more powerful than
conventional deterrence, thanks to the "crystal ball
effect," in which the destructive power of nuclear weapons
is so frightful that decision-makers easily understand the
consequences of nuclear war and would never initiate such a
war.
The crucial difference between war-fighting and
deterrence is that the war-fighting approach regards nuclear
weapons as "usable," while nuclear deterrence is based on
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the assumption that they are "unusable." Bernard Brodie is
said to have first put forward the idea of nuclear
deterrence (Iwata 1996, 24). In 1946 Brodie stated, "Thus
far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to
avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose"
(Brodie in Schell 1982, 197). Deterrence is seen as working
"through the punitive threat of irresistible hurt to the
enemy's social and economic structure, rather than through
the prospect of victory in combat" (Freedman 1981, 192-193).
Therefore, "[w]hat is important are the political effects
that nuclear weapons produce, not the physics and chemistry
of the explosion" (Jervis 1988, 83). During the Cold War,
Robert Jervis argued that nuclear deterrence theory "is
probably the most influential school of thought in the
American study of international relations" (Jervis 1979,
289).
Another important definition here is the distinction
between "deterrence by punishment" and "deterrence by
denial." Deterrence by punishment means dissuading the enemy
from initiating attack by threatening it with massive
nuclear retaliation. Deterrence by denial is discouraging
the enemy from attacking through the ability to defend
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against an attack. These two concepts work quite differently
when applied to conventional forces versus nuclear forces.
Hard-nosed nuclear war-fighters may not believe in
the efficacy of any deterrent posture, since they see war as
inevitable. Still, war-fighters generally believe in nuclear
deterrence. A state may deter some range of aggressive
action by an adversary through the credible threat to wage
and prevail in a nuclear war.
Finally, an "alliance" is a military agreement
between two or more countries related to wartime planning,
commitments, or contingencies. This is a bilateral or
multilateral action of states. Military alliances should be
considered an aspect of strategy, because they are largely
an outcome of unilateral quests for fulfilling self-interest
rather than a result of a belief in cooperation as an end in
itself. "Alliances are temporary coalitions of selfinterested states who come together for instrumental reasons
in response to a specific threat" (Wendt 1996, 53).

3. MAD Versus MDE
MAD and MDE are defined within the concept of arms
control. The MAD situation during the Cold War may have been
a mere consequence of power balancing by the superpowers,
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which were unilaterally pursuing both quantitative and
qualitative buildup of their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless,
once the United States and the Soviet Union perceived the
equilibrium of offensive nuclear forces, however illogical
the ultimate number of those weapons was during the 1960s
and 70s, it was based on bilateral or multilateral agreement,
or at least understanding, of a reality. The superpowers
were mutually deterring a deliberate nuclear attack upon
each other by maintaining a clear and unmistakable ability
to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any
aggressor, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. MAD
emphasizes offensive nuclear forces and opposes deployment
of defensive weapons. Its advocates held that allowing a
defensive weapon buildup could lead to a spiraling offensedefense arms race and might even destabilize the superpower
nuclear stalemate. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, which prohibited developing and deploying shields
against offensive ballistic missiles, was the most important
product of a MAD arms control approach. The arms race in
offensive nuclear forces continued after that, but at least
this treaty played a significant role in preventing an arms
race in strategic defensive weapons, which might well have
further accelerated the offensive arms race. MAD advocates

17

argue, "defense is unnecessary because bilateral 'offenseonly' deterrent forces can provide a safe and durable arms
control framework" (Goldfischer 1993, 4). Therefore, MAD is
defined as a school of nuclear arms control because it is
based on bilateral or multilateral agreement or at least
mutual understanding (Ishikawa 2002, 222-223).
In order to pursue their national interests, states
have built up their military capabilities. Defensive weapons,
as well as offensive weapons, may well be developed for the
purpose of war-fighting and deterrence. Nevertheless,
pursuing missile defense shields is not necessarily
unilateral and strategic. If states agree on and cooperate
in building defensive weapons while reducing offensive ones,
tensions among them might be eased, and defenses might help
stabilize strategic relations between states. This approach
has been called mutual defense emphasis (MDE). From this
perspective, "an agreement on limited defense would be seen
as a useful first step toward a more far-reaching defense
transition" (Goldfischer 1993, 4). In the case of the
nuclear age, MDE places emphasis on defensive weapons to
reduce societal damage in an actual nuclear war. It
renounces reliance on offense-dominant nuclear policies,
which are based permanently on threats of mutual
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annihilation in case deterrence should fail. "Mutual defense
emphasis advocates have claimed that their approach can
satisfy the arms control requirements of nuclear parity and
deterrence stability and provide a means to limit damage if
deterrence somehow fails" (ibid., 5; original emphasis).
Both MAD and MDE affirm the importance of deterrence.
On the one hand, MAD obviously bases its logic upon massive
retaliatory nuclear forces, which would be launched in case
of a first strike by the enemy. This is an arms control
policy of "deterrence by punishment." On the other hand, a
missile defense system may dissuade the enemy from attacking
by offering the prospect that the attack will be rendered
ineffective. This is a policy of "deterrence by denial."
These two concepts in a nuclear world connote a striking
difference. The former indicates that in case of deterrence
failure, a massive retaliatory nuclear assault would result.
Disastrous nuclear annihilation would occur even if the
enemy had only a small number of nuclear weapons. The latter
leaves the possibility that a state could defend itself even
if deterrence should fail and the enemy initiate a first
strike with or without nuclear weapons. This is the exact
point on which MDE advocates criticize MAD as a form of
"madness" which has forced us to live with tens of thousands
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of nuclear weapons that could destroy the whole world many
times over.

4. Offense versus Defense
The issue of the offense-defense distinction has been
debated for many years. Some scholars and politicians
contend that the differentiation does not matter in
international politics, while others argue that it is of
critical importance. The author considers the distinction
important and believes it should have a crucial impact on
missile defense debates. The so-called "offense-defense
theory" is that "the character of international politics is
influenced by whether offensive military operations are easy
or difficult" (Lynn-Jones 2004, xi). When offense has the
advantage over defense, war and conflict will become more
likely; when defense has the advantage, peace and
cooperation will be more probable.
Offense involves breaking into the enemy's territory,
and offensive forces are those that enable invasion from the
land, air or sea. Karen Ruth Adams defines offense as
follows: "a state uses force to attack another state's
military or nonmilitary assets to conquer its territory or
compel compliance with policy directives (impose its will on
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the other state)" (Adams 2004, 408). Looking at the other
side of the coin, according to Jervis' classic definition,
"the essence of defense is keeping the other side out of
your territory. A purely defensive weapon is one that can do
this without being able to penetrate the enemy's land"
(Jervis 1978, 39).
However, the distinction between offense and defense
is complex, particularly because many scholars argue from
not only technological but also political points of view.
Some weapons are easy to distinguish: strategic bombers,
ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers that facilitate
invasion of distant territories are clearly offensive;
fortifications, trenches and landmines that have no mobility
are purely defensive (Lieber 2000, 78-79). Nevertheless,
many weapons are in the gray zone. Particular weapons can be
both offensive and defensive on the battlefield, as well as
in larger strategic environments. Tanks are usually regarded
as offensive, but in Japan this is not the case. It
possesses a sizable number of sophisticated tanks for the
purpose of defense, since the country is surrounded by the
sea and cannot invade other states with tanks. On the
contrary, landmines and machine guns are often called
defensive, but when used in the enemy's territory for a
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strategic purpose, they become offensive. An ostensibly
defensive missile shield can be regarded as offensive when
the missile defense capability is considered in combination
with an offensive nuclear first-strike capability. If the
United States develops a reliable missile defense system, it
will pose a tremendous threat to other nuclear states
because the United States will be able to launch a first
nuclear strike without fear of retaliatory nuclear attack.
In the case of possible conflict in East Asia, even the
missile defense capability of Japan, the country with no
offensive capability, can be viewed as offensive, when
combined with the massive offensive forces of the United
States, Japan's most powerful and reliable ally.
A majority of scholars in the offense-defense debate
argue that nuclear weapons favor defense. Considering the
vast power of nuclear weapons, building and maintaining a
second-strike capability can be attained at relatively
little cost for states, and conflict among nuclear states
becomes "virtually impossible" (Van Evera 1998, 255).
"Defense is impossible - a triumph not of offense, but of
deterrence" (Jervis 1978, 34). However, the author disagrees.
Nuclear deterrence should be distinguished from the
conventional offense-defense debate, since it is a situation
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of stalemate in which states faces each other with massively
destructive and "offensive" bombers and ballistic missiles
with nuclear warheads. Besides, the argument that includes
deterrence as a special form of defense is dangerous and
misleading, because it could promote proliferation of
nuclear weapons among states claiming their pursuit of
nuclear capability is for "defensive" purposes.
The distinction between offense and defense can also
be characterized in terms of perception: "the real state of
offensive or defensive bias may be less important than the
perceived bias" (Quester 2003, ix-x; original emphasis). As
Jervis argues, when the distinction is possible and defense
has the advantage, the perceived threat is minimal and
relations between states should be stable. However, when
offense has the advantage and the distinction is not clear,
the perceived threat can be grave and that may lead to a
preemptive or preventive first strike by a state (Jervis
1978).
Strategists tend to reject the distinction between
offense and defense. The only thing that matters is whether
or not particular weapons systems favor unilateral advantage
for their country. It does not matter if such systems are
offensive or defensive. Arms controllers and disarmament
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advocates are inclined to embrace the distinction in order
to diminish risks and costs for all states concerned
(Goldfischer 1993, 26). As discussed earlier, emphasis on
offense or defense separates MAD advocates from MDE
supporters. Disarmament proponents in general believe that
both offensive and defensive weapons must be reduced, though
some may emphasize more on disarmament of offensive weapons
than defensive. The 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference
sought such a ban on arms specifically for offensive
operations. On balance, the distinction is possible and
essential, when we carefully look at various factors such as
military technology and doctrine, geography, national social
structure, and diplomatic arrangements. The author will
adopt this perspective and make a clear distinction between
offense and defense. Chapter four will discuss whether and
how missile defense issues fall within this argument.
The preceding discussion of strategic terms is
summarized in Figure 1.
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B. Realism and Pacifism in the Japanese Identity

"Identity" refers to how people define themselves "in
terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values,
customs, institutions. They identify with cultural groups:
tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations and,
at the broadest level, civilizations" (Huntington 2001, 131).
Identity "is a central aspect of the human experience" and
"should be of vital concern to those interested in security
issues" (Wyn Jones 1999, 114). Before August 15, 1945, the
Japanese homeland had never been invaded, or occupied by
another country. Therefore, for Japan, the defeat in the
Pacific War and the following occupation by the United
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States brought not only the total disruption of the
fundamental character of the state but also the loss of the
nation's sense of identity as the leader of Eastern
civilization (Kato 2002). Under the occupation, the United
States eliminated Japanese militarism completely. With
various democratization measures, it forced the Japanese to
Americanize as well as to distance themselves from other
Asian states, while establishing stronger ties with Western
civilization. This was the Japanese people's first
experience with drastic and direct influence from the
outside world.
After the war, two different national identities with
regard to national and international security emerged in
Japan: a "realist identity" and a "pacifist identity."
Clashes between these "dual identities" (Soeya 1998) have
played a role in various behind-the-scene debates in Japan's
postwar political history. These will be described in detail
in chapter three. It would not be accurate to describe these
debates as clashes of ideologies (e.g., conservative versus
radical, liberal versus communist, or right wing versus left
wing), since at bottom, there has clearly been a common
perception that the most important thing is to secure the
country and its people. The issue that emerges from this
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perception, namely, "what should be done to secure the
country and how should it be achieved," fundamentally
separates these two identities. Competition between the dual
identities has swung Japanese minds from one identity to the
other at a national level as well as at regional, local and
individual levels.

1. The Realist Identity
a. Basic Features
The realist identity considers the balance of
material forces as critical to national security, including
the military balance among states, and economic strength as
the basis of military power. Soon after the end of the
Second World War, the Cold War between the United States and
the Soviet Union emerged and fated the Asia-Pacific region
to further conflicts. Japan, under occupation by the United
States, became a part of the western alliance, even after
its independence was restored. Facing threats from Communist
China and North Korea, as well as from Soviet forces in the
Far East, calls for rearmament, from a strategic point of
view, grew louder in Japan. Recognizing the reality of the
Cold War, the realist camp concluded that Japan's security
and prosperity should be achieved based on a military
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alliance with the United States. After the end of the Cold
War, the realist identity retained its focus on military,
political and economic ties with the United States, and it
aimed at international contribution only within the
framework of this relationship, while promoting
modernization of Japan's defense capability.

b. Theoretical Background
The basis of the realist identity is the
international political theory of "realism," the mainstream
school of thought in the field of international security.
Realists consider the world to be in a state of anarchy,
where there is no governing body above the sovereignty of
individual states. In the international environment, unlike
within the state, there are neither legislative functions
that create order, nor administrative mechanisms that
maintain order. In addition, traditional international laws
have no actual authority over sovereign states, and the
exercise of international law depends heavily on the will of
each state. Given the absence of a world government, a state
is able to act as it wishes in pursuit of its national
interests; therefore, clashes of interest among states are
inevitable. From a realist viewpoint, relations among states
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are essentially conflictual. Realists focus on power
relations among states, and they take a pessimistic view of
international cooperation. A state seeks to maximize its
national power to ensure survival, or may regard the
maximization of national power itself as a goal. The state
may thus do whatever it takes to achieve this goal. In
history, states have invaded other states and fought wars in
pursuit of national power goals.
Nevertheless, "realism" is not a monolithic view.
Depending on theoretical assumptions and policy implications,
one can classify a variety of "realisms," such as classical
realism, neo-realism, neo-classical realism, and so on
(Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Among these, the most
influential theory of realism in the United States over the
past three decades has been that of Kenneth Waltz, whose
perspective has been labeled "neorealism." Neorealism is
based on four important assumptions. First, the state is the
principal actor and the most important unit to analyze.
Actors other than states, such as international
organizations, groups or individuals, which would include
even the United Nations and international terrorist groups,
are considered far less significant. Second, the state is
looked on as a unitary actor. In the domestic decision-
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making process there are various perspectives among actors
such as political leaders, bureaucrats, public opinion,
media, and so on. Nonetheless, by means of reconciliation,
coordination, and compromise, a government provides one
unified voice in the end. The state is assumed to act as if
it were an individual, independent actor. Third, the state
is regarded as essentially a rational actor. That is, the
state logically assesses its goal, considers all the means
and options to achieve it, analyzes every possibility to
attain the goal with that selected means, and calculates
cost-effect ratio. And then the state makes policy decisions
to maximize its national interests. Fourth, realists regard
national security as the most important issue in the
international arena. Hans Morgenthau, the most influential
realist scholar during much of the Cold War era, argued that
issues such as defense of a state, international conflict
and war were a matter of "high politics," while economic and
social issues such as trade and finance were in the less
important realm of "low politics" (Morgenthau 1985).
Based on the above assumptions, from the realist
point of view the world is often compared to a "billiard"
table. On the table (the globe), hard balls (the sovereign
states) keep hitting one another. But the sizes of the balls
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are not equal, and a larger ball (a state with more power)
will smash and crush smaller ones. This relation among
states is Thomas Hobbs's well-known "war of all against all"
in international relations. In this "state of nature," wars
among states are inescapable. Human history repeats itself,
and therefore it is a history of war. Furthermore, out of
this theory arises "alliance theory." According to one
strand of alliance theory, when one state or a group of
states holds superior power and poses a threat of invasion
to others, the weaker states may unite to confront the
threat. A frequently cited example is the situation in
Europe before the First World War. The confrontation between
the east and west blocs during the Cold War is another
instance. Balance of power theory and alliance theory are
two core theories of the realist school of thought; however,
some realists deny the "balancing" theory, and prefer the
"bandwagoning" argument that weaker states go along with a
strong state or a group of states led by a strong one. They
observe this "bandwagoning" of weaker states with great
powers as particularly prevalent in recent international
politics (Walt 1992). For instance, in 1990, when Iraq
invaded Kuwait, the neighboring Arab states took sides with
the United States, instead of balancing against the US.
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c. Realism and International Security
The concept of national security is, in the narrowest
sense, focused on maintaining a nation's territory and
society (Nagahisa 1998). To put it more concretely, national
security is how "militarily a state protects its own
territory, independence, lives of the population, and
property from military invasion from outside enemies"
(Kamiya 1998, 4). A state must defend its material resources
by physical means. This perspective is consistent with the
realists' worldview in which only material and military
factors matter to national security. For realists, the
international arena is a world filled with suspicion and
unpredictability, in which other states' intentions and
actions are uncertain (Waltz 1979). There is no trust among
states, and it is dangerous to let one's national security
depend on others. A state cannot expect others to help in a
crisis of survival. It is a system of self-help. Realism is
based on the zero-sum assumption in which a gain for one
state means a loss for others, and the national interest is
considered in such relative terms. Gains in the national
interest are a competitive victory, and states tend to take
advantage by deceiving others. Under the self-help system,
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states have to prepare for the worst-case scenario in which
the enemy's intention is to attack. Therefore, states fall
into a spiraling competition in military build-up. This
situation is the so-called "security dilemma."
Increasing the power of one state means decreasing
power of another in relative terms. Therefore, international
relations are necessarily based on confrontation and
competition over power among states. A state tries to
achieve its security through expanding war-fighting
capabilities and developing the economic strength to build
them up. Naturally, the possession of nuclear weapons, the
weapon of ultimate mass destruction, makes sense from this
perspective. Even regarding Japan, realists have been
clearly predicting its nuclear armament since the early
1970s, when Japan's miraculous economic growth thrust it
onto the stage as one of the world's leading economic powers
(Khan 1970; Waltz 1993; Waltz 2000). Even now the smoldering
argument regarding Japan's nuclear armament is rooted in the
realist perspective.

d. Realism and International Cooperation
Some realists are more conscious of international
organizations or institutions than others; however, for them
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the roles of such actors are limited by states' national
interests and their efforts to survive and maximize their
power. Realists do not see global interdependence as
necessarily favorable, for relationships between dependent
states based not on equality but on dominance and obedience.
From a realist position, Joseph Grieco emphasizes
that international institutions and regimes affect the
prospects of cooperation only marginally, because of two
significant barriers to state cooperation: concerns about
"cheating" and "relative gains" (Grieco 1988). Grieco
contends that realists provide a more comprehensive theory
of the issue of cooperation than liberalists. He points out
that liberalists consider only "absolute gains" from
cooperation and the worst possible outcome is simply a lost
opportunity. Realist theory explores how cooperation might
result in lost security. As Jack Donnelly points out, a
regime requires limited renunciation of sovereign national
authority in an issue-area in order to achieve mutual
benefits from cooperation (Donnelly 1986). From the realist
perspective, it is very difficult for a state to give up its
own rights, even partially, in a self-help system.
Realists also argue that international regimes matter
to the extent that they benefit the national interest of
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states. The theory of hegemonic stability links regime
creation and maintenance with the existence of a dominant
power, and the weakening of regimes with a waning hegemony.
John Mearsheimer contends that the most powerful states in
the system create and shape institutions so that they can
maintain their share of world power, or even increase it.
Institutions are mere "arenas" for acting out power
relationships (Mearsheimer 1995). For realists, as Stephen
Haggard and Beth Simmons maintain, regimes require no formal
international commitments or institutional machinery to
function (Haggard and Simmons 1987). Some examples have been
cited. In the nineteenth century Britain controlled
international finance with the gold standard system, and it
formed the international order, the so-called "Pax
Britanica." In the twentieth century, particularly after the
Second World War under the Bretton Woods system, the United
States took over Britain's position and dominated the world
economy (at least the western hemisphere), the so-called
"Pax Americana." As a regional case, the United States has
dominated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A
strong argument can be made that the current phenomenon of
globalization is fundamentally based on the power of the US
to sustain a system based on US-style capitalism and free
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market economy. For realists, international organizations
and regimes are only "dependent variables," which are
subordinate to the primary and independent variable of
national interest.

e. Offensive Realism versus Defensive Realism
Naturally, the realist strand within the Japanese
national identity would be inclined to adopt a "strategy"
rather than "arms control" or "disarmament." In a world of
anarchy and self-help, a state can rely only on its own
material power. States act unilaterally and only form
alliances and/or cooperate with other states so far as the
cooperation serves their national interests.
Nonetheless, in terms of "strategy" versus "arms
control," one can find serious differences among realists
that can gravely affect the debate on missile defense.
Although both assume the anarchical nature of the world, the
two schools of realism - offensive realism and defensive
realism - diverge in explaining states' behavior. This
division "represents a fundamental divergence on the
implications of anarchy" (Taliaferro 2001, 134). Offensive
realists, such as John Mearsheimer, see the world of anarchy
as a strong incentive for state expansion. The goal of the
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state is to increase its power and security, which is prone
to provoke conflict among states. Glenn Snyder calls such
states "maximizers," which seek power and security
maximization through struggle to become a hegemon (Snyder
2002, 154). Offensive realists recognize little security
dilemma among states, nor the difference between offense and
defense. As Snyder quoted Mearsheimer in his book, The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), "The best defense is
a good offense" (ibid., 156).
Defensive realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, regard
anarchy as an incentive for state expansion, but under
certain conditions. That is, a state will seek expansion and
wage war when it feels threatened and insecure. Basically,
the state will try to maintain the existing order and
balance of power. According to Snyder, such states are
"satisfiers," which seek to preserve power and status quo,
so long as they can maintain security and survival (ibid.).
One of the leading defensive realists, Robert Jervis, sees
good chances here for arms control and even disarmament. As
discussed earlier, Jervis argues that when the distinction
between offense and defense is possible, and when defense
has the advantage, the perceived threat is minimal and
relations between states can be stable (Jervis 1978).
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To put it differently, while offensive realists
exclusively consider states' capabilities, defensive
realists take perceptions of state leaders into account.
Offensive realists would see little room for diplomacy and
negotiation, and their policy for the state is likely a
unilateral "strategy." But defensive realists differentiate
offensive and defensive weapons and postures and look upon
"arms control" approaches as a useful alternative. Missile
defense systems can play a role in arms control approaches
from defensive realist perspectives.

2. The Pacifist Identity
Pacifism in the Japanese national identity contrasts
with realism. Pacifists seek peace by nonviolent and
diplomatic approaches instead of military capability and
coercion. They highly regard ideational factors such as laws,
institutions, norms, culture, history, national character,
domestic politics, ideas, preferences and values. This type
of national identity emerged from the self-questioning
resulting from the destructive war and from the pacifist
ideal of making postwar Japan a model peaceful state. With
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan as its core, the
Japanese pledged never again to cause the horrors of war.

38

They renounced war and military capability and sought to
construct a non-nuclear, peaceful country. This led to the
idea of entrusting national security to the United Nations.
During the Cold War era, the pacifist identity was seen in
Japan's omni-directional diplomacy that aimed for
international security based on broad international
cooperation, as well as on people's desire for unarmed
neutrality, protection of the Constitution, and opposition
to the US-Japan Security Treaty as a military alliance.
After the end of the Cold War, the pacifist identity has
been seen through non-military contributions to
international society within pluralistic frameworks such as
the United Nations.
The pacifist identity of the Japanese is easily
linked with the multilateral approaches of "arms control"
and "disarmament" in contrast with a unilateral "strategy,"
toward which the realist identity should tend to orient
itself.

3. Cognitive Approach to Explaining the Japanese Identity
In the field of international security studies,
realism has been the mainstream approach. As mentioned above,
realists adopt a state-centric approach. They assume
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rationality of a state and primarily analyze observable
material factors. As a result, strictly speaking, realism
theoretically lacks analyses of any ideational factors such
as identity. The state's rational decisions issue from a
"black box," and realists deal with national interests and
identities as "given." However, this study defines the
Japanese realist identity as the will or self-image of
people who "intend" to secure the country based on the
realist worldview. The Japanese people define themselves
through the realist and the pacifist identities in
considering national security issues. The existence of the
dual identity in Japan is an ontological observation. The
next question is where these identities come from, and
whether or not, or when and how, these identities have been
formed and have changed in the course of history. This issue
can be explored through a school of thought, called
cognitivism.
In the 1980s both realism and liberalism pointed to a
new stage in rationalist approaches. In realism Kenneth
Waltz rigidly excluded human and domestic elements and
established "neorealism," which analyzes international
relations from deductive theory building, referring to
microeconomics (Waltz 1979; 1986). A sovereign state, like
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an enterprise, is regarded as a unitary rational actor,
which pursues the maximizing of its own interests. State
activities are constrained by the structure of the anarchic
international political "system," just as enterprise
activities are constrained by the structure of the market.
Hence neorealism is also called "structural realism," which
has a deterministic view unconcerned with any individual
human factor. In liberalism, the so-called "neoliberalism"
or "liberal institutionalism" made a significant theoretical
compromise with realism. While emphasizing absolute gain
from cooperation among states and the importance of
international organizations and regimes, Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye admitted and even stressed the value of power
relations among states based on the coercive force of
military capability (Keohane and Nye 1977). Most essential
was their acknowledgement that a state is a rational actor,
and the principal actor in international politics.
Consequently, neorealism and neoliberalism came to largely
converge as a rationalist approach, sharing a similar view
on the following three points: International relations are
in a state of anarchy. A sovereign state is the principal
actor in international politics. And a state is a unitary
rational actor that egoistically maximizes its national
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interest. What separates them is the difference in
"relative" versus "absolute" gains of a state through
international cooperation.
Cognitivism is a reflective approach to international
issues, which opposes rationalist approaches. Cognitivism is
a broad concept framed by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger,
which includes social constructivism, critical theory, and
postmodernism. It emerged in the latter half of 1980s and
has significantly influenced international political studies,
including the field of international security. Various
schools of thought, with critical differences, constitute
cognitivism, but they share a central feature: an
epistemological view on international affairs. This approach
is radically different from standard scientific approaches
such as behaviorism and positivism, in that moral judgments
are given power to explain events, facts, and figures.
Cognitivists see epistemic and perceptive limitations of
material structures and regard international order as a
construction of various actors. Cognitivist analyses are
aimed at finding truth by decomposing, dismantling and
deconstructing concepts that constitute the order
(Hasenclever et al. 1997).
Cognitivists, like classic idealists and liberalists,
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make a point of analyzing not only nation states but also
actors like bureaucrats, political parties and individual
decision-makers. They also emphasize the importance of
ideational factors such as personalities, perceptions of
national leaders, ideologies, norms, cultures, values,
beliefs, ideas, knowledge, and identities. Moreover, they
argue that foreign policies of a state result from domestic
politics, and domestic political movements often echo
international relations; hence dynamic aspects are
significant.
Analytical factors prioritized by a cognitivist
approach are dynamic knowledge building, communication and
cooperation among actors, and roots and processes of
national interest formation. They focus on the origins of
interests as perceived by states and on the role of causal
and normative ideas. Ideational factors can alter actor
interests. National interests are not a given, as realists
argue, and interests cannot be completely deduced from power
and situational constraints. Interests are socially formed
and constructed. Cognition of the national interest and even
apparently tangible military and political power depends on
individual and societal knowledge, upon which these
interests and forms of power are based. Both structures and
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ideas are important and influence one another in
construction and transformation of the national interest.
The international and domestic political structures restrict
actors through subjective apprehension of the actors, and
the formation, reconstruction, and change of these
structures are influenced by the practices of the actors.
Linking the structures and actors is the so-called
intersubjective meaning, a structure or framework that
formulates the meaning that the actors interpret and through
which they understand one another (Wendt 1992).
Cognitivists argue that states are not utility
maximizers but role-players in international relations.
Growing interdependence means that groups at the domestic
level increasingly have "regime interests" and continually
reconsider their self-interests and priorities. Likewise,
national interests are conditioned by historical limitations,
ideologies of actors, interpretative frameworks, and agreed
and shared knowledge. The learning processes of actors also
further shape national interests. Then cognition,
misconception and information building processes reveal
merits and demerits of particular behaviors of states and
influence cooperative relationships among and within states.
For cognitivists, international organizations and regimes
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are key factors in international politics. Once they are
established, international regimes acquire their own will,
independent of the international structure or national
interests and may possess enough power to change states'
self-interests and power relations. Therefore, international
cooperation and regimes, for cognitivists, are "independent
variables" that can impact international politics.
Among cognitivists, the most explicit on identity
issues in the international security field are scholars of
social constructivism. Peter Katzenstein argues that
international and domestic environments shape state
identities. The international society of states shapes
varying state identities by virtue of recognizing their
legitimacy and admitting them to international organizations
whose membership is often restricted. And the state is a
social actor, embedded in the social rules and conventions
that constitute its identity and the reasons for the
interests that motivate actors (Katzenstein 1996). Alexander
Wendt contends that states act differently toward friends
and enemies because enemies are threatening and friends are
not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient
to tell us who is a friend and who is an enemy. The
distribution of power always affects states' calculations,
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but how it does so depends on intersubjective understandings
and expectations, and on the "distribution of knowledge,"
which constitutes their conceptions of self and others.
According to Wendt, there are three types of international
security system: competitive, individualistic, and
cooperative, depending on states' negative, indifferent or
positive stance toward each other's security (Wendt 1992).
One example of social constructivism applied to the
field of international security is a critique of nuclear
deterrence theory, one of the core theories in traditional
international security studies. Nuclear weapons have not
been used in warfare since the United States dropped atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The realist
account of the so-called principle of no-first use of
nuclear weapons, which we can call a sort of international
regime, is the following: The United States and the Soviet
Union possessed enough second-strike nuclear capability that
they could survive a first strike and retaliate. The reason
why all-out nuclear war has not happened is that a first
strike with nuclear weapons would mean immediate national
suicide. The overwhelming destructive capability of massive
nuclear forces compelled them to eliminate a nuclear first
strike from their rational options and created a situation
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in which the superpowers deter each other. This is the logic
of MAD. However, constructivists point out that a
significant normative element must be taken into account in
explaining why these weapons have remained unused. Even
before the nuclear balance between the superpowers emerged,
when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons,
the norm of no-first use already existed. The reason why
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the first and the last places
where bombs were actually dropped comes from the "taboo" of
using nuclear weapons, which is an ideational factor caused
by our recognition of and our will against the
indiscriminate and inhumane nature of weapons of massive
destruction (WMD) (Price and Tannenwald 1996). Years have
passed since the Cold War ended, and the nuclear balance
between the United States and other states has gone. From a
constructivist point of view, nuclear weapons will never be
used, even without a MAD situation, as long as we are
conscious that nuclear weapons must not be used, and as long
as the "taboo" persists.
The author takes the position that identity is
critically important in international politics. This is
particularly true in analyzing Japan's defense policymaking
and debates on missile defense. The struggle between the
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"realist" and "pacifist" national identities has shaped
defense and security policy in postwar Japan. The two
identities have developed through political processes in
legislation, administration and judicature, claims of
political parties, voices of political leaders, journalists
and critics, and public opinion, and have been repeatedly
expressed in the mass media. The dual identity of the
Japanese is subject to change. The people in fact have
shifted from one to the other in the course of history. They
will certainly change in the future also. From this point of
view, postwar Japanese national security policy will be
discussed in the subsequent chapter.
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Chapter III
JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

This chapter will review Japan's post World War II
defense and security policy, based on the Japanese dual
national identity argument defined and discussed in the
previous chapter. This chapter will be divided into four
periods: from 1945 to 1960, from 1961 to 1980, from 1981 to
1990, and from 1991 to the present.

A. From Defeat to Re-Armament (1945-60)

The total defeat in the Pacific War, following the
two atomic bomb attacks and the Soviet invasion, represented
the first complete wartime defeat in Japanese history. It
also represented the loss of Japanese national identity as
the agent of hegemony in Asia, an identity built around
Japanese militarism and imperialism. Under occupation by the
United States, Japan confronted drastic changes in every
respect. Its labor system was democratized, zaibatsu
(financial cliques) were dismantled, and farmlands were
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redistributed. Most importantly, the United States
eliminated Japanese militarism completely. It is pointed out
that the most significant gift that the United States
provided Japan was "neither democracy nor economic
assistance, but the American willingness to take over the
costs and risks of Japanese security" (Scalapino 1992, 214).
At the time, Japan's rearmament was not necessary for the
western alliance, because US nuclear capability was
considered far beyond that of its Eastern counterpart.
Therefore, the United States did not have to strengthen
regional conventional forces in the Far East. And in Japan,
reflection on their experience during World War II led
people to embrace pacifism.

1. The Defeat and the Constitution
To begin with, the core of postwar Japanese national
identity was the Constitution of Japan, taking effect in May
1947. Article 9 of the Constitution renounced war and
military capability, and this became a central value of the
Japanese, who had just made a fresh start as a peace-loving
nation. Article 9 states as follows:
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international
peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of
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settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.
A pacifist identity grew out of this and developed into
demands for Japan's diplomatic neutralism or a position
based on unarmed neutrality. The Japanese people realized
that "military capability was not at all useful for its
national security and had even ruined the nation" through
the devastating defeat (Tanaka 1997, 16). In reality, Japan,
under occupation, was forced to put its own national
security into American hands, but at the same time, most
Japanese people tended to shy away from discussing national
security issues. All they could do was try to survive the
time of postwar poverty and ruin.
As for Article 9, the final draft, written by the
General Headquarters (GHQ), was a relaxation of the first
draft's "Macarthur Principles" that directed Japan to
completely renounce any kind of war. Its purpose was to give
Japan the right of self-defense. That is to say, Japan
should renounce "war as a means for conflict resolution,"
but it should permit "war as a means for self-defense."
However, Shigeru Yoshida, then prime minister of Japan,
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noting that most recent wars had been started in the name of
self-defense, had a different idea. His interpretation of
Article 9 was that "by prohibiting all armaments and the
right of belligerency, it renounced war even as an exercise
of the right of self-defense" (ibid., 28). The overwhelming
majority of the Japanese accepted his interpretation, though
there existed some arguments for the right of self-defense.
Yoshida envisioned postwar international security
being maintained through peacekeeping activities under the
leadership of the United Nations. He thought that this was
the best way to maintain Japan's security without its own
armament. Nevertheless, the Cold War between the United
States and the Soviet Union that emerged soon after the end
of World War II forced the United States to shift its policy
toward Japan largely from constructing a de-militarized
country to making it a bulwark of democracy against the
communist bloc in the Far East. World-shaking events in
1948-49, such as the Berlin Crisis, the Soviets' successful
nuclear test, and the victory of communism in China and
subsequent establishment of the People's Republic changed
the whole situation in the region. The United Nations
Security Council became a battleground between the two
superpowers, and the security system that Japan envisioned
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was paralyzed. As with NATO in Europe, Japanese military
forces needed to be re-established by the United States in
order to contain communist power. The US interpretation of
the Japanese Constitution changed as well. On the issue of
the right of self-defense, General Macarthur's statement on
1 January 1950 said: "It is absolutely impossible to
interpret Article 9 as completely denying the inviolable
right of self-defense against attacks from opponents."
Yoshida stated in response: "Renouncing a war does not
necessarily require us renouncing the right of self-defense
all together." However, most Japanese people believed that
the United States expected Japan to be neutral, and they
still strongly supported Macarthur's comment in March 1949:
"The role of Japan is to become a Switzerland in the
Pacific" (ibid., 92).

2. The Korean War and the Restoration of Independence
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was
particularly important in Japan's break from the policy of
unarmed neutrality and the rise of a realist identity. The
United States "used Japan as a large workshop to produce
supplies for U.S. troops in Korea" (Drifte 1986, 9). In July
1950, while US military stationed in Japan were deployed to
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the Korean Peninsula, the GHQ reached critical decisions
that directed Japan's rearmament: the establishment of the
Keisatsu Yobitai (National Police Reserve; NPR) with 75,000
personnel, which was the predecessor of the present Ground
Self Defense Forces, and increasing by 8,000 the number of
personnel in the Maritime Safety Agency, which was to be the
foundation of the current Maritime Self Defense Forces. At
the time, the Japanese public generally believed Prime
Minister Yoshida's explanation to the Diet that these
decisions were made for the genuine purpose of increasing
police capability to maintain domestic order, making up for
the loss of US occupation forces which had been shipped to
Korea.
The ideological confrontation between capitalism and
communism had a significant effect on Japan's domestic
politics. The authorities in Japan were very concerned about
the rise of the Communist Party, which, backed by labor
movements, had been increasing its influence emerging from
food crises. In August 1952, the new section in the Maritime
Safety Agency was cut loose and renamed as Keibitai
(Maritime Guards), and the NPR was strengthened and
transformed into Hoantai (National Security Forces). These
gradually increased "capabilities" were discussed
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intensively, and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau finally
issued the government's unified view in November 1952. It
read: "While Section 2 of Article 9 in the Constitution
prohibits maintaining 'land, sea, and air forces', it is
constitutional to maintain and use force that is less than
the 'forces' required to defend Japan from invasion. Since
the Maritime Guards and the National Security Forces are
part of the police force, not military, they are
constitutional" (Shugiin Kenpo Chosakai 2004, 25).
As the end of occupation and the restoration of
independence approached, public opinion in Japan was divided
along the lines of this dual national identity. Those on one
side argued that Japan should seek an overall peace with all
of the belligerent states, both capitalist and communist. At
the other end the argument was that Japan should give a
higher priority to peace treaties with states in the western
camp led by the occupying United States. In the sphere of
academics and journalism, those who had been forced into
silence during the war started to make strong appeals for an
overall peace in such opinion magazines as Sekai (World).
This pacifist argument was widely supported and was dominant
in academics and journalism for a long period (Kato 1998).
The debates on this issue resembled a kind of domestic Cold
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War between "rightists" (conservatives) and "leftists"
(radicals). The former, backed up the US-Japan Security
Treaty, supported pro-American policies, promoted a
constitutional amendment for the sake of rearmament, and
demanded an autonomous defense for Japan. The latter opposed
the US-Japan Security Treaty, supported pro-Soviet policies,
asserted the preservation of the Constitution, particularly
Article 9, and demanded Japan's unarmed neutrality. This
contrast can be explained in terms of realist versus
pacifist identities when viewed from a broader perspective.
In September 1951, the Japanese government signed the
"Treaty for Peace with Japan" at the Peace Conference in San
Francisco, California. Out of the fifty-five nations
belonging to the United Nations, forty-eight appeared and
signed the treaty. As an ambassador plenipotentiary, Yoshida
initially aimed at pursuing international cooperation based
on mutual economic interests; however, in the end he
abrogated an overall peace. Several states including the
Soviet Union, China, and India did not sign the treaty.
Japan at the same time signed the "Security Treaty between
Japan and the United States." With this, Japan chose to
continue leaving its own national security in the hands of
the United States and to become a part of the western
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alliance. This choice led to the situation in which the
pacifist constitution and realist military alliance with the
United States co-existed, and an institutional framework was
thus established for the two, in a sense, contradictory
national identities. With the Japanese policy regenerating
itself as an economic power and contributing to the realist
alliance economically, Japan began to seek national
development consistent with its pacifist identity (Iokibe
2001).
In the early 1950s, political parties confronted one
another on the issue of the rearmament of Japan, and heated
debate went on in the Diet. As for the government party
Jiyuto (Liberal Party) led by Yoshida, there was some
opposition to Yoshida's security policy within the party.
For example, Ichiro Hatoyama, returning to public service in
the summer 1951, argued for rearmament. However, there was
fundamental agreement that Japan should "seek a gradual
increase of self-defense capability according to the growth
of its national strength" (Kusunoki 1998, 154). Yoshida
himself intended to establish "a respectable military" when
the time should come to rearm. The reasons why Yoshida
opposed immediate substantial rearmament were these: to
place a high priority on rebuilding its economy, to contain
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the threat of reemerging militarism, and no less importantly,
to echo the lack of public support for rearmament (Tanaka
1997, 52). The conservative Kaishinto (Reformist Party),
which was formed in February 1952 under Hitoshi Ashida's
leadership, insisted on amending the Constitution and
rearming by the establishment of a "self-defense military."
However, not all party members shared this opinion. Shakaito
(the Socialist Party) declared the Four Principles for Peace,
consisting of the following positions: overall peace with
every state; strict maintenance of neutrality; opposition to
US military bases; and opposition to rearmament. Nonetheless,
after independence, confrontation between right and left
wings within the party over the issues of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty became serious,
and the party ended up splitting. Kyosanto (the Communist
Party), which supported worldwide communist revolution,
declared its opposition to the United States, thus becoming,
to the government, a direct threat to Japan's security.
Still, it earned substantial public support that could not
be ignored.
Japan's rearmament was the most crucial issue in the
general election in October 1952. In contrast with academics
and journalists, right-wing politicians and veterans, who
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had been purged until the previous summer, publicly demanded
rearmament. However, the argument for rearmament lost
momentum owing to strong opposition from youth and female
voters. Neither Kaishinto nor the Hatoyama faction in Jiyuto
could increase their seats in the Diet; thus they did not
gain public support for rearmament. In the following general
election in April 1953, rearmament was once again a central
issue, and the rearmament schools lost seats while both the
right and left wings of Shakaito increased their
representation considerably. After all, neither pro- nor
anti-rearmament schools could win an absolute majority, and
the issue of rearmament through a constitutional amendment
was pigeonholed for the time.

3. The Self Defense Forces
In July 1954, the Defense Agency Act and the Self
Defense Forces Law, the so-called Dual Defense Laws, were
put into effect. Developing the then National Security
Forces and the Maritime Guard, and adding an air force
branch, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) was established. The
SDF consists of Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces.
In the process of congressional debate, the Three Conditions
for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense were developed and
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have become a fundamental principle of Japan's defense
policy and a guideline for the government's interpretation
of the Constitution. These three conditions are as follows:
there should exist a threat of urgent and unjustified
invasion; there should be no other means to eliminate the
threat; and Japan should employ the minimum capability
necessary to defend against it. In the same month, a
resolution that prohibits sending the SDF abroad was passed
in the Diet. This resolution emerged from the idea that
"self-defense" should be a justified action against an
unjustified invasion, so it should be strictly limited to
tangible cases of defending Japan's own territory. This was
in line with Japanese public opinion and their deep regret
that the Japanese military had invaded foreign countries in
the name of self-defense. As a whole, while making steady
progress in realist rearmament, the Japanese put a clear
pacifist brake on the exercise of its forces. The Japanese
concept of self-defense has remained along these lines.
After the birth of the SDF, voices questioning the
official interpretation of "forces" in the Constitution
became louder within the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. They
recognized a need to determine whether or not the
Constitution could justify an SDF whose mission was to deal
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with direct invasion from foreign enemies. According to the
government's unified view issued in December 1954, the
Constitution does not deny the right of self-defense. Japan
is naturally entitled to possess the right of self-defense
as an independent sovereign state. Also, the Constitution
does not prohibit combat for the purpose of self-defense.
Article 9 renounces a war "as means of settling
international disputes," thus in case of an attack by other
states, its forces should be employed only in clear selfdefense, a case essentially different from resolving
international conflict. And finally, maintaining a
capability just sufficient to defend Japan, like the SDF, is
constitutional, because the Constitution recognizes the
right of self-defense. Therefore, the SDF does not
constitute the "land, sea, and air forces" prohibited by
section two of Article 9. This is the official
interpretation of the Constitution by the government that
has been consistently held to this day.
In September 1955, the right and left wings were
united, and the newly unified Shakaito (Socialist Party) was
founded. Sensing a threat from this merger of the government
being overthrown by radicals, in November Jiyuto (Liberal
Party) and Minshuto (Democratic Party) also merged and
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established Jiyu Minshuto (Liberal Democratic Party; LDP).
Representatives from the two parties dominated the Diet.
Thus a two-power structure of LDP conservatives and
Socialist Party leftists came into existence, and this socalled 1955-system continued for the next thirty-eight years.
As for national defense policy, the Socialist Party was
rather flexible in the beginning, but gradually became
increasingly insistent on the unconstitutionality of the SDF
and rigidly adhered to an unarmed neutrality policy. In the
meantime, there was no unified opinion among members in the
LDP. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that "it is possible to
maintain a military capability for self-defense," and some
defense experts in the party kept demanding rearmament.
However, the LDP could not construct and rearm a selfdefense system by specifying the Self Defense Forces as
"military forces." Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who led
the following administration, was a class "A" war criminal
and known for his right wing discourse. Kishi nonetheless
did not pursue drastic rearmament, but took the Yoshida line,
which had aimed to gradually strengthen defense capabilities
based on the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Yoshida line was
firmly established down the road as a national defense
policy (Tanaka 1997).
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When the US-Japan Security Treaty was concluded,
there was no need to debate limitations on the exercise of
self-defense. However, as Japan's defense capabilities were
strengthened with the establishment of the SDF, the issue of
limitation on self-defense, individual and collective, was
laid on the table. The right of individual self-defense is a
right of a state to defend itself by force against military
assault by other states. The right of collective selfdefense is a right of a state to defend its ally or
affinitive state in case of military attack by a third state.
In the case of Japan, the latter has been much more
debatable than the former. While the Constitution of Japan
declares its pacifism, it is widely believed that Japan
possesses the right of individual self-defense, namely, to
use force to defend itself, since it is hardly possible to
consider that the Constitution should allow immediate
surrender to military invasion by other states, and such
logic would eventually lead to denial of Japan's very
existence. The right of collective self-defense is a far
more complex issue for the Japanese. If Japan is invaded,
the SDF and US troops stationed in Japan will jointly meet
the aggression. It will naturally be a case of individual
self-defense. Meanwhile, it will become controversial
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whether Japan could use force or not, if the United States
should be invaded by a third state.
Although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
approves the exercise of individual and collective selfdefense by its member states, the government's
interpretation since May 1955 has been following: It is
natural for Japan as a sovereign state to hold the right of
collective self-defense from an international legal
perspective; however, the Constitution of Japan restricts
the exercise of the right of self-defense to a minimum, and
the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is
considered to be beyond this limitation and thus
unconstitutional. In short, exercising individual selfdefense and possessing military capabilities for this
purpose are constitutional, while exercising collective
self-defense is not. The unconstitutionality of collective
self-defense had been debated over time, but the
government's first formal publication of this interpretation
in the Diet was far later, in May 1981. As mentioned earlier,
this quite moderate interpretation resulted from Japanese
sensitivity toward the prewar foreign deployment of their
military and their expansionist policy in the name of selfdefense, and from the recognition of a danger of possible
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broader re-interpretation of self-defense in the future.
The Diplomacy Blue Book issued for the first time in
1957 held up "UN-centrism" as the first of the Three
Principles of Diplomacy of Japan, along with "cooperation
with democratic countries" and "firm maintenance of the
position as a member of the Asian nations." This "UNcentrism" earned public support; however, Japan was unable
to participate in UN Forces activities since the government
had clearly declared that the Constitution prohibits
deployment of the SDF abroad. When a conflict broke out in
Lebanon in July 1958, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld
asked the government of Japan to send an SDF contingent to
participate in the United Nations Observation Group in
Lebanon (UNOGIL). The Japanese government rejected this
request for the reason of possible infringement on domestic
laws, even though it was possible for the government to
interpret a dispatch of the SDF as constitutional. To say
nothing of the Socialist Party's opposition, general public
opinion was very negative toward sending the SDF to other
countries. Practically, one scholar pointed out, the Three
Principles of Diplomacy of Japan in reality were: first
"cooperation with the United States," then "international
cooperation" within the limits of the first principle, and

65

lastly "economism" (Iokibe 1999). As the nuclear arms race
between the US and the USSR heated up and the situation came
to a deadlock, the United Nations turned into an arena of
the Cold War. The UN Security Council that was supposed to
deal with international security issues ceased to function
due to repeated exercises of veto by the two superpowers.
Japan's "UN-centrism" gradually faded away as its bond with
the "West" became clear.

4. The Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty
From the mid-1950s, when Japan's economy, triggered
by so-called special procurements for the Korean War,
started back on track calls for revision of the US-Japan
Security Treaty grew louder. Several problems were behind
this growing demand. The first was the "clause on internal
disturbances," in which the treaty permitted the US military
to quell domestic riots within Japan. Japanese political
leaders asserted that this clause was unsuitable for Japan
as an independent state, and eventually the clause was
deleted in the newly revised treaty. Second, the existing
treaty did not clearly mention the obligation of the United
States to militarily defend Japan while it did specifically
state the duty of Japan to provide military bases to the
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United States. This point made the treaty appear "onesided." This was also addressed in the new treaty by
describing the US responsibility to defend Japan.
Third, there was a fear, mainly on the pacifist side,
that Japan might be automatically dragged into an American
war against its will in the name of "maintaining peace and
security in the Far East." As previously mentioned,
collective self-defense was, and still is, considered
unconstitutional in Japan. Thus, in the revised treaty this
issue was taken into consideration, stating that Japan-US
military cooperation should not deviate from the limit of
the right of individual self-defense. Then, as requested by
Japan, the revised treaty prescribed its coverage of defense
as "the sphere under the administrative right of the
Japanese government" including US military bases in Japan.
Therefore the Japanese government could avoid changing its
constitutional interpretation to finalize revision of the
treaty. Fourth, Japan was concerned with the possibility
that the United States might bring nuclear weapons onto
Japanese soil against Japan's will. To deal with this issue,
the treaty included a new clause on "prior consultation,"
which required the US government to consult with Japanese
counterparts if it planned major changes in weapon systems
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of the US military in Japan, such as bringing nuclear
weapons onto a US military base in Japan or having its
nuclear armed vessels enter a Japanese harbor. The United
States kept pressuring Japan to rearm itself; however,
seeing the Hatoyama and following Ishibashi administrations'
attempts to normalize relationships with the Soviet Union
and China, the US government feared that Japan might pull
away from the US and declare neutrality. So after all, it
yielded and gave up on rearming Japan for the sake of
strengthening the alliance. Consequently, the newly revised
treaty was adopted largely in line with Japan's wishes (Wada
1998).
Following the Sunagawa Incident, involving an anti-US
base movement by local residents in 1955 and the Gerard
Incident of 1957, in which a US soldier shot and killed a
Japanese housewife who was collecting spent ammo cartridges
from military exercises, Han-bei (anti-American) and HanAnpo (anti-US-Japan Security Treaty) sentiments grew among
the general public in Japan. Revision of the treaty was
partly an attempt to contain public opposition to the
alliance. However, people thought, on the contrary, that the
revised treaty might drag Japan into another war. Prime
Minister Kishi's strong reactionary image fueled the
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opposition and led to massive, organized anti-treaty
movements (Inoki 2000). In January 1960, after agreeing with
the US government on the new treaty, the Kishi
administration presented it to the House of Representatives.
But the majority LDP suddenly called off interpellation and
stopped the debate in May. Prime Minister Kishi then pushed
through passage of the bill with the votes of LDP members
alone, while bringing police forces into the House to
contain the opposition. The other parties rejected the
result and the Diet ceased to function. Kishi's antidemocratic moves shocked the Japanese public. A number of
intense protests were held every day, with repeated clashes
between demonstrators and police. The situation grew worse,
and finally a college student was killed in the chaos as
demonstrators rushed into the Diet in a failed attempt to
stop automatic approval of the treaty. The Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States
of America went into effect on June 23, 1960, and on the
same day Kishi declared his intent to step down as prime
minister.

5. Early Debates on Missile Threats
According to Frances Fitzgerald, the quest for anti-
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ballistic missile systems started shortly after World War II,
with a recognition that "the development of an
intercontinental ballistic missile was only a matter of
time" (Fitzgerald 2000, 114). Following the technological
advance of rocket science in the early twentieth century,
Nazi Germany developed "vengeance weapons" during World War
II (Ford 1971). They caused serious damage, both physically
and psychologically, terrorizing citizens in London and
Paris. The Vergeltungswaffe-1 (V-1) looked like a small,
unmanned airplane, and was the prototype for cruise missiles
developed after the war. Powered by jet engines, it created
a loud noise, and was called a "buzz bomb." The incoming
noise and subsequent explosions added to its psychological
impact. About 5,500 people were killed, and 16,000 injured
in V-1 attacks (Hogg 1957, 145).
The Vergeltungswaffe-2 (V-2) was a radical innovation
in that it was powered by liquid fuel. The development of
the liquid fueled rocket and guidance systems led to the
development of launch vehicles that could escape the earth's
atmosphere and eventually put satellites into orbit, and the
V-2 was the predecessor of the intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM). The V-2 rockets had a range of 220 miles and
it reached four times the speed of sound. Since V-1 rockets
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were relatively slow and flew low in the air, it was
possible for jet fighters and antiaircraft guns to shoot
them down, or to defend against them with balloon barrages.
Out of 9,017 V-1 missiles launched by the Germans in August
and September 1944, 3,461 (38 percent) were shot down and
2,340 (26 percent) reached the London area (ibid., 141).
However, it was impossible to defend against V-2 rockets
which overwhelmed existing radar and interception
capabilities (Nogi 2000, 295). "[T]he missiles' inaccuracy
and flight failure rate helped reduce their military
potential dramatically" (Handberg 2002, 40), but they posed
serious threats to defenseless citizens of the UK and France.
Germany launched 1,359 V-2 missiles toward London, with 517
hits, about 2,400 citizens killed and 5,850 injured (Hogg
1957, 144). This new weapon "fundamentally altered the
nature of strategic warfare" (Mitchell 2000, 5).
During the first decade of the Cold War, the Soviet
Union began to develop a series of long-range bomber
aircraft capable of reaching targets within the continental
United States. The potential threat posed by such aircraft
became much more serious when the Soviets exploded their
first atomic bomb in 1949. In response, the United States
developed generations of surface-to-air Nike guided missile
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systems. The first generation Nike system, Nike-Ajax, was a
two-stage missile with a range of 25-30 miles. Nike-Ajax
batteries became fully operational in 1953. The initial
mission of the Nike system was to defend against such
aircraft, but a later variant of the system provided a
limited capability to defend against ballistic missiles.
However, the threat of intercontinental ballistic missile
was initially remote for the United States. Ernest Yanarella
points out that the first serious attempt to develop an
anti-ballistic missile system began in 1955, with the US
army's "decision to undertake feasibility studies into the
technical problems and practical possibilities of missile
defense" (Yanarella 2002, 6).
In Japan, missile threats were perceived and publicly
discussed as early as February 1954. The earliest debates
were on how Japan should defend itself against air-launched
guided missiles (GM), but the clear conclusion was that the
just recently started SDF had no such capability. Japan had
no choice but to leave this issue to US air defense
capability. To cope with ballistic missile threats, through
the Cold War period and thereafter, Japan's national
security has depended on the US extended nuclear deterrence
strategy, the so-called "nuclear umbrella." The Japanese
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government nonetheless began studying GMs for defensive
purposes. It was later revealed that a study on missiles had
begun within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1955
(Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1966a). The JDA asked
the US government to provide seven types of missiles,
including the Nike. The second generation Nike system, NikeHercules, was a nuclear-armed missile and became operational
in 1958. The mission of Nike-Hercules was to defend against
Soviet bombers and primitive cruise missiles with nuclear
explosions. It was truly unthinkable for the Japanese people
to admit possessing such a nuclear weapon, and naturally the
constitutionality of its introduction into the SDF defense
posture was intensely discussed in the Diet. In May 1957 the
Kishi administration denied the possibility of deploying
nuclear-armed GMs and even expressed its intent to reject a
likely request from the United States to employ such nuclear
missiles on US bases in Japan.
The "Sputnik Shock" in October 1957 propelled debate
on missile threats and popularized the term misairu
(missile) among the Japanese public. But the development of
missile technology did not have a direct influence on the
SDF arsenal. Kishi persisted in maintaining that the SDF
should only have the "necessary minimum" capability to face
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a direct invasion with conventional weapons. An attack with
nuclear weapons was not expected since it would immediately
lead to all-out nuclear war between the superpowers, and
would thus be out of the hands of the Japanese. In general,
there was a domestic consensus that Japan should deal with
nuclear missile threats through the deterrence provided by
the Japan-US security arrangement, not by Japan's own
military means. There was also the alarming fear that Japan
could be made into a US nuclear missile base against the
Soviet Union. Realist political elites believed that Japan
needed an anti-missile missile system to face ballistic
missile threats. They did not see the illegality of such
missiles as long as anti-missile missiles were non-nuclear.
In reality, however, technology had not yet reached the
level of practical deployment. In addition, pacifists in the
Japanese public were so sensitive about the offensive
capability of guided missiles that even introducing the US
Sidewinder for a "study" was subject to a debate on
constitutionality. (The Sidewinder was a heat-seeking,
short-range, air-to-air guided missile carried by fighter
aircrafts.)

74

B. The Cold War and Japanese Security (1961-80)

1. Economic Security
The anti-US-Japan Security Treaty movement, which
shook the nation like "the eve of a revolution," died out
quickly after the revised Japan-US security treaty went
through and Prime Minister Kishi stepped down. Despite the
chaos, revision of the treaty did not, in essence, affect
Japanese security policies, since the basic structure, of US
forces defending Japan and Japan providing bases in return,
was left intact. Nonetheless, the anti-treaty movement
greatly influenced the future security policy of Japan, in
that both Ikeda and Sato, the successors of Kishi, kept a
"low profile," passive stand on national security issues.
The lesson of avoiding any more chaos like the anti-treaty
struggle, resulted in an informal policy of avoiding frank,
open debate on security matters in Japan, and revision of
the Constitution of Japan did not become a key issue in
politics again for the next thirty-four years.
During the 1960s, the Cold War drastically shifted
from a mood of impending total nuclear war to a stabilized
relationship between superpowers. After the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came
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to acknowledge their mutual superpower capabilities, and
endeavored to institutionalize their relations to avert
nuclear catastrophe. They established a series of agreements
on arms control such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty
(PTBT) and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The overwhelming nuclear capabilities
of the US and the USSR led to a situation of mutual assured
destruction (MAD), in which the superpowers mutually
deterred a preemptive nuclear strike with retaliatory second
nuclear attack capability sufficient to completely destroy
the first attacker. MAD broadly provided strategic stability
in the international political circumstances.
At the same time, however, both superpowers offered
"nuclear umbrellas" to their allies. For example, if Japan
were attacked by the Soviet Union, the United States would
retaliate with its nuclear forces. This was also called
"extended deterrence." Thus there was a widespread fear that
a regional conflict could lead to a major confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union. This meant
that the defense capability of Japan had no definitive
significance in the world military balance no matter its
size; for once a "hot war" between the nuclear superpowers
broke out, this would immediately mean a full-scale nuclear
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war and total annihilation. It was far more important for
Japan to maintain its tight alliance with the United States
than to build up its small-scale defense capability. What
was required of Japan was to participate in international
society as an economic power with a moderate military
capability within the framework of the US-Japan alliance
(Tadokoro 1999).
It was obvious that the Japanese government based its
national security policy upon a realist identity, but it was
also true that the pacifist identity of the general public
put firm brakes on the government's realist approach. On the
issue of the stalemate in the Vietnam War the government
took a pro-American position, while most Japanese were
against the war, seeing the government's mistake in
identifying the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation
as a falling domino in the spreading worldwide communist
movement. When the United States began bombing North Vietnam
in February 1965, Japanese media and peace activists
considered it an invasion, and movements to help people in
Vietnam arose among the people (Inoki 2000). The Vietnam War
symbolized the dilemma, in which Japan was caught between
its two identities: pacifism that would restrain Japan's
involvement in an American war and realism of
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"cooperationist line with the United States." As a result,
Japan managed to take a centrist stand, but this also
reflected the lack of clear definition in its security
policymaking (Tadokoro 1999).
Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda pledged a "national
income doubling program" and built a national consensus to
focus on "economics rather than politics" with the aim of
becoming an economic power in the region. Ikeda succeeded in
healing the nation's wounds from Kishi era division over
security issues by shifting attention from political
conflicts to economic development. Kishi was a symbol of
reactionism harking back to prewar Japan, and when he
stepped down, the anti-treaty movements lost its target and
dissolved, with opponents suffering from a sense of defeat
and powerlessness against the steamrolling approval of the
treaty by the LDP. Most Japanese regarded economic
prosperity as the center of Japan's national interest, and
this recognition later developed into the idea of "economic
security" (Katzenstein 1996). The economic security concept
focused on reducing Japan's dependence on natural resources
from abroad, and on technological development as a tool for
expanding its share of the world market. During the 1960s,
Japan demonstrated impressive economic development by
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importing raw materials while exporting value added
manufactured goods. Meanwhile, its rising economic power
pushed Japan toward a position of responsibility. Japan
joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1952, and
acceded to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
in 1955. It became an "Article 11 member" of GATT in
February 1963, under which Japan could no longer place
quantitative restrictions on imports, and became an "Article
8 member" of IMF in 1964. Japan was thus required to
abrogate any limitations on monetary exchange. As a state
living on foreign trade, Japan expanded interdependent
relationships with other countries through liberalization of
trade and deregulation of industry. Truly, "economics is
national security for the Japanese" (Samuels 1989; original
emphasis).
"The Study of Integrated Defense War Games in
FY1963," code-named the "Mitsuya Study," secretly simulated
security scenarios such as deployment of the Self Defense
Forces in case of an emergency situation in the Korean
Peninsula, in which the conflict might severely influence
Japan. This secret study by the Defense Agency was revealed
in the Diet in February 1965 and caused a huge controversy.
The section on "wartime defense legislation" in the study,
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discussing needs in crises, attracted particular attention.
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was deeply unsettled and critical,
saying that conducting such a secret study behind the
government's back was "never acceptable." The public also
reacted negatively and considered it a conspiracy by the
Self Defense Forces, similar to the Imperial Army's
activities before World War II. Later, Sato backtracked
somewhat and commented that the study itself was legitimate,
even stating, "It is natural to study a case of military
penetration." But he added, "Issues such as a national
mobilization plan were not a matter for uniformed personnel
to discuss" (Tanaka 1997). As a result, the Defense Agency
came to avoid study of yuji (emergency situations) and
discussions on emergency defense legislation.
Okinawa was still under US occupation and played an
important role as a strategic frontline base in Asia against
the Communist bloc. However, the 1951 Peace Treaty permitted
the Japanese government to hold the so-called "remaining
sovereignty" in Okinawa, and the legal status of Okinawa was
kept obscure. Local autonomy in Okinawa was limited, and
welfare support for local residents provided by the US civil
affairs section was far from satisfactory. The Americans'
annoying attitude of superiority as an occupying power
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stimulated the people's desire for reversion to Japanese
sovereignty. The United States took on the image of an
arrogant empire just as had the Soviet Union, which kept
ignoring the issue of the Northern Territories (Tadokoro
1999). When Sato became the first prime minister to visit
Okinawa in August 1965, he stated, "Japan's war will not end
until Okinawa returns to Japan." From that time, efforts for
the reversion of Okinawa increased (Inoki 2000). Although
the intensified war in Vietnam, and the US demand for
Japan's self-imposed limits on its export of textiles to the
United States complicated the negotiations, in November 1969
Prime Minister Sato and President Richard Nixon finally
reached an agreement on the return of Okinawa with the
unambiguous phrase, "return in 1972, without nuclear weapons,
with the same treatment as the mainland" (Wakaizumi 1994).
This meant that any nuclear weapons deployed in and around
Okinawa should be removed, and that requirements for prior
consultations prescribed in the Mutual Security Treaty
should be applied in the same way as on the mainland. At the
same time, however, they added the so-called South Korea
Clause and Taiwan Clause that expressed the importance of
stability of neighbors for the peace and security of Japan,
and therefore Japan began to bear more responsibility for
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stability in the Far East.

2. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles
No other nation has demonstrated such fierce
objection to nuclear weapons as Japan. When atomic bombs
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan
became the only country in history to suffer nuclear attack.
Thousands of people were instantly vaporized by the
explosions, and hundreds of thousands of others were killed
slowly by the radiation released. Even now many are
suffering from radiation sickness caused by the bombs. In
March 1954 the Dai Go Fukuryumaru Incident shocked the whole
nation. A Japanese fishing boat was exposed to deadly
radioactive ash from a US hydrogen bomb test, and one of the
crew died half a year later. The other 22 crew members
survived, but they suffered from serious radiation
aftereffects. This incident was remembered as "the third Abomb attack." Public anger led to a swelling mass movement
against nuclear weapons and campaigns for nuclear
disarmament. Popular sentiment in Japan was overwhelmingly
against nuclear weapons, making the prospect of Japan's
nuclear armament out of the question. The renowned "Three
Non-Nuclear Principles," a symbol of Japan as a peaceful
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nation, remains a popular and highly valued policy among the
general public in Japan.
For the Japanese elites, however, it did not
necessarily mean that Japan completely excluded the nuclear
option from its future national security policy. In May 1957,
the Kishi administration suggested a constitutional
interpretation by which possessing nuclear would not be
unconstitutional as long as it was judged to be necessary to
a minimum self-defense capability. Also, the 1955 Atomic
Energy Fundamental Law prohibited the use of nuclear energy
for other than peaceful purposes. This limitation was based
on the idea that Japan's nuclear armament was still
"constitutional," but it was "illegal" in terms of the
current legislation. Thus, the government did not have to
amend the Constitution to legalize nuclear armament. Going
nuclear would only require changing some laws. Nuclear
armament is a matter of political will.
In April 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda avowed: "As a
constitutional argument, I think it is widely held that if
it [nuclear weapon] is not for offensive but for purely
defensive purposes, this [Constitution] does not
juristically prohibit it. But no matter how it is
juristically considered, I am saying that we will not
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possess nuclear weapons as a matter of policy" (Japanese
Diet, House of Representatives 1961).
Unfortunately, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were
not a product of nation-wide argument, promoted by those who
sought ideal peace, but a result of compromise in the Diet
to break through the deadlock on the issue of the reversion
of Okinawa (Tanaka 1997, 224-225). The Socialist Party was
adamant that Okinawa, as well as any other Japanese
territories, must be demilitarized.
In January 1968, Prime Minister Sato declared the
Three Non-Nuclear Principles of "not producing, not
possessing and not allowing entry of nuclear weapons into
the country." However, Sato also asserted that the set of
three principles was only one part of the four pillars of
Japan's nuclear policy. The other three were: promoting
worldwide disarmament, depending on US nuclear deterrence,
and advancing peaceful use of nuclear energy. Concerning
these four pillars, it was especially important to note that,
"the Three Non-Nuclear Principles could be maintained only
when they went hand in hand with the other three nuclear
policies, and Japan cannot single out and promote the
principles" (Katzenstein 1996, 128).
Thus Japan's non-nuclear policy was only a partial
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one, integrated with the nuclear umbrella supplied by the
United States. But the public and the Diet soon accepted the
Three Non-Nuclear Principles. They have become an essential
factor in national security policymaking, and are recognized
as kokuze (national policy).

3. The Nixon-Shocks
In vivid contrast to the turmoil of the 1960s, the
1970s started rather calmly, symbolized by the automatic
extension of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in June
1970. The political atmosphere was not much influenced even
by the Yodogo Incident in March 1970, in which young
communists hijacked a Japan Airlines passenger airplane, nor
by the Mishima Incident in November 1970, an attempted coup
d'état ending with the suicide of the prominent novelist and
rightist Yukio Mishima. These shocking actions by leftists
and rightists attracted public attention, but only briefly.
Yasuhiro Nakasone took up the post of Director
General of the Defense Agency in the third Sato Cabinet in
January 1970, and tried to reform Japan's defense policy. He
attempted to create a basis for that purpose on his own
initiative. As his "personal view," Nakasone announced his
Five Principles of Autonomous Self-defense: to protect the
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Constitution and concentrate on defense; to unify defense
with diplomacy aimed at harmony with other national
policies; to maintain civilian control; to sustain the Three
Non-Nuclear Principles; and to supplement them with the
Japan-US Security Treaty. He stated that Japan should
achieve autonomous defensive capabilities in a gradual
manner (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors, 1970). This
guideline set the US-Japan mutual security system as
"subordinate" and autonomous self-defense as the "main"
component of Japan's security policy. In October 1970, the
first white paper on the national defense of Japan was
published, and shortly after, the Outline of New Defense
Buildup Plan was released. The Fourth Defense Buildup
Program, a 1972-76 five-year plan presented in the Outline
caused serious backlash domestically and internationally,
because its estimated budget of 5.2 trillion yen (14.4
billion dollars at the prevailing rate of exchange) was more
than twice that of the previous program. Nakasone's idea of
"autonomous self-defense" was criticized for its lack of
consideration of the United States, and, in fact, drew a
caution from the US government. At the same time, China
denounced it as a revival of prewar Japanese militarism.
Nakasone stepped down from the JDA post in July 1971,
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leaving the "Nakasone vision" frozen (Sato 2002).
In July 1971, Washington and Beijing agreed on
President Nixon's visit to China in the following year, but
without consulting Tokyo.

This action, known as the "Nixon

Shock," shook the Japanese, since the United States improved
relations with China "over Japan's head." Nonetheless, it
was also true that reconciliation between the US and China
simultaneously decreased the perception of China as a
formidable threat. The general sense of threat from abroad,
which had been gradually decreasing, declined even further,
and recognition of the trend toward détente spread
throughout the country. In August 1971 President Nixon again
shocked Japan and the world by coming off the gold standard.
These two Nixon Shocks evoked temporary public distrust of
the United States, but soon trust was recovered. Prime
Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing in September 1972 and
agreed with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on diplomatic
normalization between Japan and the People's Republic of
China (PRC). By this agreement Japan terminated diplomatic
relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. When
Tanaka and his cabinet started normalization talks with
Beijing in early 1972, Japan was particularly concerned
about the Chinese reaction to the US-Japan Mutual Security
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Treaty. Surprisingly, China expressed its support for the
Japan-US security alliance. Premier Zhou Enlai even said
that the Mutual Security Treaty was very important for Japan
and it was natural to firmly maintain it. As a result, the
Socialist Party of Japan which took a pro-PRC, anti-Security
Treaty stance found itself in an awkward position, while
public opinion, which had been generally anti-Treaty and
anti-US for quite some time, changed dramatically. The
number of Japanese viewing the United States as a likable
country steadily increased from 1973 to the latter half of
the 1980s (Nakanishi 1999, 159-160). On one hand, domestic
political outlook on international security shifted to
seeking regional stability and maintaining the status quo.
On the other hand, in the economic sphere, Japan faced the
chaos of "run-away inflation" caused by the 1973 Oil Shock.
As a result, concerns about national defense and security
faded away, and few directly discussed a "vision" for
Japan's security policy (Tanaka 1997).

4. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Contrary to their hatred of nuclear weapons, the
Japanese public has been quite tolerant of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and the Japanese government has intensively
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developed peaceful nuclear programs. The Atomic Energy
Commission was established in 1955, and became part of the
Prime Minister's Office in the following year. Substantial
progress began in 1961, and by 1967 it became clear that
Japan had overcome the technical barriers to
commercialization (Endicott 1975, 114). In the early stages,
the Japanese government was quite optimistic and had high
hopes for dramatic progress as its foreign counterparts did.
But in practice it faced technical difficulties and entered
an era of slowed progress. As of August 2004, about 50
percent of Japan's total supply of electricity was provided
by nuclear power plants. Fifty-two nuclear power plants are
currently in operation, five plants are under construction,
and six more are planned.
Japan's nuclear development has been based on a longterm goal of energy independence. Japan has very few
traditional natural resources, and is heavily dependent on
imports to meet its needs for food, energy, and raw
materials, such as iron ore. In Japan, 99.7 percent of oil
is imported, with 87 percent of this coming from the Middle
East. Overreliance on this unstable energy source is a
critical issue for the Japanese people. This vulnerability
was brought into focus during the chaos of the oil shocks in
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1973 and 1979. As of 2002, owing to nation-wide endeavors to
make industry more efficient, oil accounted for only 49.7
percent of total energy consumption in Japan. The figure was
77 percent before the 1973 oil crisis. Nuclear power is the
dominant energy choice even if Japan has to depend on
imported uranium. Proponents of nuclear power argue that
uranium can be stored within the country for a long period
of time, and therefore it can be regarded as a semi-domestic
resource (Asa made Nama Terebi! 1989, 25). The main
suppliers of uranium are Canada and Australia, which are
politically far more stable than the oil suppliers in the
Middle East. This point is critical in reference not only to
energy issues but also to national security issues. Moreover,
when reprocessing of spent fuel becomes available, plutonium
will become a stable and semi-permanent source of energy.
From an environmental point of view, nuclear power also has
been seen as a clean and efficient energy resource,
replacing the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil,
which are thought to contribute to global warming.
Nonetheless, there remain a number of issues in
developing nuclear energy programs. Safety concerns have
grown since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster terrified the world
and posed serious questions about the safety of nuclear
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energy. Failings that led to the Chernobyl incident have
been scrutinized and faults and dangers of nuclear power
plants around the world have been pointed out. It has been
increasingly revealed that many nuclear plants in the former
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have been
dangerously mismanaged, and they could potentially cause
disasters similar to Chernobyl (ABC News 1992). The
disaster's long-term influence on area residents and soil
are still unknown. Even in Japan, one of the most
technologically advanced countries, a number of minor
accidents have been reported. The 1999 accident in Tokai
village alarmed the Japanese people and the world. Enough
uranium in solution was mistakenly poured together to reach
critical mass and cause a nuclear chain reaction. Three
workers at the site died and 56 rescuers and 119 neighbors
were exposed to radiation. It was the worst accident in the
history of the Japanese nuclear industry. Another problem is
the skyrocketing cost of nuclear plant construction, the
main reason for the recent retreat of the nuclear industry.
Those who advocate complete shutdown of the nuclear power
industry welcome "the collapse of nuclear power in response
to the discipline of the marketplace," because it has partly
been a driving force behind weaponry proliferation, an
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ineffective way to displace oil, and a still dangerous means
to generate electricity (Lovins et al. 1980, 1138).
Furthermore, the issue of nuclear waste remains
unresolved. This problem has forced many governments to give
up their nuclear plans. In fact, nuclear industries started
their electricity generation programs assuming future
development of satisfactory methods of dealing with nuclear
wastes. These have not arisen. Presently, huge amounts of
nuclear waste have accumulated. There is no place to dispose
of them, and with no resolution to the problem, nuclear
wastes are piling up. Many methods, such as launching into
space, burial in Antarctic ice or the deep sea, and
enclosure in concrete buildings have been discussed, but all
are questionable. South Carolina had been receiving nuclear
wastes from all over the United States, but, in 1979, the
governor of South Carolina rejected two trucks from Three
Mile Island, carrying high level nuclear wastes contaminated
in the nuclear plant accident. As long as nuclear wastes
exist, this sort of struggle will remain internationally as
well as domestically.
In 1993 it was revealed that the former Soviet Union
had dumped its nuclear wastes, including 18 obsolete nuclear
reactors from retired nuclear submarines, into the Barents
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Sea, Kara Sea, and the Sea of Japan after 1966. More
surprisingly, the Russian government announced that it would
not stop dumping for the time being (Broad 1993). Japan has
asked the UK and France to reprocess its nuclear wastes, and
a significant amount of plutonium has been returned to Japan.
However, electric power generation programs using plutonium
with mixed oxide fuel (MOX) have had significant obstacles:
technical uncertainties, concerns with safety, issues of
construction, and so on.
Considering the size of Japan, similar to that of
California, the density of nuclear power plants in Japan is
astonishing, and it is remarkable that Japan continues to
promote nuclear utilization in spite of the limited land
area, volcanoes, earthquakes, high population density, high
construction costs, and so forth. In addition, the aging of
nuclear plants in Japan has become a serious problem. In
this era of international terrorism, a possible attack on
nuclear facilities has become a grave concern, as well. For
all that, the Japanese government is still calling for more
nuclear plants in spite of the worldwide retreat from
nuclear electric production (although this is recently
reversing). The Japanese government focuses on the need to
compensate for the lack of domestic energy resources, and
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its confidence is backed by Japan's economic and
technological strength and its achievements in avoiding
major accidents. However, the incidence of numerous minor
accidents makes this assertion appear shaky. The Japanese
government has strongly promoted nuclear utilization, and
public movements against nuclear energy development have
been fairly weak. The public has been extremely tolerant of
peaceful nuclear development in comparison to its attitude
toward nuclear weapons. Anti-nuclear plant movements have
never had a major impact on Japan's nuclear policy. Although
local opposition has often arisen at the first stage of
nuclear power plant construction, political pressures from
the government and its effective financial subsidization to
local authorities (in case they accept to offer construction
sites) have gradually lessened the heat. Feelings of
powerlessness and passivity among people also seem to have
weakened public movements.
Intensive promotion of the "peaceful" utilization of
nuclear power seems to be consistent with the pacifist
identity in that it asserts anti-nuclear weapon sentiments
on the one hand and promotes the peaceful use of nuclear
energy on the other. However, the nuclear industry could, in
various ways, contribute to the proliferation of nuclear

94

weapons, escalate the danger of clandestine nuclear weapons
development, expand the chances of nuclear smuggling, and
increase the possibility of international conflicts. To
produce nuclear weapons, three elements are necessary:
materials, equipment, and technology. Materials include
uranium and plutonium. Uranium can be mined in limited areas,
such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and South
Africa, and plutonium is a secondary product of uranium.
Equipment and technology are closely related critical
factors, and the types employed distinguish between weaponry
and peaceful use of nuclear power. The enrichment of uranium
and separation of plutonium require an extremely high level
of technology and secure facilities. It is difficult for
nations who do not possess nuclear weapons to obtain these
technologies, not only because they are controlled by
several advanced countries, but because nuclear weapons
technologies are key factors in a state's national security.
States possessing nuclear weapons are extremely cautious
about leaks of information. A notable exception was when, in
January 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely regarded as the
founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, confessed to
involvement in a clandestine international network spreading
nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan.

95

The technological gap between weaponry and peaceful
nuclear applications still controls access to the nuclear
club, but technology developed for peaceful use of nuclear
power has played a significant role in the proliferation of
nuclear weaponry. Barry Buzan suggests that technological
development has historically been a critical factor in
warfare, and that "any civil industrial society contains a
latent military potential. This potential lies in its stock
of knowledge, equipment, material, technique and capital"
(Buzan 1987, 28). He directly points out that, "perhaps the
clearest example of this latent potential in today's world
is the civil nuclear power industry" (ibid., 29). Even if it
was impossible to convert a peaceful energy resource to a
deadly weapon yesterday, it may become possible as
technologies develop. Frederik Willem de Klerk asserted that
the clandestine success of South African nuclear weapons
production was not dependent on the transfer of technology
from other countries (Keller 1993). However, there is no
doubt that nuclear weapons are an outcome of cumulative
knowledge. Japan is well known as a nation that has clearly
rejected development of nuclear arms. However, no one doubts
the capability of Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons
(Sorenson 1975; Endicott 1975, 127-128; McIntosh 1986, 64;
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Reischauer 1988, 367). The rising number of fast breeder
reactors (FBR) and the growth in plutonium use raise the
potential for nuclear weaponry development in Japan. This
capacity, combined with its space program-oriented
development of sophisticated rockets that could be converted
to nuclear-tipped ICBMs, has left neighboring states,
including North and South Korea and China, skeptical about
"Japan's nuclear ambitions" (Harrison 1996, 4-5).

5.

Reviewing the US-Japan Security System and Limiting of
the Defense Budget within One Percent of GNP
The first half of the 1970s brought dramatic events

in international politics: détente between the United States
and the Soviet Union, reconciliation between the US and
China, and the end of the Vietnam War. This reduced Japanese
fears of getting caught up in an American war due to the
Mutual Security Treaty. In parallel, the situation allowed
Japan to review its security system (Nakanishi 1999). The
first step in the review was the Defense Agency's report,
"Limits of Peacetime Defense Capability," ordered by Prime
Minister Tanaka. This was an attempt to reframe the Mutual
Security Treaty, not only as a deterrent to threats, but
also as a means to promote the détente then in progress. The
report, renamed "Peacetime Defense Capability," was made
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public in February 1973. However, it caused confusion in the
Diet and was eventually withdrawn, because many Japanese
regarded any hint of buildup in autonomous defense
capability as a revival of prewar militarism.
Michita Sakata took up the post of Director General
of the Defense Agency under Prime Minister Takeo Miki, who
took office in December 1974. Sakata thought it was
essential for the cabinet to receive broad public support
for national defense policymaking. He organized the Society
to Consider Japan's Defense, consisting of scholars and
civilian international security specialists, and in 1976 he
resumed publishing a white paper on national defense, which
had been issued only once previously. Ever since, white
papers have been published annually. In addition, he pushed
to complete a proposal on the fundamentals of defense policy,
which could replace the earlier Defense Buildup Programs.
The concept for the yet unnamed proposal was called
Fundamental Defense Capability, and focused not on preparing
for a specific threat, but on maintaining minimum defense
capability to protect the nation. In other words, it tried
to reduce the risk arising from uncertainty in international
relations by focusing Japan's defense capability
sufficiently to independently repel a small-scale direct
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invasion. Based on this idea, in October 1976 the government
formulated the National Defense Program Outline, the socalled Taiko, thus shifting the emphasis of defense policy
from US-Japan cooperation towards autonomous defense of the
country.
In 1954 when the Self Defense Forces were established,
defense spending was less than three percent of Japan's
gross national product (GNP). During the era of almost
miraculous economic growth in the 1960s, the defense budget
benefited, as well. The defense budget for the Second
Defense Buildup Program, the five-year program of 1962-67,
was approximately 1.16 trillion yen (3.2 billion dollars),
but in the end, the budget exceeded 1.37 trillion yen (3.8
billion dollars). However, the defense budget for FY1966 was
only 1.1 percent of the GNP, far less than the previously
estimated 1.5 percent. This tendency continued during the
Third Defense Buildup Program. The defense expense for
FY1971, the last year of the five-year program, was 670.9
billion yen (1.9 billion dollars), more than half of the
total amount of the previous five years, but only 0.8
percent of the GNP.
When the Taiko was approved in Cabinet meeting,
setting a clear-cut limit on the defense budget was
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suggested. Responding to this, in November 1976, the Miki
Cabinet concluded that annual defense expenses should not
exceed one percent of GNP. The cabinet resolution read: "For
a time, in each fiscal year the total defense expenses
should be targeted within one percent of the amount of the
GNP of the respective year" (Nakanishi 1999). In spite of
restrained words such as "for a time" and "target," the
decision was widely supported by the Japanese public, and it
has endured as a fundamental line of Japanese defense policy
ever since.

6. Comprehensive Security
Having depended heavily on oil supplies from the
Middle East, Japan was forced by the Oil Shock of 1973 to
shift its policy drastically and to make clear its proMiddle East stance in order to secure oil resources. This
experience revealed the vulnerability of the basis of
Japan's economic power. Japan was dependent on imports, not
only for oil, but for various natural resources and foods.
More Japanese came to realize that losing their supply lines
could threaten national security even in the absence of a
military threat. In January 1977, Prime Minister Takeo
Fukuda stated in his administrative policy speech that the
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most important issues for Japan's national economy and for
its people's lives were securing the supply of natural
resources and energy and developing its science and
technology. He concluded that these factors would influence
the survival and prosperity of Japan and were the most
crucial security issues for such a resource-poor country.
During the LDP's presidential election of November
1978, Masayoshi Ohira offered the concept of "comprehensive
security strategy" as one of the three pillars of Japan's
fundamental policy. The first pillar was to firmly sustain
the existing collective security system through the Mutual
Security Treaty with the United States. The second was to
maintain Japan's own high quality, moderately sized defense
capability. Complementing the first two military pillars,
the third pillar, comprehensive security strategy, was a
plan "to preserve Japan's security comprehensively, by
generally improving such domestic affairs as the economy,
education and culture, as well as by strengthening
diplomatic efforts, including international economic
cooperation and cultural diplomacy" (Tanaka 1997, 276-277).
Nonetheless, it was indeed the economy that received
particular emphasis. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) explained in the 1980 Diplomatic Blue Paper
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that Japanese economic aid to Pakistan, Turkey, and Thailand
was "a means to maintain national security in a broad
sense." In this strategy, foreign economic assistance was
used to strengthen the western alliance and balance Japan's
limited military expenditures, constrained to one percent of
GNP. Here the concept of "strategic aid" was born. Strategic
aid is provided based on national interests and goals, in
contrast to "humanitarian aid" providing relief to victims
of wars and natural disasters, with no conditions placed on
the aid. Since 1980, Japan's Official Development Assistance
(ODA) for Third World countries, mainly in the Asia-Pacific
region, increased year-by-year, backed by an enormous trade
surplus. Japan finally became the world's largest ODA
supplier in 1989, surpassing the United States.
During the 1970s, in the international economic
sphere, Japan moved beyond the stage of being caught between
dependence on or independence from the United States. Japan
became the only developed country in Asia, an established
economic power able to play a significant role in the global
economy. Simultaneously, the end of US military and economic
superiority became manifest. International relations were
shifting from "peace maintained by the United States" to
"peace maintained by burden sharing in international
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society" (ibid., 278). In October 1978, the Guidelines for
Defense Cooperation between Japan and the United States, the
so-called Gaidorain, were concluded. They consisted of three
sets of items: 1) a system to obviate invasion by other
states; 2) counteractions to military attacks against Japan;
and 3) cooperation between Japan and the United States on
Far East issues that would significantly impact Japan, but
that emerged outside of Japan. The third point led to hot
debate over the legitimacy of sending the SDF abroad and
over the definition of "Far East." This guideline was
designed to promote substantial Japan-US cooperation, and
since then, Japan-US joint exercises, training, and research
have been actively practiced, starting with the Rim of the
Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 1980. In May 1979, for the
first time, a prime minister of Japan, Ohira, called the
United States Japan's "ally." Gradually but steadily,
realist security policy prevailed in Japan, while it
restricted its own military capability, thus continuing to
take into account pacifist claims.
In the meantime, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan
in December 1979, and the Cold War intensified once again.
President Ronald Reagan came into office in January 1981
"with a great deal of martial music about the Soviet threat
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and the need for a military buildup" (Fitzgerald 2000, 147).
Reagan publicly called the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and
pushed his hostile policies against the USSR. Japan's
perception of the "Soviet threat" heightened rapidly as well.

7. Studies on Missiles in the 1960s and 70s
Studies on missile threats in the early 1960s were
basically focused on defense against enemy bombers and
cruise missiles, but as offensive ballistic missile
technology developed after the "Sputnik Shock" of 1957,
their scope broadened to include anti-missile missiles. In
the United States, President John F. Kennedy's "missile gap"
rhetoric during the 1960 election campaign opened a way to
promote the third generation Nike system, Nike-Zeus. This
three-staged interceptor, employing a nuclear warhead, had
major problems dealing with decoys and multiple targets. In
a 1962 experiment, a radar-guided Zeus missile with a dummy
nuclear warhead was fired, and it passed within two
kilometers of the reentry vehicle of an Atlas ballistic
missile, "close enough to destroy it with a nuclear blast"
(ibid., 115). By 1963 Nike-Zeus was replaced by Nike-X,
reflecting technical advances in radar, rocket acceleration
and data processing systems. The Nike-X system consisted of
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two missiles: the Spartan with a range of 70-100 miles, and
the Sprint with a 20-30 mile range (Handberg 2002, 49-50).
This fourth generation Nike system was politically boosted
by such international events as China's first detonation of
an atomic bomb in October 1964 and the Soviet deployment of
the "Galosh" antiballistic missile (ABM) systems around
Moscow in late 1966 (Mitchell 2000, 7).
In the late 1960s nuclear-tipped ABMs were a matter
of serious debate in the United States. There were a number
of problems with them. First, even if ABMs succeeded in
intercepting incoming hostile missiles, their debris would
produce serious radioactive fallout and threaten the area
they are designed to protect. Second, the nuclear blast
would generate a massive electromagnetic pulse (EMP),
destroying communication lines and delicate radars. Even
though the United States might be able to defend against a
first strike by ballistic missiles, the anti-ballistic
missile system would then be blind and unable to deal with
following attacks. And third, the increasing number of
Soviet nuclear warheads was troublesome. Americans could not
conceive of so many interceptor nuclear warheads detonating
over their own territory. "[N]o one wanted nuclear-tipped
ABMs going off in the atmosphere" (Fitzgerald 2000, 120).

105

The development of multiple independently-targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV) technology during the 1970s accelerated this
trend, and the US government shifted its focus from nuclear
ABM to a "hit-to-kill" type of kinetic-energy weapon (KEW)
for its ABM interceptors.
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, led the "great ABM
debates" and the road to the 1972 ABM Treaty (Mitchell 2000).
He was convinced that "continually enhanced offensive
penetration aids could be deployed that were capable of
overwhelming any possible defensive configuration" (Handberg
2002, 51), and that "the only alternative to spending
billions of dollars on a pointless offensive arms buildup
was to convince the Soviets that ABM deployments were
destabilizing, and to get them to agree to strict limits on
defenses" (Kartchner 2001, 21). Many remember the well-known
episode at Glassboro, New Jersey in June 1967. When
President Lyndon B. Johnson had McNamara explain to Soviet
Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin the rationale for limiting
ABM defenses to head off an arms race in offensive weapons,
the infuriated Kosygin pounded the table shouting, "Defense
is moral, offense is immoral!" But later the Soviets
accepted the idea that building missile defenses could lead
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to an offense-defense arms race and moved toward signing the
ABM Treaty. While America's ABM capability continued to be
based on existing Nike-X technology, in 1967 McNamara gave
the system a new name, Sentinel, in order to gain control
over the debate. The Sentinel was designed as a heavy antiSoviet missile defense system, but McNamara wanted it
cancelled completely to achieve MAD. However, President
Johnson ordered him to deploy some sort of missile defense
system, so McNamara "was compelled to announce a limited ABM
deployment" (Goldfischer 1993, 214). Its rationale was
primarily to protect US cities against accidental attack or
small-scale launch of ballistic missiles, thus "not from
Soviet attack but from a much smaller Chinese threat"
(Graham 2001, 7). China had already conducted six nuclear
experiments, "including the 3-megaton thermonuclear device"
(McMahon 1997, 38).
President Richard Nixon, who took office in January
1969, on one hand pushed ahead with the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. On the other
hand, his administration continued development of the
ballistic missile defense system, renamed Safeguard in March
1969. The Safeguard program was a scaled down version of
missile defense, ostensibly aimed at providing minimal
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defense for the American population. However, its real
objective was to secure US strategic nuclear forces against
a Soviet disarming first strike so as to preserve secondstrike capabilities (Mitchell 2000, 32). The Safeguard
finally survived domestic debates, and Nixon used it as a
bargaining chip in arms control negotiations for offensive
nuclear force reductions with the Soviet Union.
In May 1972 the SALT I Agreement was signed in Moscow,
part two of which, Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, became known as the ABM Treaty. It prohibited the
United States and the Soviet Union from deploying ABM
systems to protect their whole territory, only allowing
defense of two sites: the capital and one ICBM base (the
1974 protocol limited ABM deployment to just one site). This
was for the purpose of protecting command and control
centers and/or securing retaliatory second-strike
capabilities. Consequently, the nuclear superpowers
institutionalized a situation in which they could only
develop their offensive capabilities, leaving themselves
vulnerable to nuclear missile attacks. An attempt to
initiate a nuclear war with a preemptive strike would be a
suicidal act for either state. This should, in theory, have
restricted the superpowers from striking first, leading to
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strategic stability in nuclear competition. The superpowers
established a system where they "deterred" themselves from
waging nuclear war by exclusively depending on their
offensive nuclear capabilities. The United States built its
permitted ABM system, Safeguard, at Grand Forks, North
Dakota, but "it was dismantled as useless" one year later
(Eisendrath et al. 2001, 7).
In the early 1960s, the Japanese public was so
suspicious that emerging missile technology was immediately
linked with nuclear deployment. People tended to confuse
missiles designed to deliver a warhead with the nuclear
weapon itself. Therefore, developing and deploying an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or intermediate
range ballistic missile (IRBM) strongly implied possession
of a nuclear weapon (Japanese Diet, House of Representatives
1963). Introducing such missiles was regarded as being
subject to "prior consultation," and the government could
not help but negotiate with its US counterpart in such a
case. In the meantime, it was confirmed in the Diet that
short-range missiles were not to be considered as a means of
delivery of nuclear warheads.
The Japanese government continued to study GMs, and
as the capability of the SDF grew, the introduction of a
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Nike system to defend the mainland against direct threats
from hostile aircraft became realistic. Research included
work with such weapons as surface-to-air (SAM), air-to-air
(AAM), and anti-tank (ATM) missiles. The defense budget
related to GMs was 286 million yen (794,000 dollars) in
FY1963 and 419 million yen (1.16 million dollars) in FY1964.
The total expense for studying GMs from 1956 to 1964 mounted
to 3.11 billion yen (9.47 million dollars). While admitting
that US missiles were capable of mounting nuclear weapons,
the Japanese government explained that it would study them
with a precondition that such antimissile missiles should
not be equipped with nuclear warheads (Japanese Diet, House
of Councilors 1962).
Since China had detonated its first nuclear device in
October 1964, the Japanese were well aware of nuclear
threats from Communist China. McNamara's statement on a
future "thin" deployment of anti-missile missiles against
the new threat of China's small nuclear arsenal aroused
debates on deploying defensive missiles in Japan in June
1966 (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1966b). Within the
government and political sphere, arguments for and against
ballistic missile defense were intense and continued for
months. Proponents claimed that Japan's missile deployment
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would be purely defensive and avoid conflict with Japan's
Constitution and postwar security policy. Opponents asserted
that missile defense technology was not mature enough to
provide secure defense against ballistic missile attack. In
April 1968 JDA Director Kaneshichi Masuda called the US ABM
system a nuclear weapon system and clearly denied the
possibility of Japanese ABM deployment (Japanese Diet, House
of Councilors 1968). In the end, the JDA found that an ABM
system would not provide secure and meaningful defense. It
offered several reasons for this conclusion: 1) Japan's ABM
deployment might invite a preemptive nuclear assault; 2) it
could lead to political tensions in East Asia; 3) it would
bring domestic turmoil; and 4) the issue of management of
such a system was yet to be resolved with the US government.
Once the US and USSR concluded the ABM Treaty, Japan
lost interest in antiballistic missiles. ABM debate in Japan
died out in the Diet, and did not reemerge until Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech in 1983.

C. The Second Cold War and The Strategic Defense Initiative
(1981-1990)
1. The Issue of Nuclear Weapons Presence in Japan
The renewed Cold War triggered by the Soviet invasion
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of Afghanistan shook the Three Non-Nuclear Principles that
seemed to be unanimously supported by the Japanese. Compared
with the first two principles, non-production and nonpossession, the Japanese government has flexibly managed the
third principle, non-transfer of nuclear weapon into Japan.
Violating the first two principles would clash head on with
the pacifist identity of the Japanese. However, the third
principle was not as generally tangible or politically
strict as the other two. In addition, Japan had control over
the first and second principles, while the third principle
was largely dependent on actions of the United States.
In 1981, Edwin O. Reischauer, former US Ambassador to
Japan, stated that nuclear weapons had been brought into
Japan. Although both governments denied this statement
immediately, it created an intense controversy over whether
nuclear weapons existed within Japan's borders. Numerous
studies on this issue revealed that, in fact, nuclear
weapons had been brought into Japanese territory (Niihara
and Asami 1978; Toyoda 1983; Hara 1992). It is widely known
that the United States was free to transfer nuclear weapons
into Japan under the former Security Treaty, and Okinawa was
an obvious nuclear base under the US occupation before it
was returned to Japan in 1972. As the clause of "prior
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consultation" was added to the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty,
Japan and the United States agreed on the removal of all
nuclear weapons deployed in Okinawa. However, the situation
did not seem to change. It is an open secret that Yokosuka
port near Tokyo, the main naval base for the US Seventh
Fleet, has been a major base of nuclear forces. The "prior
consultation" clause has been substantially disregarded.
Under this clause, the US government must consult with the
Japanese before it brings nuclear weapons into Japan, and
the Japanese government's position is essentially one of
trust that the United States would not transfer nuclear
weapons into its territory without an offer of consultation.
That is, Japan has no way of checking on American nuclear
transfers and can only trust the US to hold to the agreement.
Has the United States upheld the agreement? Information
regarding this issue is also controlled by the United States.
The United States does, in fact, have its nuclear-armed
fleets call at port in Japan without reporting the matter
and even brings nuclear weapons onto its bases in Japan
(Hara 1992, 211). There is no way for the Japanese to
recognize, discuss, or judge the matter, without such
information. If the United States wants to bring nuclear
weapons into this particular area of the Far East, it will
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simply say nothing about it, because the Japanese would
doubtless reject the idea if prior consultation were offered.
From a strategic viewpoint, it is natural to assume
that the United States has nuclear weapons in Japanese
territory as necessary parts of its "nuclear umbrella."
During the Cold War, many believed that the US government
would not have felt secure if their Soviet counterparts were
convinced that there were no nuclear weapons in Japan. The
Americans needed to make the Soviets believe there were
nuclear weapons in Japan (Mainichi Shinbunsha Gaishinbu
1982). One could argue that it is the US nuclear threat, not
the location of particular weapons, that matters. However,
it was difficult to believe that the US would allow a
nuclear "hole" in this critical area, while stationing
"nuclear weapons on US soil in the Pacific (on Guam) and on
certain naval ships" (Van de Velde 1988, 20), and on the
lands of other Asian allies such as South Korea and the
Philippines. Peter Heiz asserts, based on historical
evidence, that nuclear weapons had been stored permanently
in Japan and that Japan was a center of possible nuclear
warfare from the US strategic viewpoint (Heiz 1987, 78-88).
This discussion does not suggest that Japan possesses
nuclear weapons, but does suggest that Japan provided its
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territory to the United States as a strategic nuclear base.
As a declared non-nuclear state, Japan has suffered from a
deep dilemma over nuclear security. Zenko Suzuki, taking
over the government after the unexpected death of Prime
Minister Ohira in the midst of a general election campaign
in April 1980, emphasized the non-military aspects of
national security and maintained a low profile on security
issues. After the government denied the Reischauer comment
in 1981, an American journalist once asked Suzuki, if he
could infer that Japan did not want the US "nuclear
umbrella" because Suzuki would not allow the nuclear-armed
US fleet to call at a Japanese port. Suzuki replied that the
government has to deal with the issues realistically through
prior consultation. Then, when a Japanese reporter asked him
the meaning of "realistically," Suzuki said that the
government might say "yes" or "no." But he hurriedly
corrected his comment, stating, "The Japanese people have a
strong 'nuclear allergy', and I wish to adhere to nonnuclear principles. Therefore, we should come to a
conclusion based on these facts, and we will say 'no',
realistically" (Mainichi Shinbunsha Gaishinbu 1982, 178-180).
Suzuki's confusion symbolized the ambiguity and dilemma of
Japan's security policy.
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2. The Nakasone Era and the Expanding Role of the Self
Defense Forces
In contrast with his predecessors, Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone, after taking office in November 1982, got
actively involved in military aspects of Japan's national
security policy. Nakasone once insisted on Japan's
rearmament through constitutional amendment when he was a
member of the National Democratic Party in the early 1950s.
Later he became known as "an advocate for constitutional
amendment" in the LDP. However, after assuming the post of
prime minister, he kept silent on the issue because of
strong opposition in the Diet.
The "Three Principles on Arms Export" prohibit
exporting weapons to communist countries, to countries to
which United Nations resolutions prohibit the export of
weapons, and to countries that are, or are likely to be,
involved in international conflict. These principles were
for the first time presented by the Sato Cabinet to the Diet
in April 1967, and the Miki Cabinet proclaimed the
principles as the unified view of the government in February
1976. However, following strong pressure from the United
States, in January 1983 the Nakasone Cabinet decided, in
exception to the principles, to license Japanese weapons
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technology to the United States. This clearly showed the
government's prioritization of the realist US-Japan alliance
over pacifist principles. In addition, the Nakasone
government approved non-government level participation in
the SDI announced by the Reagan Administration in March 1983.
This will be analyzed in detail in the following section.
Furthermore, Nakasone increased annual expenditure on
defense far more than other areas in FY1984. Finally, in
January 1987, the cabinet approved an accounting change:
estimating the defense budget not on a year-on-year basis,
which had been common practice, but on the calculated cost
of the five-year Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program.
Accordingly, in the following year the Japanese defense
budget weighed in at 1.003 percent of GNP, the first time
that a defense budget had exceeded the one percent limit
that was Japanese national policy. This was taken by the
public as an important sign of Nakasone's hawkish view on
national security, already indicated by remarks such as,
"Japan is an unsinkable aircraft carrier of the United
States" and "Japan and the United States share the same
destiny."
Due to the renewed Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union, Japan-US military cooperation expanded,
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and the capability as well as the role of the Self Defense
Forces progressively increased through the 1980s. The Ground
Self Defense Force was no longer a sub-military organization
just for containing domestic disturbances, but a powerful
armed force that could conduct military operations beyond
its coastline. In 1981, then Prime Minister Suzuki promised
the United States that Japan would defend the one-nauticalmile sea-lane off the Japanese coast. However, there were no
specific regulations regarding sea-lane defense, and this
move substantively expanded operations of the SDF beyond
Japan's territorial waters without any clear defense policy
changes. The Air Self Defense Forces had also widened the
concept of "self-defense" during the 1980s. Japan introduced
and deployed F-16 fighters at Misawa Air Base in northern
Honshu (main island), which potentially represented an
offensive capability because their range of attack included
eastern Russia. The Maritime Self Defense Force reinforced
its capability as well by deploying four new Aegis warships,
even though it had already focused heavily on antisubmarine
warfare capabilities. Those military buildups obscured the
clear-cut distinction between offense and defense in Japan's
national defense policy.
In the late 1980s, Japan-US relations began to sour
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while the United States and the Soviet Union came closer
with the emergence of Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the
Soviet Communist Party. The Toshiba Incident occurred in
April 1987. It was revealed that some parts of a screw
propeller, which could reduce submarine noise and help them
go undetected by US sonar, were exported to the USSR against
regulations of the Coordinating Committee for Export to
Communist Areas (COCOM). This incident reinforced Japan's
image as a selfish country that sought its own economic
interests at the price of the security of the western
alliance. In May 1987, Japan was requested by the United
States to deploy its minesweepers to the Iran-Iraqi War to
protect international shipping. This brought a controversy
over Japan's legitimate contribution to international
society. Faced with strong opposition, the Nakasone Cabinet
finally refused. Instead, Japan provided expanded economic
assistance to countries in the region and increased the
budget for supporting US facilities in Japan (Keddell 1990,
15). The Japanese were again shaken in the dilemma between a
realist policy of cooperation with the United States and
pacifist popular opposition to sending the SDF abroad.
As the Cold War came to an end in a series of
upheavals such as the Tiananmen Square Incident and
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democratization movements in East Europe in 1989, notions of
the "Japan threat" and "containment of Japan" swirled in the
United States, in response to the rise of Japan and economic
friction between the two economic superpowers. Some writers
even predicted a war with Japan in the near future (Friedman
and Lebard 1991). The Japanese public responded
correspondingly; for instance, the book, Japan that Can Say
No, became a best-seller in Japan (Morita and Ishihara 1989).

3. Strategic Defense Initiative
I call upon the scientific community in this country,
who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great
talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to
give us the means of rendering these weapons impotent
and obsolete. (Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983)
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan gave his famous
"Star Wars" speech. For the purpose of making nuclear
weapons "impotent and obsolete," he proposed building a
shield that could shoot down incoming ballistic missiles.
This took US "defense experts in and out of the
administration" by surprise (Fitzgerald 2000, 210). The SDI
invited huge debate in and out of the country since it
directly challenged the prevailing posture that had been a
foundation of arms control and strategic stability for the
past decade (Saito 1992, 23). The Japanese government
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reacted calmly, about a month later announcing that it could
"understand" this strategic choice of the Reagan
Administration, as its intention was defensive and moral.
The SDI program, however, was not formally launched
until Reagan entered his second term in 1985. The president
for the first time explained his SDI plans to his Japanese
counterpart when they met in Los Angeles in early January.
Prime Minister Nakasone expressed his interest in SDI. He
expressed his "understanding" of the SDI study for four
reasons: 1) the SDI is not a nuclear weapon; 2) it is a
defensive program; 3) it is designed to protect against
nuclear ballistic missiles; and 4) its ultimate objective is
the total abolition of nuclear weapons from the earth. In
March, US Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger formally
wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe and invited
Japan to participate in the SDI.
In Japan, the opposition to nuclear weapons was such
that whether the SDI interceptor was a nuclear weapon or not
was a delicate and important issue, and the non-nuclear
feature of the SDI was a crucial point in the government's
participation. As mentioned earlier, the US government had
already retreated from developing nuclear-tipped antiballistic missiles. Nonetheless, the space based X-ray laser
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beam of the planned interceptor would be generated as a
result of a nuclear explosion, and this issue led to a
debate in Japan. The US government repeatedly emphasized
that the SDI was not a system with nuclear weapons, and the
Nakasone Cabinet made this point clear by defining nuclear
weapons as follows: "a nuclear weapon is a weapon that uses
radioactive energy generated by nuclear fission or fusion
reactions for the purpose of destruction or slaughter"
(Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1986b). Thus the Xray laser that would not directly produce a nuclear blast to
destroy enemy missiles was not regarded as a nuclear weapon.
While finding moral justifications in Reagan's
position, Nakasone offered five conditions for Japan's
participation in the SDI, adding that Japan's participation
must be based on thorough and prudent discussions. First,
the United States should not pursue strategic superiority
over the USSR. Second, the SDI should be conducive to
strengthening overall deterrent strategy. Third, offensive
weaponry should be substantially reduced simultaneously.
Fourth, the SDI should be in compliance with the ABM Treaty.
And fifth, the development and deployment of the SDI system
should proceed in consultation with US allies and negotiated
with the Soviet Union. The Japanese government sent research
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groups to the United States three times, simultaneously
monitoring the attitudes of other US allies. Following the
UK, West Germany, Italy, France and Canada, Japan announced
in September 1986 that the Japanese private sector would
participate in the SDI. This decision was made based
primarily on the political position of Japan as a member of
the western alliance. The JDA explained that the SDI did not
aim at offensive military buildup, and it was "congruent
with Japan's fundamental position as a peaceful nation"
(Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1986a). Japan
officially signed a memorandum with the United States in
July 1987. The West Pacific Area Missile Defense (WESTPAC)
program started in November 1988, and top players in the
Japanese military industry, including Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, independently joined in.
Heated debates continued in the United States in
terms of military effectiveness of the system, cost of
development and deployment, and implications for relations
with the Soviet Union. The concept of layered defense, which
existed as early as the 1960s, was developed systematically
in the 1980s, envisioning deployment of "several missile
defense systems, each designed to intercept an attacking
missile or warhead at a different stage of its flight
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trajectory" (Hildreth and Pagliano 2004, 18). The SDI
missile defense system consisted of four stages: boost phase,
post-boost phase, mid-course, and terminal or reentry phase.
The planned space–based, mid-course interceptor was the
target of especially severe criticism. Proponents of the SDI,
who believed in the US technology that had put humans on the
moon, were optimistic about the SDI program. But the
expected technological breakthroughs did not occur, and
critics stressed that space-based interceptors would be
"sitting ducks" and that the SDI was a task like "pulling
the Titanic from the ocean floor and putting it into orbit"
(Fitzgerald 2000, 375). The SDI consumed more than 120
billion dollars in FY1985-88, with no idea how much eventual
implementation of the system might cost. Another worry was
the Soviet Union, which remained skeptical about SDI
technology and about the intentions of the other superpower.
In the meantime, important political events shook the
Reagan Administration in the latter half of the 1980s.
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail
Gorbachev launched his peace initiative after taking the
post in March 1986. Focus shifted from the SDI to arms
reduction such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The
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popularity of the SDI in the US public had peaked in October
1986, but gradually fell by the autumn of the next year.

D. The End of the Cold War and The New Era in Japanese
Security (1991-)
1. The Gulf War and Japan's International Contribution
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the following war
in the Persian Gulf shook the foundations of Japan's
national security policy. The end of the Cold War eliminated
the danger of a full-scale nuclear war and the Soviet threat.
However, ethnic conflicts surfaced all over the world, and a
new kind of threat, terrorism, emerged. At the outbreak of
the Gulf War, the world started seeking a new world order in
place of the Cold War system. Initially the interruption of
oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait did not cause much
disruption in Japan, and the Gulf Crisis did not become a
major security issue there. However, it was impossible for
Japan, as the second largest economic power in the world,
not to join in the response against Iraq. Yet, the situation
was neither a war involving invasion upon the Japanese
territory nor a war that could be reasonably rationalized as
self-defense. The tangled, torturous arguments over how to
react left Japan incapable of any timely, significant

125

involvement. After drawing harsh criticism from the
international community, Japan provided a total of 13.5
billion dollars in financial assistance and sent several
non-military personnel to participate in the operation, but
much too late. When the Kuwaiti government published an
advertisement in an American newspaper to express its
appreciation to the world after the war, Japan was not
included. It gave the general impression that Japan was
subject to ridicule and loss of esteem, appearing as a
country that having shed neither blood nor sweats, tried to
make up for it with money in response to criticism. During
the Cold War, Japanese foreign policy was "labeled decidedly
passive and reactive" (Fukushima 1999,164). Now, Japan was
bitterly asked how it intended to be a responsible partner
in international security efforts and was severely
challenged as a member of international society.
After the war, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
dispatched minesweepers of the Maritime Self Defense Forces
(MSDF) to the Persian Gulf to clear underwater mines, and
Japan recovered some respect. It was the first time that
Japan had sent its minesweepers to operate beyond its own
waters since the Korean War. Debate on sending the SDF
abroad subsequently turned hot, and the issue of Japan's
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contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) was
discussed as well. The Kaifu Cabinet submitted the United
Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to the Diet in October 1990,
but it was scrapped. At that time, more than half the
Japanese public opposed participating in PKO, with only 20
percent in support. The debate continued, and in June 1992
the International Peace Cooperation Law, the so-called PKO
Cooperation Law, was passed in the Diet. During this period,
debate among politicians, journalists and scholars heated up,
and public opinion changed dramatically, with those for and
against Japan's participation in UN PKO roughly equal.
Ichiro Ozawa, then secretary general of the LDP, claimed
that Japan could participate in UN PKO, including military
operations, without constitutional amendment, and he put
forward the "normal power" argument suggesting that Japan
should participate in common international duties just as
the other responsible countries do. "The responsible
practices should include military roles in the service of
international security" (Ozawa 1993). Masayoshi Takemura,
the leader of New Party Sakigake, stood in direct opposition
and insisted that Japan need not make a military
contribution in line with its economic power and should feel
no responsibilities as a major power (Kato 2002). The
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division in Japan's national identity over how Japan should
place itself in international society was very serious.
Based on the PKO Cooperation Law, the Japanese government
sent 2,000 SDF personnel to the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) and provided logistics support. With the
success of the Cambodia peace process, the majority of
Japanese came to support participation of the SDF in PKO.
With the domestic political stalemate, the collapse
of the economic bubble, and recurring exposure of corruption
among bureaucrats, Japan of the 1990s was in a somewhat
chaotic situation. The LDP was divided over political reform,
and the 1955-system finally came to an end when the LDP lost
power in August 1993. In the following coalition governments,
policies regarding national security remained fuzzy because
coalition parties took fundamentally different positions on
security policy. Then the leader of the Socialist Party,
Tomiichi Murayama, became prime minister of a coalition
government in June 1994, and stunned the Japanese people by
drastically shifting the Socialist's view on national
security policy. He officially accepted the US-Japan
military alliance and stated his intention to "firmly"
maintain the Mutual Security Treaty, even recognizing the
Self Defense Forces as constitutional. The Socialist Party,
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which had argued for unarmed neutralism, in a sudden stroke
tried to accommodate the actuality of the US-Japan alliance
and the reality of international society. However, this move
led to a loss in public support that continues to this day.
There were also intense journalistic debates over the
search for Japan's national identity. On one hand, Yomiuri
Shinbun published its original "Tentative Plan" for a
Constitutional Amendment in November 1994. It recommended
abolishing Section Two of Article 9 while keeping Section
One, clarifying the existence of the SDF by stating, "Japan
can maintain an organization for self-defense." On the other
hand, Asahi Shinbun advocated "constitutional" diplomacy in
an editorial in May 1995, suggesting that Japan should focus
on non-military contributions to international society (Kato
1998).
Interestingly, the economic depression of the 1990s,
following the collapse of the economic bubble and various
financial crises, threatened the economic basis of Japan's
national power. But this point was hardly recognized as a
national security issues.

2. Re-Definition of the US-Japan Security System
In September 1995, the rape of a twelve-year-old girl
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by three US Marines in Okinawa shocked the Japanese people.
Residents in Okinawa were outraged, and the incident led a
majority of Japanese to express opposition to the US-Japan
mutual security system. Okinawa represents only one percent
of the Japanese land area, but contains seventy-five percent
of the total area of US military bases in Japan. This has
led to a preponderance of crimes by US personnel being
committed in Okinawa. Mainland Japanese at last began to
understand that the mutual security system designed to
defend the country could also threaten the safety of
residents in Okinawa. The US-Japan alliance, which had been
"drifting" since losing its principal perceived threat, the
Soviet Union, was thrown into its greatest crisis (Funabashi
1997). Nonetheless, both governments made every effort to
defuse the situation, and the discussion of the alliance was
moved from breaking it off to firmly upholding it, but with
sufficient consideration for the people of Okinawa. As a
result, it was agreed that the United States would relocate
an air base and return Futenma Air Station to Japan, but
leave the foundation of the US-Japan security system
unchanged.
In contrast with former Soviet-bloc countries in
Eastern Europe, which had achieved democratization only to
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face a new set of ethnic conflicts, remains of the Cold War
structure still existed in East Asia. South Korea undertook
a diplomatic offensive including establishment of formal
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990,
while North Korea lost economic aid from its patron.
Although it maintained a stable relationship with China,
North Korea was economically pushed into a corner and
increasingly isolated in the international community. It
began to focus on nuclear and missile development (Wada
1998). North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in
March 1993, and in May it succeeded in developing a midrange ballistic missile Nodong that could reach any part of
Japan (Ozu 2002, 204). Tensions rose in the region. In the
meantime, Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui's visit to the
United States in June 1995 triggered renewed confrontation
in the Taiwan Strait. China conducted a missile launch
exercise with live ammunition, and military tension between
Taiwan and China mounted. Obviously, Cold War-era tensions
had changed, but had not disappeared.
In these circumstances, Japan and the United States
initiated a restructuring of the Mutual Security Treaty and
their alliance. In November 1995, Japan laid down the New
National Defense Program Outline (New Taiko), which
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reconfirmed the significance of the Japan-US mutual security
system and aimed to make international contributions more
positively and actively. In April 1996, President Bill
Clinton visited Japan and introduced the Japan-US Joint
Communiqué on Security with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.
This was called a "redefinition of the Japan-US mutual
security system." Key components of the communiqué were the
following: First, the mutual security system should aim at
"peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region" instead of
facing "the threat of Soviet Union," the common enemy in the
Cold War era. Second, it committed both sides to the
presence of US military forces in Japan and surrounding
areas. The communiqué was released in concert with the
Strategic Report on East Asia issued in February 1995, which
confirmed that the US should keep around 100,000 personnel
in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, in September 1998, new
Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (New Gaidorain)
were established. Thus, the former Taiko of 1976 and the
Guidelines of 1978 were both replaced for the new era of the
Japan-US alliance.
The most notable feature of the redefined Japan-US
mutual security system was the introduction of the concept,
shuhen jitai (situations in areas surrounding Japan). This
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concept was not geographic, but was defined as "situations
that could gravely affect the peace and security of Japan."
Hence the geographic aspect of the Japan-US Mutual Security
Treaty, which for years had been limited to the "Far East,"
was now extended over the entire globe. The redefined JapanUS cooperative relationship and the national security
policies of Japan were quickly initiated. Bills regarding
shuhen jitai were passed in the Diet, and air tankers and
spy satellites were slated for development. The former
enabled mid-air aircraft refueling, and the latter enhanced
the area for intelligence and reconnaissance. Due to these
moves, Japan's "offensive" capability was increased
significantly, and the line between offense and defense was
further blurred.
Japan seemed to have begun moving toward strategies
beyond its borders on land, at sea, and in the air, backed
by cutting edge technologies in the areas of command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). However, the legal
basis for military actions of the Self Defense Forces
remained unclear. There was no legal basis for the SDF to
operate freely, even on Japanese soil and even in an
emergency. With a watchful eye on the situation in the
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Korean Peninsula, the government sped to establish
emergency-related legislation. In June 2003, the Diet passed
three bills, finally defining specific wartime actions,
which had been considered taboo since the Mitsuya Study.

3. The Constitution of Japan and the Self Defense Forces
After the end of World War II, as the international
atmosphere has changed, Japan has steadily developed and
strengthened its defense capability, symbolized by the
establishment and development of the Self Defense Forces.
This change was achieved not by revising the Constitution,
but by changing its interpretation. The government's
approach to the issue has been called a "constitutional
transition method" or ridiculed as an "interpretive revision
of the Constitution." The evolution of the government's
interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution has
substantially altered its original aims, and over time the
Japanese people have come to accept these interpretations.
The shifts in interpretation have had the effect of a
revision of the Constitution without its actually being
altered. This change has involved a process of refining the
definition of the armed forces in such a way that they
should not fall under the definition of military forces as

134

prohibited by Section Two of Article 9 (Kobayashi 1998). The
constitutional basis of the Self Defense Forces is still
very vulnerable, but since the end of the Cold War, the
public view toward the Constitution and the Self Defense
Forces has changed to a considerable degree. Lately, the
status of the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces has
risen steadily, and the Defense Agency was even upgraded to
a ministry-level organization in January 2007. Emergency
disaster relief missions of the SDF have always been highly
regarded. In general people preferred struggles against
nature to the killing of war. Thus the public has supported
participation of the SDF in international rescue efforts,
and the SDF has steadily built up its track record of
disaster relief. The majority of Japanese people now
recognize the SDF, and many even acknowledge it as a
military force. From other countries' point of view, the
Self Defense Forces are clearly a world-class military force.
Constitutional Research Councils were established in
both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet in January 2000,
and have been discussing possible constitutional amendments,
involving Article 9. In November 2000, even the Communist
Party recognized the Self Defense Forces.
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4. The GPALS Program
Facing the end of the Cold War, George Bush,
following President Reagan, reviewed the SDI and announced
the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
program in January 1991. The GPALS shifted the focus of
defense from massive nuclear attack in total warfare with
the Soviet Union to accidental launch of nuclear missiles or
limited ballistic missile assaults (up to several hundred
warheads) by Third World countries. This change was a
response to the Gulf War experience in which Iraq attacked
Saudi Arabia and Israel with Soviet made Scud B ballistic
missiles, and to the proliferation in the Third World of
chemical weapons, which are called "the nuclear weapons of
the poor."
The protection objective of the missile defense
system was reevaluated as well. While SDI was to mainly
protect the continental US, GPALS focused on the protection
of US forces deployed abroad and US allies. The components
of GPALS were: 1) Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to defend US
troops abroad and allies and friends, 2) National Missile
Defense (NMD) to protect the US mainland, and 3) Global
Missile Defense (GMD) to defend against long-range ballistic
missiles. GMD included a space-based anti-ballistic system
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with a thousand very small, highly intelligent orbiting
satellites with kinetic warheads. They were called
"Brilliant Pebbles," and were an attempt to avoid problems
with the SDI concept of large sophisticated battle stations
and nuclear-pumped X-ray laser satellites.
GPALS also faced harsh criticisms. First, as with the
SDI, the estimated 41 billion dollar cost of development and
deployment was very large. Second, GPALS would violate the
ABM Treaty's prohibition against deployment of antiballistic missiles in space. And third, threats from Third
World ballistic missiles were still remote. The prolonged
debate did not quiet until Bush left office. Theater missile
defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD) were
succeeded by the Clinton Administration's ballistic missile
defense programs.
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Chapter IV
MISSILE DEFENSE: BACKGROUND, CURRENT ISSUES, AND THE FUTURE

We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both
offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no
longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear
retaliation. Defense can strengthen deterrence by
reducing the incentive for proliferation. (George W.
Bush on May 1, 2001)
This chapter will analyze the course of events in the
United States and Japan with regard to missile defense,
evaluate the utility and dangers of Japan's missile defense
program, and consider what defense policy Japan should
choose in the future.

A. Missile Defense Concepts

Before we enter the missile defense debate, we need
to clarify concepts regarding missile defense in order to
avoid confusion due to the varying usage of strategic terms
over the course of history. The broad concept of "strategic
defense" can be divided into three spheres: ground, sea and
air defenses. Strategic missile defense belongs to air
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defense, including defense against bombers, fighters, and so
on.
Missile defense is still a broad concept. A "missile"
is a military weapon normally carrying a warhead and
guidance system. It is launched on land, at sea or in the
air. There are two distinct types of missiles. Cruise
missiles (CM), powered by jet engines, are low flying
strategic guided missiles. They are essentially unmanned
aircrafts, but are distinct from unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) in that cruise missiles are used only as weapons and
not for reconnaissance. Ballistic missiles (BM), powered by
rocket engines, can be launched into space. Missile defense
might be expected to include response to both CMs and BMs,
but in practice it usually entails only defense against BMs.
The term "missile defense" has come into official use
relatively recently. "MD" has been used for US missile
defense programs since the current Bush administration
removed the distinction between national missile defense
(NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) in May 2001.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD), a general concept commonly
used in the past, will be avoided in this study. This word,
with its long history, can be confusing since the BMD
concept was used in both President Reagan's Strategic
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Defense Initiative (SDI) program and President Clinton's
program in different ways. BMD in the former was a part of
SDI combined with satellite systems, while BMD in the latter
was a total program equivalent to SDI, consisting of NMD and
TMD. Moreover, the fact that the Clinton Administration's
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was formerly
called the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
may cause additional confusion. The BMDO was reformulated
and promoted as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) under the
current Bush Administration.
The US missile defense programs, NMD and TMD, were
distinguished in terms of what/who is being protected and
what range of ballistic missiles are being defended against.
In this study, NMD is defined as a missile defense system
that protects the continental territory and civilians of the
United States, and TMD is defined as one that protects US
forces stationed abroad. Distinction by range is dismissed
since there was no agreement on the exact range that divides
NMD and TMD.
The Japanese government avoided using the term TMD in
joint missile defense development with the United States.
The US TMD in East Asia should in large part play the role
of national missile defense for Japan. But the Japanese
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regarded TMD as a specific US program, which would defend US
forces stationed not only within Japan's borders but also
outside Japanese territory. On this line of argument Japan's
participation in the US TMD could have been considered a
stepping out of the constitutional self-defense mandate that
prohibits collective defense. Therefore the Japanese
government has called the joint study program BMD. This may
add even more confusion. In May 1996, the Japanese
government made clear that TMD is defined as a specific
system of the United States designed to defend US troops,
not only in Japan but also around the world, as well as US
allies and friends. In order to avoid confusion, this study
will use the term JMD to describe Japan's own missile
defense program, apart from TMD.
In sum, missile defense terms printed in lower case,
such as "missile defense," are used to describe general
concepts. Those in upper case represent specific missile
defense programs of the day, such as SDI of the Reagan
Administration, GPALS of the Bush Administration, NMD and
TMD of the Clinton Administration, MD of the George W. Bush
administration, and JMD of the Japanese government.
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B. Missile Defense Development in the United States

As reviewed in the previous chapter, the issue of
missile defense has been debated in the United States since
the 1950s, however, such programs as SDI and GPALS remained
merely an unrealized vision. In terms of an actual missile
defense system in the post-Cold War environment, the debate
did not become animated until the presidential campaign of
2000. Debate on missile defense intensified between the
Republicans, who actively supported the program, and the
Democrats, who were less enthusiastic. President Clinton's
missile defense program was composed of TMD and NMD. TMD was
a combination of upper tier system (Army Theater High
Altitude Area Defense [THAAD], Navy Theater Wide Defense
[NTWD], and Airborne laser [ABL] of the Air Force) and lower
tier system (Army Patriot Advanced Capability 3 [PAC-3],
Navy Area Defense [NAD]). The Medium Extended Air Defense
System (MEADS) was developed in cooperation with Germany and
Italy, and the Arrow System developed with Israel is also a
lower tier system. NMD was to defend the continental
territory of the United States from a limited ballistic
missile attack, succeeding the GPALS program. NMD consisted
of land-based interceptors, radar and space-based sensor
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systems. The Clinton administration prioritized TMD, because
the United States perceived more imminent threats to its
foreign military bases from Iraqi Scud and North Korean
Nodong missiles, and because NMD faced the political
obstacle of violating the ABM treaty.
After taking office, President George W. Bush
declared his stance on the promotion of missile defense. He
announced in his speech at the National Defense University
in May: "We need a new framework that allows us to build
missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's
world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the
30-year-old ABM Treaty" (Bush 2001). President Bush's
calling for major deployment of missile defense systems and
removal of the distinction between the NMD and TMD programs
indicated that the United States would promote its MD in a
comprehensive manner under one administrative umbrella,
despite technical and conceptual distinctions between NMD
and TMD, and despite vigorous criticism of these programs
(the criticisms are analyzed in detail in the next chapter).
A new stage was set for debate on missile defense. Initially,
the Bush administration did not make clear its plans for
integration of the two programs or what specific kind of
system it intended to pursue. It did not identify "an
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architecture that it [would] seek to deploy nor [establish]
a schedule for the development and deployment of any
particular system or element, but, a clear underlying
objective [was] the early deployment of a defense against
missiles aimed at U.S. territory" (Hildreth and Woolf 2004,
5). Later it suggested that it had been taking a "spiral
approach," adopting a flexible and incremental course of
development dictated by technological advances, instead of
employing rigid, long-term planning. This approach has also
been called "strategic ambiguity."
The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001
immediately shifted the focus of US national security policy
to anti-terrorism campaigns, but it did not eliminate debate
on the US MD program. Given the impact of the 9-11 terrorist
attacks, two separate paths could have been followed: the
United States could pursue an active MD shield program,
taking into consideration possible future terrorist assaults
with ballistic missiles (Funabashi 2001, Spring 2003), or it
could reconsider the program and prioritize other counterterrorist options, some of which are currently under way
(Dowd 2001, Klare 2003, Wright 2003). In the end, President
Bush was preoccupied by ballistic missile threats from Iraq,
Iran and North Korea, and the Bush Administration "seemed as
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determined as ever to move ahead with a national defense
system" (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2001). Attention
was distracted from missile defense issues for a while, but
President Bush firmly decided to pursue a missile shield for
the country. US MD plans have significant strategic
implications not only for security policies of the United
States and its allies, but for future world security.

C. Japan's Missile Defense: the Program

In 1993 the US government officially proposed that
Japan join its TMD program. This coincided with North
Korea's declaration of its withdrawal from the NPT and its
first launch of a Nodong short-range ballistic missile. At
the Japan-US Defense Summit in September 1993, it was agreed
that a forum for policy study on ballistic missile defense
would be established under the Security Sub-Committee (SSC).
Following this agreement, the TMD Working Group (TMD-WG) was
established in December 1993. Since then, TMD-WG meetings
have been a forum for exchange of information at the
administrative level, including opportunities for the US
government to further explain its TMD programs. As mentioned
earlier, the Japanese government has avoided using the term
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TMD for its own missile defense program, and called it BMD
(relabeled JMD for purposes of this study).
In September 1994, it was agreed that a Japan-US
bilateral study would be undertaken to allow Japan to obtain
the information on TMD necessary for its policy decisions.
JDA established the Office of Ballistic Missile Defense
Research (BMDR) in April 1995 (Venable 2001, 80). Since
January 1995, experts from both nations have been studying
the characteristics of ballistic missiles, the technological
feasibility of missile defense systems, and so on. A white
paper on defense claimed, "it is necessary to investigate
various issues of BMD thoroughly from comprehensive
perspectives in order to make decisions on Japan's future
attitude" (Japan Defense Agency 1999). Based on this
recognition, the JDA has been conducting a study, entitled
Comprehensive Research on Japan's Future Air Defense System,
with cooperation from the United States. Costing 560 million
yen (4.7 million dollars) from FY1995–98, the study focused
on TMD weapon systems, sensors, and Battlefield Management
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (BMC4I) systems. Continued cooperation in these
studies on missile defense was assured by the Japan US Joint
Declaration on Security in April 1996, signed by then
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President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto.
In August 1998, North Korea's test launch of a threestage rocket, possibly an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) Taepodong 1, spurred the argument for JMD. The rocket
flew over Japanese territory, and the Japanese people were
stunned and deeply humiliated by the intimidating test of a
missile "over their heads." At the Security Consultative
Committee (SCC or "2 plus 2") meeting on September 20, 1998,
the Director of Japan's Defense Agency and the US Secretary
of Defense expressed a commitment to proceed with further
work in the direction of conducting cooperative research on
missile defense. In October the Security Council of Japan
convened, and the JDA announced that it would begin internal
coordination in the Cabinet with an additional budget
request. In December, prior to the compilation of the
government's budget for the fiscal year 1999, relevant
ministers met in an attempt to reach consensus on the
importance of JMD. Subsequently, on December 25, the
Security Council of Japan was convened, and it approved the
initiation of Japan-US cooperative technological research on
Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD). This was later reorganized
as the Sea-based Midcourse Defense (SMD) system.
Simultaneously, the government announced its views in the
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"Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary Regarding Japan-US
Cooperative Technological Research on Ballistic Missile
Defense."
Through its research to date, JDA has reached the
basic conclusion that cutting-edge technology, including
Japan's own, has reached a level where JMD systems are
feasible, if not today, at least in the foreseeable future.
By 1997 JDA concluded that the NTWD system "would be the TMD
system most amenable to bilateral cooperation and capable of
defending Japan most effectively" (Takeda 2005, 67). At the
Japan-US Defense Summit in December 1998, it was announced
that JDA was going to begin domestic development, with
coordination on technical matters where such cooperation was
possible. JDA appropriated 26.2 billion yen (218.3 million
dollars) over the 1999-2005 periods for joint efforts with
the United States on Requirement Analysis and Design (RA&D)
for the following four components of NTWD (The RA&D included
risk reduction activities concerning elements of the
infrared seeker).
1) Nosecone: to protect the infrared seeker from heat
while in flight
2) Kinetic warhead: warhead that directly hits the
incoming ballistic missile and destroys it
with kinetic energy
3) Infrared seeker: seeker that uses infrared rays to
detect and follow targets
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4) Second-stage rocket motor: second-stage rocket of
a three-stage missile
In December 2003, the Security Committee and the
Cabinet Meeting of the Japanese government approved the
introduction of JMD into Japan's defense posture. Japan has
officially shifted its position from the stage of joint
study to that of development and deployment. These decisions
regarding JMD did not attract much public attention nor
received major media coverage. However, it signified that
Japan had taken a step toward a major shift in its strategic
thinking with regard to security policy. The decisions show
the Japanese government's willingness to defend Japan with
its own missile defense shield, and could represent a
substantial shift in defense strategy from dependence on US
deterrent forces to its own active defense.

D. Japan's Missile Defense: the Debate

The Japanese government has put forward the following
rationale for establishing its own missile defense system:
First, the significant proliferation of ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represent an emerging
threat. Forty-six or more states possess ballistic missiles
as of 2005, and the threat of those weapons has increased
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substantially (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005a).
Second, Japan has no system that can defend its territory
and people in case of actual ballistic missile attack, and
there is no viable alternative to missile shields like JMD
(Ishiba 2005). Third, Japan's missile defense shield is
purely defensive, and will not pose any threat to other
states. Japan deploys neither ballistic missiles nor WMD,
and building a JMD system is not likely to destabilize
strategic relations with neighboring states. The government
has been especially conscientious about JMD's defensive
posture in line with its national sen-shu boei (exclusively
defense-oriented) policy.
Missile defense issues have been brought up in the
Diet more often since 1995, particularly after North Korea
launched its three-stage missile over Japanese territory on
August 31, 1998. However, they have been overshadowed by
other sensitive and more immediate security issues such as
the rape incident in Okinawa in 1995, the debates in 1997
and 1999 on the Japan-US Security Treaty's "guideline," and
the collision of the US submarine, Greenville, with the
Japanese fishing trawler, Ehimemaru, in February 2001. For
some time following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, there
appeared to be little interest in Japan in discussing JMD.
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Although MD issues had been in the forefront since President
Bush took office and announced his strong commitment to
"deploy missile defenses to strengthen global security and
stability" (Bush 2001), these issues disappeared both from
the Japanese Diet and the media after September 11. The
primary issue then was whether and how Japan should dispatch
the SDF to support retaliatory US attacks on the al Qaeda
terrorist network and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, and
subsequently in the Iraq War. Nonetheless, cooperation with
the United States on missile defense did not slow down and
has been steadily maintained. Joint study on NTWD was
succeeded by SMD midcourse defense research, and it has
remained intact in President Bush's current MD program. The
debate on MD issues in Japan was revitalized after the
government decided to move toward development and deployment
of JMD in December 2003.
In the Japanese Diet, debate on JMD issues has pitted
proponents--the government, the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), and other conservative parties (such as the
Democratic Party, Conservative Party and the Liberal Party)
against critics--the Social Democratic Party and the
Communist Party. Nevertheless, as the Social Democratic
Party has been losing seats in the Diet since 2000, critical
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voices have been progressively muted. Generally, these
debates have been tedious and unproductive, due to repeated
assertions by ministers and government officials that the
missile defense issues are still under investigation
(Namatame 2003). Missile defense can be regarded as a
specific military posture on a strategic level, so it is
essentially a matter of choice for the Ministry of Defense
(MOD) and SDF, not for politicians or general public.
However, it will have a tremendous impact on broader
Japanese security and strategic policy.
The most remarkable feature of the domestic debate
regarding JMD since 1993 is the long-term consistency of the
government's policy toward JMD. This consistency has been
maintained despite the frequent regime transitions following
the demise of the 1955-system in which the LDP dominated the
Diet. These include the post-LDP coalitions--Hosokawa and
Hata administrations (August 1993-June 1994); the LDP
coalition with the Socialist Party--Murayama and Hashimoto
administrations (June 1994-July 1998); the LDP coalitions
without Socialists--Obuchi, Mori, Koizumi, Abe, and Fukuda
administrations (July 1998-September 2008). This may be
attributed to Japan's security policymaking process, in
which bureaucrats in MOFA and MOD take leadership in making

152

concrete decisions and crafting bills. It is also a
manifestation of the stable relationship between Japan and
the United States, despite the occasional political tensions
and the "drifting" alliance during this period (Funabashi
1997).
The following section reviews the debates in terms of
five specific points of contention. These aspects are: 1)
nature of the threat; 2) technological feasibility; 3) costs
and other economic factors; 4) international political
relations, especially with Russia and China, including the
international legal dimension of the 1972 ABM Treaty; 5)
domestic Japanese issues regarding missile defense; and 6)
moral considerations. The first four points coincide with
conditions the Clinton administration considered in deciding
whether it would pursue deployment of NMD, or whether it
would pass along that decision to the following
administration. Arguments peculiar to either NMD or TMD will
be discussed within the appropriate section. The fifth
section deals with issues unique to Japanese domestic
politics. And the final section examines the moral aspects
that underlie all the points analyzed previously.
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1. Threat Assessment
During the Cold War, the primary threat to the United
States and its allies were Soviet strategic nuclear forces
and the danger of annihilation in case of an all-out nuclear
war between the superpowers. However, with the demise of the
Soviet Union such a danger has become remote. In the postCold War era, new threats have arisen, including ethnic and
religious conflicts, international terrorism, and
proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles.
For US proponents of MD, the ballistic missile threat
is "real and persistent" (Pena 1998) and "growing" (O'Hanlon
1999). In July 1998 the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States issued a famous report.
The so-called Rumsfeld Report, named after chairman, Donald
Rumsfeld, who was Secretary of Defense in the Reagan and
Bush Administrations, warned that ballistic missiles are
"not a distant threat." The Rumsfeld report also criticized
a report by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
published in 1995, which stated that there would be no
threat in the next 15 years (Garwin 1998). It is also
reported that 46 or more nations now possess ballistic
missiles, and further proliferation of missile technology is
looming ahead (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005).

154

There are three sources of ballistic missile threat.
The first is from so-called "rogue states," such as North
Korea and Iran, representing the transfer of ballistic
missile technology to Third World states. Although Libya,
named "rogue" by President Bush, announced the abandonment
of its nuclear program, the "rogue" threat has continued to
grow. The Iraq War broke out in March 2003. The United
States called it a preventive attack against Iraq and part
of "a war against terrorism," despite the opposition of
major states in the UN Security Council. They believed that
the Saddam Hussein regime could develop nuclear weapons and
had a strong connection to Osama bin Laden and the al Quaeda
terrorist network. However, they have proved neither of
these "facts," even after demolishing the Saddam regime.
Seven of the "tyrannical states" identified by Bush
in his new national security strategy announced in March
2006--North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Myanmar and
Zimbabwe--remain with regimes intact. In particular, North
Korea has become a serious threat with nuclear weapons and
missile development, along with a number of troubles
emerging in the last several years: suspicious boats, spy
ships, abductions, and so on. In particular, state-sponsored
kidnapping of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s has
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antagonized the Japanese people. At the end of August 1998,
North Korea launched a three-stage rocket over Japan's
territory. It was believed to be a long-range Taepodong 1
ballistic missile. The Japanese people were infuriated and
at the same time realized the imminent presence of missile
threats from a neighboring country (Nakatomi 2005). Although
another missile, the Nodong, first tested in 1993, can also
reach all of Japan, the psychological impact of Taepodong on
the minds of the Japanese people was enormous. Furthermore,
North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles on July 5,
2006. North Korea not only "fields the largest ballistic
missile force in the Third World," reportedly two hundred or
more, but it is also "the world's greatest proliferator of
ballistic missile systems, technologies, and components"
(Bermudez 1999). Basically, however accurate they are,
ballistic missiles with conventional warheads are not
militarily effective, and hence not themselves a threat.
They become a real threat only when they are combined with
WMD, and the problem is that the "rogues" concurrently
pursue possession of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons.
Missile defense proponents fear that leaders of those states,
who may not behave rationally in a crisis situation, will
not be deterred by threat of reprisal (Spring and Anderson
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2000). If they possess nuclear weapons, they might become
even more aggressive in their regions out of confidence that
the United States would not go to war against them. In fact,
North Korea declared that it tested nuclear device on
October 9, 2006, posing even more serious threat worldwide.
Secondly, it has been pointed out that the threat
after the Cold War has shifted from direct confrontations
between nation states to "asymmetric" threats from lesser
actors such as terrorist groups, religious cults and
individuals. International terrorists such as Osama Bin
Laden and the al Quaeda terrorist network regard the United
States and its allies and friends as inveterate enemies and
have waged war against them with terror attacks. Possession
of WMD by such actors is one of the newest and worst fears
confronting world society.
The third source of threat, though of less concern,
arises from the established nuclear powers, notably Russia
and China. The United States has been concerned with
economic problems and political instability in Russia. A
conservative US think tank, the Heritage Foundation, pointed
out that Russia's fragile political situation could lead
either to a breakdown in the chain of command controlling
its arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs or to a renewal of
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hostile relations with the United States (The Heritage
Foundation 1999). The current Putin regime has been stable,
and it was once cooperative with the United States. But
concern still exists, especially since revelation of the
confrontation between Russia and the United States over the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline from the Caspian to the
Mediterranean Sea. Responding to the Bush administration's
announcement in June 2007 that it would deploy its missile
defense system in Europe, President Putin expressed strong
opposition and even threatened countermeasures. Putin has
repeatedly mentioned Russia's possible withdrawal from the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, and
in December 2007, Russia dropped compliance with the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which
restricts deployment of non-nuclear arsenals. In 2008 the
Bush administration initiated a plan to deploy its MD in
Poland and the Czech Republic, which has aggravated its
relation with Russia.
Meanwhile, although the US government and its allies
have avoided directly referring to China, national security
experts and scholars have been quite explicit about their
concerns (Japanese Diet 2006, House of Councilors). They
point to China's gradual military modernization, especially
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the development of ballistic missiles, which is transforming
military geography and making US bases there vulnerable.
China also substantially improved the accuracy of its
missiles over an eight-month period, a feat that took the
United States and the Soviet Union 25 years to accomplish
(Bracken 1998). Despite the facts that no one knows the
actual size of China's strategic forces (estimates vary from
seven to twenty ICBMs and from 225 to 1,000 nuclear
warheads) and that Beijing appears to be focusing on its
economic development, "the very uncertainty of China's
future is a cause of concern" (The Heritage Foundation 1999).
Besides, China is regarded as a major supplier of missilerelated materials (Ogawa 2000). China has reportedly been
increasing its military spending more than 10 percent
annually, and the uncertain nature of the expenditure has
itself been a matter of grave concern.
Critics of missile defense argue that such threats
are overstated. One critic argues that the threat
confronting the United States from ballistic missiles was
much greater in the mid-1980s than in the post Cold War
environment (Cirincione 2000). The Rumsfeld Report was
criticized for assessing what ballistic missile threats were
"possible," not what threats were "likely" (Gronlund and
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Wright 1998). Critics supported the 1995 NIE and 1996
government intelligence assessments that progressing from
short to medium range missiles would require a major leap in
technology, and an immediate threat to the United States
would not emerge in the next 15 years (Cirincione 1997;
2000). They also argue that North Korea is not in a position
to constitute a threat to either the United States or even
neighboring states, since it has no economic base to support
the development of its missile programs (Wang 2000). As of
the fall 2008, thirteen years after the NIE warning, it
seems that the ballistic missile threat has spread around
the globe, but is not yet critically imminent.
There is debate on this point, however. Perception of
threat is a matter of judgment, and depends on politics as
much or more than technology. The emerging threat of
ballistic missiles to international security is still
debatable, although

2. Technological Feasibility
Behind the recent missile defense debate, there is
recognition that technological development has finally made
"shooting a bullet with a bullet" possible. One MD advocate
simply declared, "the technology is ready" (Spring 2000).
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The feasibility of "hit-to-kill" missile technology "was
proven in a series of successful intercept tests in 1999"
(Spring and Anderson 2000). Following the reportedly
successful first intercept test on 15 July 2001, the Bush
administration has conducted missile defense experiments in
an incremental manner. Nonetheless, MD proponents'
optimistic pronouncements remain to be proved. The two
intercept tests prior to the first success were miserable
failures. This undercut confidence in the system's
feasibility, leading President Clinton to postpone the
program. Even the seemingly successful interception in
October 1999 was in doubt, due to indications that an object
other than the target momentarily distracted the interceptor
(prior to this test, the success rate of interception had
been just two hits in sixteen attempts). Opponents of MD
contended that it was a "rush to failure" to decide on
deployment of such systems without enough testing
(Cirincione 1998). Moreover, they argued that even the
widely deployed short-range missile defense system, the
Patriot system, had a remarkably low success rate in the
Gulf War despite the fact that it had a perfect test record
(17 hits in 17 tests) before the war (Lewis, Postol and Pike
1999). Indeed, it was pointed out that ballistic missile
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defense would be far more difficult than shooting down a
bullet with a bullet. The speed of a typical bullet is about
Mach 2.5 while "an incoming warhead moves at Mach 6 and
more" (Hermetz 2001, 363), though a warhead is far larger
than a bullet.
Other than the feasibility problem, there are a
number of technological issues. With regard to the terminal
phase, the upgraded Patriot surface-to-air missile (PAC-3)
is nearly an entire system redesign, intended to intercept
tactical ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. As of
March 2005, it was reported that ten out of twelve tests had
been successful, and the Japanese government regarded the
reliability of the PAC-3 system as sufficient to announce
that Japan would begin deployment in 2006. However, the
utility of the PAC-3 terminal phase system against highspeed Nodong missiles is unknown. The issue of wreckage
remains to be discussed as well.
As for the midcourse defense system that Japan aims
to introduce, the Aegis-launched SMD system succeeded in six
out of seven tests. Some critics, however, pointed out that
these should not be counted as successful tests since they
were merely checking out the radar system, confirming the
separation of kinetic interceptor from the rocket, and
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guiding and controlling the interceptor in space. They were
not tests for actual intercepts but a kind of pre-test for
intercept tests. This was compared to taking swinging
practice and hitting tossed balls before beginning actual
batting practice (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005b).
The sixth test was legitimate and successful in destroying a
target, but the successful interception was conducted at an
altitude of 137 kilometers. Some discounted the result,
since the Nodong ballistic missile would actually be engaged
as high as 300 kilometers above the ground.
Plans for interception during the midcourse phase
have attracted the most technological criticism, emphasizing
the availability of countermeasures. Critics argue that even
if MD were now technically feasible on the test range, the
attacker "would be able to take straightforward steps to
defeat this system" (Lewis, Gronlund and Wright 2000). A
number of authors have pointed to a variety of possible
countermeasures: submunitions, decoys, cooled shrouds,
chaffs, aerosols, and so on (Cirincione 2000; Lewis, Postol
and Pike 1999; Garwin 1999; Mendelsohn 1999; Lewis and
Postol 1997).
Furthermore, some opponents of MD also argue that
emphasizing MD systems is meaningless because "rogue" actors

163

would likely deliver WMD by means other than ballistic
missiles, such as suitcases, vans, trucks, small civilian
airplanes, container ships, cruise missiles, subway cars,
and so forth (Cirincione 2000; Mendelsohn 1999; Gronlund and
Wright 1998). Such means are less expensive, and easier to
covertly develop and deploy (possibly enabling attackers to
evade retaliation), more reliable, accurate, and effective
than ICBMs (Krepon 2003, 80). In fact, the 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks were conducted by way of the nearly
unthinkable but well prepared hijacking of four commercial
airplanes full of fuel. The actual weapons of the terrorists
were said to be box cutters.
As for the countermeasure argument, MD supporters
respond that a properly designed system "should be able to
anticipate and neutralize potential countermeasures" (Spring
and Anderson 2000). However, MD critics refer to the cost
effectiveness of countermeasures, arguing that, "it is far
easier and cheaper to deploy simple and effective
countermeasures against defenses than it is for the defenses
to respond" (Cirincione 1997). Therefore, "each move drives
up the defender's costs much further than it does the
attacker's" (Bracken 1998). As for other means of delivery,
MD advocates object to "putting all defense eggs in one
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basket." That is, it is not right to just give up "simply
because missile defense is not a panacea" and to leave
people utterly vulnerable to this particular type of attack
(O'Hanlon 1999). They condemned the Clinton Administration's
reluctance to support MD deployment, contending that the
danger of ballistic missile stems not only from the spread
of these destructive weapons but also from the policy of
purposeful vulnerability to these weapons. "Long-range
ballistic missiles are the only weapons against which the
Clinton Administration has decided, as a matter of policy,
not to field any defense" (Spring and Anderson 2000). This
remark is relevant and closely related to the moral aspect
of the debate, which will be mentioned later.
While some MD advocates support a total missile
defense shield (boost phase, mid-course phase and terminal
phase) (The Heritage Foundation 1999; Canavan 1999), others
support boost phase defense for technology-oriented reasons
(Postol 2000; Garwin 2000; Green 1997). Boost phase defense
is designed to intercept ballistic missiles while their
rocket engines are still burning, and "their target size for
radar is largest before the separation of booster rockets"
(Hughes 2004, 184). Still in the midst of acceleration, they
are slow and emit high heat, so they are easily detected.
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Moreover, the intercept occurs within the enemy's territory,
and there is no worrying about debris fallout. Another merit
of boost-phase defense is that it can be carried out before
enemy missiles launch decoys and other countermeasures.
Supporters of this system argue that a boost phase
interceptor system involves mainly proven technology, unlike
the mid-course intercept system formerly proposed by the
Pentagon, with its susceptibility to countermeasures.
Ballistic missiles are said to be perfect weapons for a
surprise attack (Nose 2007. 82). A serious problem with
boost phase systems, as well as with mid-course interception,
is that operational time-constraints become acute; for
instance, a Nodong missile would reach Japan in ten to
fifteen minutes after launch. Therefore detection and
communication technologies are crucial. Also, a boost phase
system would require deployment of Aegis warships in the Sea
of Japan, but the decision to intercept would have to be
made within minutes of detecting a launch. In March 2007,
the Japanese government decided to authorize an onsite
commander to launch intercept missiles at his own judgment
in case of a missile attack.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration has pursued a
comprehensive MD system after all, following a "spiral
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approach" of incremental development as dictated by
technological advances. Flight tests have been steadily
conducted, showing significant development in intercepting
ballistic missiles. The PAC-3 tested on July 2007
successfully intercepted a subscale aircraft target that had
electronic countermeasures. Also, on December 2007 Japanese
Kongo Aegis destroyer launched a Standard Missile (SM)-3,
which are to be employed in the SMD system, and successfully
intercepted a ballistic missile target. This was "the first
time a non-US ship fitted out with the Aegis BMD system was
able to intercept a ballistic missile target" (Center for
Defense Information 2008).

3. Cost Analysis
In the United States the merits of NMD were
vigorously debated during various periods (from 1967 until
1972, in the early 1980s, and since 2001). On the contrary,
the costs of TMD were little discussed, mainly because TMD
development was only at the early stage of assessing
specific technologies. NMD had far greater strategic
importance from the US perspective, while TMD was not
clearly defined; for instance, whether it should protect
only US forces deployed abroad, or allies and friends also.
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The cost would depend on the definition (Morimoto and
Takahashi 2002, 306).
The United States has spent well over 100 billion
dollars on missile defense since the mid-1950s. A large
portion of the money (44 billion dollars) went to SDI from
1983 to 1993. Since 1993, around 3.5 billion dollars has
been devoted to NMD annually (O'Hanlon 1999; Cirincione
1997). A wide variety of estimates for MD implementation
have been presented: from two to three billion dollars by
upgrading Aegis destroyers and cruisers with antimissile
interceptors, to 60 billion dollars for the deployment of an
NMD system, to 116 billion dollars over 20 years to deploy,
support and operate MD systems (Cirincione 1997).
As a matter of fact, missile defense advocates tend
to favor lower estimates, while critics are inclined to
employ analyses based on much higher costs. The Heritage
Foundation study argued that an affordable and effective
system would be possible in four years for eight billion
dollars or less (The Heritage Foundation 1999), while
critics pointed out that there were no official cost
estimates for a long-term comprehensive MD system (Lewis,
Gronlund and Wright 2000). Moreover, defining a system as
expensive or not depends on subjective judgments. For
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example, the average annual expenditure of 3.5 billion
dollars on NMD elicited varying responses. It appears cheap
when compared with the 1999 national defense budget of the
United States (only 1.2 percent of 292.1 billion dollars).
But it appears very expensive at more than the half the 6.8
billion dollar budget for the 2005 Head Start program, which
provides comprehensive education, health, nutrition, and
parental involvement services to more than 905,000 lowincome children and their families (Administration of
Children and Families 2006). It seems inexpensive when
compared to the annual cost of the US air traffic control
system (6 billion dollars), but not so cheap when compared
to US foreign military financing program (3.5 billion
dollars). In any event, now that the current Bush
administration has adopted a "spiral approach" and
"strategic ambiguity" with no published plan for specific MD
systems, it is difficult to debate the real costs.
Missile defense costs and budgets have also been the
subjects of debate in Japan. However, since the government
maintained that it was only at an early stage of studying
specific technologies, estimated costs were not presented,
and discussion on MD costs did not develop to any extent.
The Japanese government appropriated modest annual expenses
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for investigation, spending 15.6 billion yen (141.8 million
dollars) from 1999 to 2003 for the joint study with the
United States on TMD technologies. After the decision in
December 2003 to develop JMD, the government has provided an
estimated 800 billion to 1 trillion yen (7.3 to 9.1 billion
dollars) for the development and deployment of Aegis SMD and
PAC-3 ground-based terminal missile defense systems by 2011.

4. International Political Environment
A missile defense protecting a state's own territory
and people from hostile ballistic missiles, possibly
carrying WMD, is purely defensive in theory. What sort of
defensive measures the state should take is also a domestic
matter. No other country should interfere in this, as long
as the principles of equality of state sovereignty and
nonintervention in internal affairs hold from an
international legal perspective. Nevertheless, deployment of
MD systems by the United States will have a grave impact on
existing arms control regimes, and therefore, it is of
serious concern for other states. By the same token, JMD
will affect the complex international political situation in
East Asia. This region is "one of the most dynamic and
potentially unstable ... in the world today, yet the
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security institutions that are available to manage tensions
are scattered, weak or non-existent" (Ikenberry and
Tsuchiyama 2002, 69).
The largest obstacle to deployment of US MD systems
was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which
prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from
building nation-wide missile defense systems. The signatory
powers to the treaty were redefined in the 1997 New York
Agreements, and four former Soviet republics formally
replaced the USSR (McCarty 2003). Since the other three
republics transferred their nuclear weapons to Russia and
became NPT signatories as non-nuclear states, Russia in
effect became the sole successor to the Soviet Union for
purposes of the ABM Treaty. Some MD advocates contended that
the treaty was no longer valid because the Soviet Union had
ceased to exist (Spring 2000). In addition, they justified
withdrawal from the treaty by pointing to a number of Soviet
and Russian violations of the treaty in the past (The
Heritage Foundation 1999). Other MD supporters recommended a
partial amendment of the treaty, considering the importance
of cooperation with Russia (Garwin 2000).
The US government has asserted that its MD is purely
defensive against ballistic missiles and poses no threat to
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other countries, and therefore it does not affect the
strategic balance with other nuclear powers. In theory, US
MD can be consistent with a mutual defense emphasis (MDE).
However, the international political reality is not in favor
of such a unilateral assumption. In practice, US deployment
of its missile defense is just beginning and its posture
remains offense dominant. In addition, there is nothing
mutual about the initiative, since the other major nuclear
powers lack missile defense systems. MDE and international
stability can only be realized if all the major states agree
and recognize the United States MD program as purely
defensive. However, Russia and China have explicitly and
repeatedly opposed it and warned that they could build up
their offensive nuclear forces to overcome such an MD shield.
Even US allies in Europe have not been cooperative. The
Australian government has supported US MD, but is hesitant
to allow US forces use of its territory for MD. In February
2005 the Prime Minister of Canada, Paul Martin, announced
that it would withdraw from the MD program. The current
Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, has been cautious about the
decision, but the Canadian people in general have opposed
participation. These two states had been expected to host MD
radar sites, and their decisions will have a significant
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impact on US MD. Only friends of the United States in East
Asia, notably Japan and Taiwan, have shown positive support
for the US plan. Above all, the crucial actors are Russia
and China, nuclear powers positioned outside the US alliance.
Although Russia showed flexible but inconsistent
reactions to the US proposal to review the ABM Treaty
(Russia has even indicated its interest in joint defense
with the United States), it basically opposes the US MD
plans. Russia worries about long-term consequences of the
program, which is limited at present but could be expanded
in the future, possibly even nullifying Russian strategic
nuclear forces at some point. Russia's Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Igor Ivanov, questioned the rationale of NMD, which
risks "serious deterioration in Russia-US relations, global
strategic stability, and, ultimately, US security" (Ivanov
2000).
The Bush administration claimed that the ABM treaty
did not fit the post Cold War environment in which the
United States must face the new and imminent threat of
ballistic missiles from "rogue" states and terrorists.
Despite the opposition of many countries, the United States
declared its withdrawal from the ABM treaty in November 2001.
President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, then in need of Bush's
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cooperation in dealing with his own problems with Chechen
terrorists, reacted softly to the US decision, but he called
it a "mistake" that could destabilize the strategic balance.
As mentioned earlier, Putin has been skeptical toward Bush's
intention in deploying MD in Europe.
MD critics believed that any amendment of the treaty
would cause fundamental changes compromising the security
benefits the treaty provided (Lewis, Gronlund and Wright
2000; Gronlund and Lewis 1999). That is, a revision allowing
even a limited MD shield would undermine the assumption of
MAD. Russia might perceive that MD could provide the United
States a capability to initiate a first strike with its
enormous offensive nuclear forces and also to absorb a
retaliatory nuclear attack from Russia, which would have
already been weakened by a massive and accurate US first
strike. Logically, this scenario is destabilizing. This
would lead Russia to build up offensive nuclear forces to
overcome the US missile shields.
Though not a party to the ABM Treaty, China has been
consistently and adamantly opposed to amending the treaty as
well as to the US MD program. The US MD plan would have a
direct impact on Chinese nuclear forces. Even a limited MD
system would become a serious problem for China, since it
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has only a limited number of strategic nuclear missiles
deployed (Van Ness 2000). This would undermine China's
current nuclear deterrence strategy (Wang 2000; Yan 1999).
Many Chinese suspect that the US MD plan is intended to
counter China's strategic forces. "Despite its wellestablished ballistic missile program, China is apparently
less confident in its ability to overcome future defenses"
(McMahon 1997, 79). In fact, though no government has
clearly mentioned the "China threat," some scholars have
been explicit about the efficacy of MD against the threat
from Chinese ballistic missiles (Ogawa 2000; Green 1997).
"Viewed from Beijing, an East Asian TMD looks like a new
multilateral security alliance against China" (Van Ness 2002,
145). China is particularly sensitive to the issue of TMD in
the East Asia region because of the possible involvement of
Taiwan, which may give an illusion of safety and provide a
strong incentive for the Taiwanese to pursue independence.
China will not tolerate this, since Taiwan is of supreme
national interest to China, and it would be too costly and
dangerous for the United States and its allies to encourage
the Taiwanese and provoke the Mainland Chinese (Christensen
2000; Wang 2000). Consequently, MD critics, especially
Chinese scholars, believe that US MD would upset the
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regional military balance and undermine existing arms
control regimes (Gu 2000; Zhang 1999; Hong 1998). It is
reported that China has already been preparing
countermeasures such as electronic jamming equipment and
decoys for its ballistic missiles (Kaneda et al. 2006, 62).
Some MD proponents argue that a defense-oriented
military posture with MD systems, rather than an offenseoriented one, will contribute to global and regional
stability (Canavan 1999; Ding 1999; Krepon 1999).
Nevertheless, with all the assurances that the US MD plan is
not aimed at Russia or China, both states are deeply
skeptical about the intentions of the United States. In such
circumstances, a decision by the United States to pursue a
missile defense system, especially when made unilaterally,
could destabilize the strategic relationship with Russia and
China and trigger renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons
and a ballistic missile arms race (Mendelsohn 1999; Lewis
and Postol 1997).
Critics of JMD have criticized Japanese participation
in the US MD plan, maintaining that JMD will destabilize
strategic relations in the East Asia region. First, they
believe that a defense shield will make Japan more confident
and more militarily ambitious (Hong 1998). Second, they

176

suggest that TMD can be both defensive and offensive. The
essential elements of ballistic missiles and most TMD
systems are similar, and the differences between them are
only in their warheads (Yan 1999). The point is that the
difference between defense and offense depends on the
intension of the Japanese. Third, because Japan and the
United States are close allies, it would not be ridiculous
for MD critics to connect JMD with US offensive capability.
The forces combined could constitute a significant warfighting capability in the region. The Chinese government
has repeatedly objected to the JMD program, as well as US MD,
which it regards as a sign of the revival of Japanese
militarism and as part of the strategic enlargement of US
forces in the East Asia region. As detailed in Chapter Two,
this requires careful distinctions between offense and
defense and analysis of the relationships between them.

5. Japanese Domestic Issues
The Japanese government takes the position that the
missile defense issue is an operational level matter in the
MOD and SDF, and thus claims that it is not necessary to
consult the Diet and ask for approval. However, JMD has led
to various debates on Japanese domestic issues: the issue of
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exercising the right of collective self-defense, the
conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Export, the
balance with the parliamentary resolution on the peaceful
use of space, and so on.
First, as reviewed in Chapter Three, the Japanese
government has interpreted the Constitution as not
inhibiting Japan from possessing the Self Defense Forces,
which it regards as totally defense-oriented. However, the
Constitution does prohibit participation in collective selfdefense, the most obvious example of which would be to
participate in US military operations abroad as an ally. The
position publicized by the government is that, "the exercise
of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9
of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary
level for the defense of the country. The government
believes that the exercise of the right of collective selfdefense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore,
permissible under the Constitution" (Japan Defense Agency
2005). Especially after President Bush announced the
unification of NMD and TMD in favor of integrated boost,
midcourse and terminal defense segments, Japan's cooperation
with US efforts to shoot down ballistic missiles might be
regarded as a "use of collective self-defense" (Sakaue 2004,
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156). Furthermore, some argue that on a regional level the
actual operation or even deployment of a missile defense
system may make cooperation with not only the United States
but also South Korea or Taiwan inevitable. The Japanese
government has countered the criticisms, contending that
defending its own territory does not conflict with
collective self-defense and that JMD systems will be applied
within the independent right of self-defense. Meanwhile, the
recent argument for boost-phase defense was more problematic,
because it is very difficult to judge, within minutes of
detection, whether the launched ballistic missile is aimed
at Japan or another country. And that is exactly the reason
why the Japanese government has excluded a boost-phase
defense from JMD options.
Second, the possibility that Japan's TMD technology
could be transferred to South Korea or Taiwan would violate
the Three Principles on Arms Export, which prohibits the
export of weapons. The Three Principles, declared in April
1967, stated that Japan is not allowed to export weapons to:
(1) communist countries; (2) countries to which exporting
weapons is prohibited by United Nations resolutions; and (3)
countries that actually are, or are likely to be, involved
in international conflict. In February 1976, the Japanese
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government announced its unified view on this issue, which
stated that in addition to the three exclusions above, Japan
would abstain from exporting weapons to "any other" country.
However, in January 1983, following ardent requests from the
United States, Japan decided to open the way for the
transfer of its military technology to the United States as
an exception to the Three Principles. As of 2001, Japan had
decided to transfer to the United States twelve types of
military-related technology.1 Therefore, it is considered
that the joint study of MD with the United States does not
legally violate the principles, and that this issue would
arise only if a project involved a third country. The
Japanese government has argued that the transfer of a
missile defense system is only a future possibility, which
cannot be discussed right now. This had been the basic
position of the Japanese government before it decided to
move forward with development in December 2004. The
1

Such technology includes: technologies related to portable
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), technology for the
construction of US naval vessels, technology for remodeling
US naval vessels, technology related to support fighters (F2), technology related to the digital flight control system
(DFCS) to be installed on the P-3C, technology related to
joint research on a "ducted rocket engine," technology
related to joint research in "advanced steel technology,"
technology related to cooperative modification of the
"ACESII ejection seat," "advanced hybrid propulsion
technology," and technology related to cooperative research
for the F-2 system (Japan Defense Agency 1998 and 2001).
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government has been quite clear on the distinction between
the stages of 'study', 'development' and 'deployment' of a
JMD system, and it has cautiously avoided any argument
regarding future stages.
Third, the deployment of SMD, the formerly planned
upper-tier TMD system, may violate the 1969 Diet resolution
that called for peaceful use of outer space. In May 1969, a
plenary session of the House of Representatives declared
that development and use of any objects and rockets launched
into space are to be limited to peaceful use. Following this
resolution, Japan pledged that it would not deploy offensive
weapons in outer space, although Japan has reserved the
possibility of developing a spy satellite to collect and
transmit information for the purpose of national security.
After the "Taepodong shock" of 1998, Japan introduced
"information satellites," but their operations are under the
control of the cabinet, not JDA, to support the claim that
they are not "spy satellites" that can be used militarily.
Also, their visual resolution was intentionally restricted
to one square meter, instead of a militarily effective level
of some square centimeters. The "peaceful use of outer
space" pledge has been included in Japan's basic national
defense policy. Here the term "space" is defined as the area
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above the atmosphere, and the Diet resolution would
contradict the joint study of SMD technology that aims at
mid-course intercept of incoming ballistic missile above the
atmosphere. The Japanese government has responded to the
criticisms, maintaining that the 1969 Diet resolution should
be revised to permit purely defensive activities including
the planned SMD, because of recent technological
developments and emerging threats.
Outside the Diet, JMD supporters have found several
other merits in Japan's missile defense program. First, JMD
supplements the US extended nuclear deterrence strategy in
coping with threats from rogue states, and therefore Japan
need not possess its own nuclear force to counter them
(Green 1997). This argument has to be assessed carefully.
The expected deterrence effect of JMD is "deterrence by
denial," which is quite different from "deterrence by
punishment," which has been supplied by the US "nuclear
umbrella." If JMD is positioned as a supplement to the
umbrella, the combined forces will represent a significant
war-fighting capability for Japan and the United States.
Second, JMD may help the Japanese defense industry,
which can also have a positive spin-off effect for the
general Japanese economy (Morimoto et al. 1998). This
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argument is not a major one. However, not only JMD
proponents but also those Japanese who have benefited from
the development of military technology believe that various
technologies developed from missile defense programs can be
applied by the private sector in civilian fields, and should
contribute to Japan's technological and economic development.
For instance, in the latter half of the 1950s Japan was
licensed to produce Lockheed F-104 fighters. Production
essentially relied on Lockheed's capabilities, but the
Japanese learned many things in the process. For example,
techniques for converting and molding aluminum allowed
innovations in disc brakes for bullet trains.
Third, a number of arguments, including those from
the MOD itself, point out that Japan's decision would help
improve its relationship with the United States (Japan
Defense Agency 1999). A major reason why Japan favored TMD
was that "if such a system were to be put in place,
participation would strategically link Japan even more
tightly with the United States" (Van Ness 2002, 144). In
fact, there exists very little discrepancy between the two
governments in the recognition of imminent ballistic missile
threat and of the necessity to build a defensive system
against it. The cooperative relations of the two have been

183

quite consistent and deliberately maintained. The current
joint study, development and deployment of MD systems may
contribute to strengthening the alliance, which has been
occasionally shaken by incidents mentioned earlier.
Japanese who advocate JMD from this viewpoint have
tended to fear "abandonment" by the United States that might
injure the alliance, and the possibility that United States
might look to other powers in the region, such as China. On
the contrary, critics of JMD fear that Japan could be
"entrapped" by the alliance with the United States and
dragged into military conflicts elsewhere (The Stanley
Foundation 1999). In any case, JMD will be, in essence, "a
weapons system that cannot function without the active
cooperation of the United States" (Hughes 2004, 187).
Nevertheless, it seems that the argument for prioritizing
the alliance with the United States misses the point. A more
logical approach would begin with the premise that the
alliance must be a part of a grand strategy to promote the
national interest, so one should first seek to identify the
national interest. The issue of maintaining the alliance
should be secondary.
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6. Moral Considerations
Other than the five dimensions focused on above, it
should be noted that an underlying element in the debate on
missile defense belongs to the philosophical or moral
spheres. An important rationale for the development and
deployment of MD systems was the recognition that Americans
could no longer tolerate leaving their people vulnerable to
ballistic missile-based WMD that have significantly
proliferated in the Third World. The "Star Wars" program,
started in 1983, included recognition of this danger, and
post-Cold War argument for MD gave emphasis to Third World
threats (Fitzgerald 2000). The moral argument holds that, if
the technology is ready, it is wrong to maintain current
policy, which depends on a MAD policy based on Cold War
politics and technology. For MD advocates, the threat is
real enough that even if technology cannot provide a perfect
defense, if expected costs of development are high, or if
other states argue against it, "No Americans should be left
defenseless in the event of missile attack" (Spring and
Anderson 2000). From this perspective, differences over
threat assessment, technological feasibility, cost,
international political environment, and domestic politics,
should be weighed in light of the moral imperative of
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protecting the American people.
The Japanese public is divided over the issue of JMD.
While most major Japanese newspapers have recommended that
the US take a cautious approach in its pursuit of national
missile shields, particularly taking into account its
relations with Russia, their responses to the issue of
Japan's own missile defense have been more sharply divided.
Yomiuri Shinbun, a rather conservative newspaper with the
largest circulation in Japan, expressed immediate support
for Japan's participation in the US MD program (Yomiuri
Shinbun 2003). Sankei Shinbun, known as a particularly
conservative publication, also argues for JMD. Their
specific emphases are on the emerging threats of ballistic
missiles and the advantage of basing deterrence (deterrence
by denial) on MD systems (Sankei Shinbun 2003). On the
contrary, Asahi Shinbun, a relatively liberal newspaper with
the second largest circulation, has argued strongly against
Japan's missile program. Asahi has raised concerns about
technological feasibility, costs, and a possible regional
arms race, should JMD be deployed (Asahi Shinbun 2003).
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E. Japan's Missile Defense: the Future

International conflict resolution can take one of two
courses: a war cycle or a peaceful settlement cycle. This
dichotomy coincides with the dual Japanese identities and
the theoretical concepts categorized and analyzed in this
work.
On the one hand, realists see international relations
in terms of conflicting values and goals. Methods to be used
are selected primarily according to considerations of
national interest and effectiveness; and their approaches
tend to be unilateral. Interests are often competitive and
zero-sum, making threats and coercion a regular part of the
process of interaction, and when other methods of pursuing
self-interest fail, force is the ultimate arbiter.
Accordingly, when an international security issue comes up,
realist reactions can lead to armed confrontation.
Heightened tension may result in a stable balance of power
or war. Given that worldview, realists may regard JMD as a
part of military strategy in which JMD becomes an actual
shield against ballistic missile attacks in war.
On the other hand, pacifists see the realist
preoccupation with competition and conflict as a cause of
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unnecessary danger. From this perspective, an emphasis is
placed on the importance of maintaining mutual trust and
confidence in relationships with others. Their approaches
are therefore multilateral. They view interests as often
competitive but still compatible and non-zero-sum, so that
maximizing their own interests may allow others to maximize
theirs as well. They regard threats and coercion as
inappropriate. Underlying norms should govern interaction of
states, and the ultimate goal is mutual agreement serving
all parties. Hence when an international security issue
arises, pacifist approaches emphasize negotiation rather
than coercion. This leads to the pursuit of arms control
(MAD, emphasizing offense and deterrence by punishment, or
MDE, emphasizing defense and deterrence by denial) and
disarmament. Peaceful settlement can be facilitated through
implementation and establishment of legitimate international
regimes. From a pacifist perspective, if Japan puts a
pronounced emphasis on defense and builds a JMD system, JMD
will not play a role in war with other states but instead
become a shield against extraordinary incidents such as the
accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles.
Limited defenses against such threats can provide a chance
to establish "a cooperative defensive transition as an
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ultimate arms control objective" (Goldfischer 1992, 171).
The realist approach to international security can
trap Japan into unacceptable risk and danger. The pacifist
approach may be a favorable option.

Then, within the

peaceful settlement cycle, one wonders whether the Japanese
should choose offense (MAD) or defense (MDE). Here, the
distinction between offensive realism and defensive realism
is useful. As mentioned in Chapter II, offensive realists
are prone to adopt unilateral strategy and an offensive
posture for the state. Defensive realists see the state as
seeking its survival and security, not necessarily
territorial expansion. An emphasis on defense and reduction
of offensive weapons will serve the national interest of the
state, and lead to a status quo of stability in
international society. Defensive realist approaches and MDE
can be useful.
If we choose to live in the MAD world, there will be
no need for missile defense. However, people have been
losing faith in MAD since the end of the Cold War. The
assumption of human rationality has become shaky with the
emergence of apparently irrational leaders of "rogue" states
and international terrorists. President George W. Bush is an
example of a leader with little faith in rational behavior
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by other countries, and that was the exact reason he
strongly promoted MD, along with withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty in December 2001.
MAD has a long history of debate. It has been
severely criticized in terms of its logical bases, lack of
evidence for its effect, questionable morality, and so on.
The purpose of the nuclear forces the superpowers
established at vast cost was not to use them. According to
the Japanese scholar, Iwata (1996, 41), "We must not attempt
to survive nuclear war, and we must be prepared to die once
it breaks out, then we do not have to die. This is an insane
logic." Political scientists Samuel Huntington and Stanley
Hoffmann put it in different way, stating that the
significant element for maintaining deterrence is "fear"
that deterrence may not work in case of a crisis (Carnesale
et al. 1983, quoted in Iwata 1996, 42). MAD advocates have
at times claimed that nuclear weapons have been a major
contributor to avoiding a global war. But crucial problems
are, as Jervis pointed out, "the lack of search for
supporting evidence" and the fact that "deterrence theory is
largely deductive" (Jervis 1979, 301). Keith Payne also
argued that the chances for testing nuclear deterrence
policies had been too few and unpredictable, and information
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about the enemy's decision-making too limited to understand
whether nuclear deterrence in fact has prevented war. "The
penalty for failure was too high to engage in a conscious
testing scheme" (Payne 1996, 7). John Vasquez attacked
Waltz's deterrence theory, pointing out that it was based on
a faulty causal inference. Following the example of the
story of a boy in Brooklyn, Vasquez suggested that
deterrence theorists instigated the build-up of nuclear
weapons (running down the street waving his arms wildly
every day) in order to keep the invisible nuclear war (the
elephants) away, and that they (the boy) declare, "See, it
works!" (Vasquez 1991). As he asserted, the point is that we
do not know, and it is not easy to find out because we try
to explain what did not happen. In other words, "For every
case of a 'deterrence success', the possibility will thus
remain that no deterrence was needed, and that no effect was
achieved, that no test was passed" (Quester 1989, 62).
Deterrence theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz and John
Mearsheimer, argued in favor of a well-managed proliferation
of nuclear weapons as the preferable route to world
stability (Mearsheimer 1990; Sagan and Waltz 1995). This
position is problematic not only because it promotes
proliferation of nuclear weapons but also because it
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increases chances of nuclear war. The fundamental assumption
that has sustained deterrence theory is the rationality of
the state, but this has been seriously questioned from
psychological, organizational, and moral perspectives.
Jervis contends that deterrence theorists "have ignored
decision makers' emotions, perceptions, and calculations and
have instead relied on deductive logic based on the premise
that people are highly rational" (Jervis et al. 1985, 1).
Scott Sagan maintains that nuclear deterrence will likely
fail, because organizational culture can be disturbed by
self-serving organizational objectives, because
organizational priorities are conflicting, and because
organizational learning with hazardous technologies can be
difficult due to strong disincentives against exposing
serious failures. "Nuclear weapons may well have made
deliberate war less likely, but, the complex and tightly
coupled nuclear arsenal we have constructed has
simultaneously made accidental war more likely" (Sagan 1993,
264; original emphasis). And finally, "The notion of MAD has
been frequently attacked not only as militarily unacceptable
but also as immoral since it holds the entire civilian
populations of both countries as hostages" (Keeney and
Panofsky 1982, 298). This moral argument has been a major
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motivation behind missile defense promotion since the 1983
speech of President Reagan.
Consequently, defense (MDE) should be emphasized. It
would be recommended that Japan should build JMD on this
line of argument. From the pacifist point of view,
disarmament should be the ultimate goal, but that goal must
also be recognized as difficult to achieve in this realist
world. Defensive realist and MDE approaches would be a
realistic alternative in the current security environment
and an effective middle ground toward the pacifist goal of
peace. Arms control stressing defense should be the safe and
steady policy as a transition process toward disarmament.
Nevertheless, pacifist approaches and MDE are not risk-free.
It may be all too easy to disturb the peaceful settlement
cycle and bring back the realist war cycle through violence,
including preventive or preemptive attacks and terrorism. It
will be extremely difficult to pursue a peaceful process in
the face of bloody violence that causes pain and death and
provokes anger and sorrow which can lead to vengeance. The
peaceful settlement cycle is a long, patient, and rugged
process, while the war cycle is a rushed, thoughtless, and
simple one. The world in which we live may well, in fact, be
a realist world. In this international environment with no
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authority above national sovereignty, states have acted as
they have wanted. This history of war and conflict may be
rooted in a fundamentally violent human nature. Ideal peace
and nonviolence may be an illusion, since violence easily
invites violent reactions. The peace cycle may well be
pulled back to the war cycle with a single act of terror.
The power of physical violence is enormous, and therefore
people may well believe in the realist's concept of peace
through stability and balance of power in international
relations. And, indeed, most people have been realists
behaving as if realist assumptions were true.
Nevertheless, from a constructivist point of view,
this is a matter of identity (Namatame 2004). If we treat a
state as an enemy, it will become an enemy. More
specifically, as Joseph Nye points out, "If the United
States treated China as an enemy, it was likely to guarantee
itself an enemy, particularly given that nationalism has
been rapidly replacing Communism as the dominant ideology
among the Chinese people" (Nye 2001, 97). If states believe
it is a realist world, it will become a realist world for
them. In the words of Alexander Wendt, "whether or not a
state's system is anarchic will be determined by the entity
with which member states identify with respect to the
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performance of their functions, especially security. If
states identify only with themselves, so to speak, the
system will be anarchic" (Wendt 1996, 47; original emphasis).
And they will continue to live in a realist world. Such a
world will be created and re-created by realists, based on a
"reality" that they themselves create. Realism is what
Robert Cox characterizes as "a problem-solving form of
knowledge" for dealing with the challenges of preserving
one's position in the existing realist order (Cox 1986; 2001,
106).
If one imagines a different world from a realist
"reality," there may be a possibility of opening a peaceful
settlement cycle. The realist worldview can pose extreme
danger in the contemporary world, in which military
technology has produced tremendous destructive power. Even a
small-scale nuclear war, once begun, would result in
enormous death and destruction. Peaceful conflict resolution
through the peaceful settlement cycle is necessary.
In the final analysis, Japan may well pursue its own
missile system, but it must be cautious and prudent in doing
so. JMD faces significant obstacles. First, threat
assessment is a matter of perception, and the threat Japan
faces at present from the North Korean dictatorship regime
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appears real. The China threat, about which some JMD
proponents warn, seems remote and quite possibly exaggerated.
It is occasionally pointed out that the Cold War bipolar
structure was much more stable and less dangerous than
today's situation. However, such judgment is only made in
retrospect, and in the midst of the Cold War the threat of
total nuclear warfare between the United States and the
Soviet Union and subsequent nuclear holocaust was real, and
even imminent, at various moments. Second, the technological
feasibility of JMD is still debatable, though the Japanese
government seems quite confident. Technological developments
may at some time lead to breakthroughs and overcome current
difficulties, but the potential performance of the PAC-3
terminal defense against ballistic missiles is still unknown,
and the issue of countermeasures overshadows the Aegis SMD
midcourse defense. Third, costs must be considered, but thus
far, the cost to develop and deploy JMD, which is estimated
to be 800 billion to one trillion yen (7.3 to 9.1 billion
dollars), has not disturbed the momentum toward establishing
JMD systems. As the detailed components of the system are
specified, the cost of JMD will become an important issue.
Unless struck by a serious economic decline in the near
future, Japan will go forward with missile shields against
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current and future threats, for moral considerations hold
that the government cannot leave the people vulnerable to
nuclear missile attack. Fourth, domestic constraints, such
as the Three Principles on Arms Export, may not hold back
JMD for long, and they may well be removed by political
decisions following development and deployment. As the
government has repeatedly stated, in theory, JMD is a purely
defensive weapon that should not threaten any other state.
Nonetheless, in practice, it is again a matter of perception,
and if other states, such as China, see JMD in combination
with offensive capabilities of Japan or the United States,
they may perceive a strong threat. Japan can restrict its
offensive capability, which might favorably affect Chinese
perceptions, and the US could also move toward offensive
nuclear disarmament and even MDE arms control involving
China, Russia and Europe, which could also greatly help
resolve "security dilemma" thinking. But, so far, the
Chinese and Russians have been highly skeptical toward the
intentions of the Japanese and Americans. Consequently, the
author finally emphasizes the remaining point, the
importance of the international political environment.
The United States under President George W. Bush has
vigorously promoted a unilateral and coercive security
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policy, including missile defense programs. And the Bush
administration's pursuit of missile shields has invited much
criticism due to its unilateral character. In fact, it seems
that the United States intends to pursue a narrow
interpretation of its national interest no matter what other
states would argue. US unilateralism became apparent in its
abandonment of the ABM Treaty, as well as its intention to
withdraw from international regimes such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Kyoto Protocol.
Such a "strategic" policy is contrary to the "arms control"
approach, which requires bilateral or multilateral
collaboration.
The Bush administration has often linked its call for
MD to its intention to reduce US offensive nuclear forces.
This may well lead to strategic stability on a global scale,
if the spirit of arms control and MDE drives it. However, it
has not at all convinced the other states concerned. So far,
statements by the US government appear only rhetorical
because they have been unilateral declarations. Unilateral
reduction can be easily turned to unilateral buildup, if the
United States deems it necessary, because there exists no
restraining mechanism to enforce, verify, or monitor the
disarmament effort. Also, the United States has been storing
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its nuclear warheads instead of destroying them. It would be
quite difficult for unilateral efforts by the United States
to be fully trusted by states other than its close allies.
The United States needs to shift its approach from missile
defense "strategy" to "arms control" and "MDE" in order to
maintain stable strategic relationships, especially with
suspicious nuclear powers like Russia and China. The
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001 made it necessary for the United
States to collaborate with these states and create a
coalition against terrorism. This could have changed the
future course of MD debates, but it did not. The United
States rushed to "wars against terrorism," often ignoring
prudent advice from the international community. The Bush
administration gained support for its war against the
Taliban regime of Afghanistan, but the war against Iraq in
2003 invited severe criticisms internationally. The United
States in fact defeated the Saddam Hussein's regime, but it
failed to prove connections with the al Qaeda terrorist
network or to find WMD in Iraq--the two most important
rationales for going to the war. Terrorist attacks against
US forces have not ceased, and the political and social
situations have been far from secure and stable for the
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people of Iraq.
Japan's decision to pursue JMD could represent a
substantial shift in defense and security policy. From a
viewpoint of "strategy," Japan may have shifted its
strategic focus from dependence on US deterrent forces to
its own active defense; and in an extreme sense, from
prevention of war to preparation for war. Japan may have
shifted from one kind of deterrence policy to the other. Or,
Japan may be pursuing both defense and deterrence at the
same time. A succession of JDA Directors has repeatedly
claimed that the planned MD would be "independently applied"
within the right of self-defense, emphasizing that it would
not be applied to defend any other state. However, JMD could
also be regarded as a unilateral military buildup from a
strategic point of view.
JDA officials have claimed that JMD is purely
defensive and poses no threat to neighboring countries, but
such a claim is a one-sided assertion and therefore
unilateral. It was reported that the Japanese government
began to explore the introduction from the United States of
Tomahawk Missiles with a range of 1,700 kilometers, which
were used for pinpoint attacks in Iraq War. The government
has explained that in the case of an enemy's obvious intent
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to carry out an imminent missile attack, it was within the
limits of self-defense to conduct preemptive attacks against
the enemy's missile bases at the a missile launch stage (Ozu
2002, 209). In July 2006, after provocative ballistic
missile tests by North Korea, leading politicians, including
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, explicitly argued for a
preemptive attack on North Korean missile sites. The view
that justifies preemptive attack for defensive purposes has
been official since the 1950s, but the introduction of longrange offensive missiles like the Tomahawk will clearly
exceed Japan's national pledge of "exclusively defenseoriented" policy, and other states may even regard it as a
nominal cover-up of Japanese militarism.
A strategic shift to include counterforce would end
any effort to affirm a purely defensive posture of the
Japanese security policy. A Japanese missile shield could be
regarded as offensive even though Japan does not possess
obviously offensive weapons, particularly if one considers
its connection with the offensive capability of the United
States. Japan's closest ally has the largest and most
sophisticated offensive forces in the world, including a
massive nuclear weapon stockpile. The combined force of US
offensive forces and Japan's missile defense systems could
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constitute a significant war-fighting capability and
destabilize strategic relationships in the region. For other
states, this capability would increase the prospect of a
preemptive and preventive attack, for after the United
States launches a massive first strike against an enemy in
the region, JMD could absorb the opponent's retaliatory
ballistic missile attacks, already depleted by the first
strike.
This strategy would not serve Japan's national
interest. It is clear that most of the criticisms toward
missile defense mentioned earlier are related to views
against "strategy" (Krieger 2002). An arms control
orientation and MDE should be the answer to these criticisms.
If Japan pursues JMD, its arms control orientation must be
shared with other states in the region, including China and
in a sense even North Korea, so that they would not perceive
a threat and that regional stability would be maintained.
The current international political environment is not in
favor of JMD. For the time being, it will be difficult for
Japan to achieve national security by deployment of a JMD
system.
The Japanese government should make clear that its
intention is MDE. It is not enough just to declare
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unilaterally that JMD is defensive; there are a number of
measures that Japan can actively take both bilaterally and
multilaterally. Japan should encourage other states to
believe in its defensive orientation through negotiation and
diplomacy. The Japanese government should begin to seek
discussions with China, Russia, Britain, France and the
United States about a shift from offense to MDE. It should
utilize communication channels such as confidence building
measures (CBMs), play an active role in peaceful conflict
resolution through international organizations such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the United Nations, and
promote international security regimes, including inviting
and bringing in the reluctant Americans.
In 2001 Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka showed her
interest in President Bush's willingness to reduce US
offensive nuclear forces while pursuing MD, and this can be
a good starting point for the discussion. She stated: "The
most important thing in President Bush's announcement is
that a major premise for US missile defense is further
reduction of [offensive] nuclear weapons" (Japanese Diet,
House of Representatives 2001). Unfortunately, Japan's
leaders have not adopted this point, and related discussions
have been blocked by the government's refusal to answer
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important questions. With the government advancing toward
development and deployment of JMD, it does not appear that
Japan has been considering JMD from arms control and MDE
perspectives. Japan is, in fact, in a strong position to
pursue MDE since it unmistakably has little offensive
capability. Japan possesses no WMD, ICBMs, long-range
strategic bombers, or offensive aircraft carriers. Japan has
the famous peace constitution, along with many other
peaceful constraints, which prohibit Japan from becoming a
military power. These constraints include the Three NonNuclear Principles, the long-standing pledge that Japan's
defense expenses in the annual budget will not exceed one
percent of GNP, the Three Principles on Arms Export,
exclusively defense-oriented policy, participation in a
number of international arms control regimes, and so forth.
Japan should use its position as leverage for offensive arms
reduction in the region, especially in negotiation with
China, the regional nuclear power that possesses ICBMs and
has reportedly been building up its offensive capability in
a dramatic fashion. In addition, Japan should encourage the
United States, whose reduction of offensive forces within a
multilateral framework would be a key element in helping
persuade China and also Russia to join the circle of arms
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control and take a step toward MDE. These actions would
substantially contribute to regional stability.
The current situation leads to the pessimistic view
that realization of MDE is hardly possible in the
foreseeable future, seeing that China has adopted policies
based on strictly "strategic" thinking (Johnston 1996).
China has calmly observed, and in a way made use of, the
unilateral behavior of the Bush administration, which has
accelerated its realist strategic security policy on a
global scale. Nevertheless, within realist dominated world
politics, the United States seems to understand that the
regional situation in East Asia is unlike other regions.
Identifying North Korea as one of the "rogue" states, the
Bush administration has adopted a more cautious and
multilateral approach to the Kim Jong Il regime than to
others, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
On balance, Japan has taken cautious steps toward
both JMD and US MD. While Japan shifted gears toward
development and deployment of JMD recently, the government
has not accepted the US unilateral MD initiatives entirely,
although it has repeated its "understanding" of the US push
for national missile shields. Still, seeing that its
alliance partner has been quite ardent to develop and deploy
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its missile defense system, Japan's "wait-and-see approach"
(Urayama 2001) will not allow Japan to escape from the
fundamental question for long. Japan should show its
willingness to pursue MDE, making its position clear and
starting dialogue with the states concerned. This will be a
most difficult task, since all the actors must eventually
understand and agree on the concept in order to realize MDE.
It would be a historic moment in the nuclear age. The shift
from MAD to MDE would require a drastic change in existing
strategic thinking, not only because the emphasis would be
on defense instead of offense, but also because pursuing MDE
in the Asia-Pacific region could even mean joint development
of missile defense shields by all the major states in the
region: the United States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and
China (but not Taiwan for the time being, due to the issue
of the Chinese sovereignty). Above all, MDE will be the
inevitable choice if we wish to escape from the MAD world
and promote arms control while the new threat of ballistic
missiles and WMD is emerging.
If the Japanese government is not willing to make
efforts to achieve MDE, it should stop pursuing missile
defense. Unilateral, or even collateral with the United
States, development and deployment of a missile defense
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system will only invite regional instability and possibly a
spiral of offensive and defensive arms race. A unilateral
JMD system will provoke antagonism in North Korea, and
possible acceleration of its nuclear weapon and missile
programs. Skepticism will also grow in South Korea, which
may lead to a somehow corresponding counteraction with the
North to confront Japan. China will regard it as a revival
of Japanese militarism and overtly criticize Japan,
justifying its own military buildup. This scenario
contradicts the national interests of both Japan and the
United States. JMD must be part of the path toward a more
stabilized and peaceful international society (Cronin et al.
182). "Indeed, the era of passive Japanese foreign policy
has come to an end. Japan is now expected to play a
substantial, if not leadership role, in helping to create
post-Cold War international order and institutions"
(Fukushima 1999, 169).
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Chapter V
CONCLUSION

This study has explored and analyzed the Japanese
missile defense program, and explained the development of
strategic thinking on ballistic missile threats in Japan's
defense and security policy. Nevertheless, it is still
unclear if the intention of the Japanese government is to
shift its security policy from passive "deterrence" to
positive "defense" in a war-fighting strategy, or from MAD
"deterrence by punishment" to MDE "deterrence by denial" in
the context of arms control. It is also questionable if the
embrace of JMD has resulted from thorough review and
articulation of national security strategy by Japanese
defense policymakers. The author concludes that Japan's
"defensive realism" and MDE approach would be a good
compromise between the Japanese realist and pacifist
identities.
Against the background of suspected nuclear weapons
development and possible reckless use by North Korea, the
possibility that Japan might go nuclear has been the subject
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of considerable conjecture, both domestically and
internationally. In October 1999, an undersecretary of the
Japanese Defense Agency argued for nuclear armament as soon
as he took office, and he was immediately replaced. In June
2002 a senior government official remarked that the Three
Non-Nuclear Principles should be revised. After North Korea
launched seven ballistic missiles in July 2006, US Senator
Sam Nunn, an expert on nuclear issues, revealed in an
interview on Cable News Network (CNN) that Japanese
officials had told him that Japan would have to develop
nuclear weapons if the United States did not step up to
protect them.
A process that could not be imagined in the past is
under way. More clearly, the Japanese are breaking taboos
and weakening the brakes on militarization. Neighboring
states have repeatedly warned against Japan's ambitious
nuclear policy (Kim 1996). Nonetheless, the prediction by
some realist scholars that Japan would move toward nuclear
armament has so far been proven wrong. There is no doubt
about Japan's capability to develop nuclear weapons, but
there is still no sign of actual nuclear armament. In spite
of serious causes for concern, such as its plutonium
stockpile, Japan has confounded what realist theory
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predicted. As for the military capabilities of Japan,
despite its having the world's second largest defense budget,
and cutting-edge equipment and technologies, Japan's threat
to South Korea cannot be compared with the threat posed by
North Korea, whose 2000 defense budget was only three
percent of Japan's. Even with the ability to develop nuclear
weapons, few Japanese look upon nuclear armament as a
desirable symbol of international status. The majority still
considers nuclear weapons and a strong military force not as
sources of wealth and power but as potential sources of
enormous danger through the tragic calamity of war.
Japanese postwar defense and security policy has been
a product of struggles between the pacifist and realist
national identities. Identity is an ideational factor and it
cannot by itself thoroughly explain defense and security
policy or diplomatic policy. Identity is sometimes overcome
by the structural power of international politics and
sometimes works itself as a powerful driving force in
policymaking. This ideational factor is built and rebuilt,
intertwining with other ideational factors and with
structural, material ones. The national identity is closely
linked to changes in international situations. Compared with
the fact that individual perceptions of threat are affected
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largely by conflicts or regime changes in neighboring
countries, the national identity as a whole--that is, "who
and what we the Japanese are" and "what we should do as
Japanese"--seems to change to a far lesser degree. At the
same time, it is very hard to pull back a mega trend once
the national identity shifts in a particular direction, just
like movements deep in the earth's crust. Facing the
upheavals of post-World War II international politics and
confronting a series of threats, the Japanese public's view
of national security and security policy have gradually
changed.
In Japan, people rarely reach an agreement through
debate, and views swing only slightly within a limited range
until the situation changes drastically through some major
event. Looking back on the postwar era, Japanese domestic
political currents have shown a distinctive development
though internal dynamics, at the same time largely defined
by international circumstances. Political leaders--cabinet
members, party leaders, and bureaucrats--shifted in the
early stage of the postwar era towards realist policies
because of the escalation of the Cold War. However, the
general public, including individual citizens, peace
organizations and journalists, became attached to pacifist
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ideals. Thus, the government has prioritized realist
policies in the name of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty,
while the people have resisted this. For most people, the
military buildup and repeated constitutional reinterpretations by the government are seen as a gradual
movement toward rearmament. In spite of the domination of
the realist LDP in the Diet after World War II, political
leaders have not been able to ignore the opposing voice of
the pacifist public.
Nevertheless, the pacifist identity has not
outstripped the realist identity. After the war, Japan
started over under the world's preeminent pacifist
constitution, but there has been no country to follow its
footsteps, and the international political environment has
not led to promotion of its ideals. International efforts
towards nuclear disarmament and arms control have not made
much progress, and the United Nations has been the stage of
realist confrontation between great powers. Global-scale
anti-war and anti-nuclear movements have gradually fallen
apart. Looking back upon the time right after the war, the
confrontation between pacifism and realism in Japanese
security policy was centered on issues such as the existence
of the right of self-defense and the choice of unarmed
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neutralism, and nobody imagined that Japan would send its
troops abroad in the future. In contrast, today's debate
features discussion on contributing internationally,
including military options, and this way of using the Self
Defense Forces is already recognized by the public. That is
to say, the counterview has shifted from pacifism towards
realism in the last 60 years. Lately, even preemptive
attacks and nuclear armament are publicly argued for. It can
be said that the Japanese political current has departed
from the pacifist identity and listed heavily to the realist
identity. In other words, "Japan's transition from a normsbased to interest-based defense strategy" (Kliman 2006, 88),
bringing "growing realism, frayed idealism" (Green 2001, 6).
Hereafter, the national identity of Japan may gradually
change like a landscape exposed to the wind and rain of the
international security environment, or it may radically
change, shaken by the shifts in the crust or giant
earthquakes of wars in the neighborhood. As realist scholars
have indicated, Japan may someday become a military
superpower and, even, eventually a nuclear power.
The warning to the United States from a former
Australian Ambassador to the UN, Richard Butler, holds true
for JMD:
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Research on defense against ballistic missiles could
continue ... But a unilateral decision to deploy such
a system should not be made unless it becomes clear
that others will not join the United States in
dealing directly with the threat of nuclear weapons.
If the United States does find a reliable way to
defeat the threat of ballistic missiles, it should
examine the question of how this technology could
best serve global safety and stability - by solely
national deployment or by deployment shared with
others (Butler 2001, 16)
JMD can be a tool of either realist military strategy
or pacifist arms control. The author concludes that Japan
should choose defensive realism and MDE arms control as a
middle way, which may eventually open a pacifist route to
disarmament. Japan possesses the world's most sophisticated
technology and a tradition of pacifist identity, and because
of this, Japan is in a unique and advantageous position. The
"wars against terrorism" of the Bush Administration have
painted the globe black and white, where rogue states and
international terrorists are challenging democracy and
freedom. Thus far, few states have completely rejected the
United States' claims, no matter how skeptical and reluctant.
There is a great opportunity to promote arms control and
MDE: building missile shields against rogue and terrorist
missile attacks or accidental or unauthorized launches,
while advancing offensive arms reduction among major states.
Japan can and must become a leader in such a shift toward a
214

less dangerous world.
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ABSTRACT
For some years, Japan has pursued its own missile
defense system in cooperation with the United States. The
Japanese government claims that the missile defense (JMD)
program is purely defensive and will not pose a threat to
other countries. JMD may seem justified by North Korea's
development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
However, neighboring states regarded it as a sign of
military ambition and revival of Japan's prewar militarism.
The development and deployment of JMD could have grave
implications for regional and global security. This
dissertation focuses on these implications, domestic and
international political considerations and the future
direction of Japan's defense and security policy.
After the Cold War, when the superpowers maintained
strategic stability with massive offensive nuclear arsenals
(mutual assured destruction—MAD), new threats from rogue

states and terrorists have forced us to rethink the
credibility of MAD. But attempts to build shields against
nuclear ballistic missiles could trigger a new phase of the
arms race pitting offensive vs. defensive capabilities. The
author argues that defense must be emphasized in order to
achieve stability and security (mutual defense emphasis—MDE).
Characterization of JMD as truly defensive or not depends on
theoretical and strategic viewpoints. The key is the
distinction between defense and offense, and whether Japan
will emphasize defense, and convince other states that its
strategic intentions are really defensive.
For the Japanese, with their dual realist and
pacifist identities, JMD can be a tool of either realist
military strategy or pacifist arms control. Japan should
choose defensive realism, including MDE arms control, as a
middle way that may eventually open a pacifist route to
disarmament. With the world's most sophisticated technology
and a tradition of pacifism, Japan is in a unique and
advantageous position to promote arms control.
In pursuit of JMD, the Japanese government should not
only promote arms control and MDE—building missile shields
against rogue and terrorist missile attacks or accidental or
unauthorized launches, but also advance offensive arms

reduction among major states. Japan can and must become a
leader in such a shift toward a less dangerous world.

